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Abstract 
 
The high volume and minimal screening of sea-land cargo containers 
presents a vulnerability in which explosive devices may be smuggled across 
national borders. Fast neutrons are a strong candidate for use in container 
screening due to their high target penetration and ability to discriminate between 
materials of low atomic mass, such as explosives and non-metallic container 
contents. An algorithm has been developed that uses flags, calculated from 
specific measurements of the reflected neutrons and photons produced during 
active neutron interrogation, to discern explosives hidden in cargo containers. 
Steps in algorithm development included Monte Carlo simulations for scatter 
characterization, identification of flags in idealized scenarios, refinement of flags 
in realistic scenarios, combining the flags into a detection algorithm, and 
evaluation of the algorithm and associated detection system. Simulations 
compared favorably with small-scale neutron scatter measurements using the 
explosives-surrogate, melamine. The detection algorithm included corrections for 
different types of cargo contents and cargo inhomogeneity, surrounding 
environment, and realistic neutron sources and radiation detectors. The 
proposed algorithm has two variations, one of which can be easily implemented 
with today’s technology. The proposed scanning system utilizes a shielded 14.1 
MeV neutron generator, eleven large liquid scintillators neutron detectors, and 
several inorganic scintillators for photon spectroscopy. This system should cost 
less than $1M to install and dose estimates fall well within acceptable levels for 
both operators and smuggled persons. Algorithm performance has been 
quantified with various explosive sizes and positions, as well as heterogeneous 
cargo configurations, with typical minimum detectable amounts not exceeding 
200 kg. 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The detection of hidden explosives has been an area of intense study for 
several decades. A solution has become more urgent with the increase of 
terrorism and other violence perpetrated independent of any national 
government. One particular vulnerability is the enormous volume of sealed 
shipping container traffic entering the country at busy seaports. The vast majority 
of these containers pass by unsearched, providing an easy route for the passage 
of conventional explosives. Most of the current methods of contraband scanning 
depend on X-ray images of cargo and the use of explosive-sniffing dogs. 
However, dogs have several crucial limitations and X-ray scanning is unable to 
clearly distinguish the presence of most explosive materials due to their lack of 
high atomic massed components. Furthermore, the large size of cargo containers 
makes X-ray scanning very difficult. One solution to this problem is to use fast 
neutron interrogation, as the neutrons react strongly with low-Z elements and are 
highly penetrating, especially of metallic objects. Possible strategies in fast 
neutron interrogation include thermal neutron activation (TNA) measurements, 
detection of the photons produced in neutron inelastic scatter, and 
measurements of the scattered neutrons.  
The method proposed here is unique in that it combines the information 
provided by both the scattered neutrons and scatter-produced characteristic 
photons at all scatter angles through specific calculations that provide a yes/no 
decision point about the presence of explosives. These specific calculations, or 
flags, are formed from features such as the ratios of photon peaks, ratios of 
elastic or inelastic neutron scatter peaks at specific scatter angles, or the total 
number of neutrons that undergo backscatter when interrogating an unknown 
target. Other flags are calculated from more general measurements, such as the 
ratio of neutron counts at two angles, the number of certain characteristic 
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photons normalized by neutron count ratios, or the number of high- or low-energy 
neutrons measured at specific angles. Still other flags are formed directly from 
the neutron detector pulse height distributions. These flags have then been 
combined to take into account the type of cargo, different explosive materials, 
and correcting for inhomogeneities in the cargo container.  
Throughout this document the flags are described using the terms “flag 
strength” and “flag value". As mentioned above, a flag is a specific calculation 
made from the neutron or photon tallies in a given simulation. Flag value (f) 
refers to the actual numerical value of the flag under these particular conditions. 
The mathematical definition of flag value will change according to the particular 
flag, but the general form is: 
 
f = n(E1,A1)n(E2,A2)
    or     f = p(E1)p(E2) ,  (1.1) 
in which n(E,A) is the neutron tally at a particular energy or energy range and 
angle and p(E) is the photon tally at a particular energy or energy range. Some 
neutron-based flags may use the same energy for E1 and E2. Flag strength (S) is 
a quantity that was used when determining which flags should be used to find 
explosives. This quantity is defined as:  
  
 
S = fe ! f if i ,     (1.2) 
in which the flag strength (S) is a function of the flag value with only inert cargo, 
(fi) and the flag value with an explosive present (fe). The flag strength may be 
thought of as the absolute value of the percent difference between cases with 
and without explosive. Flags with the greatest flag strength are the most sensitive 
to the presence of explosive and are potentially the best flags to use in a 
detection algorithm. Uncertainties in flag value and flag strength are determined 
by propagating the statistical error provided in the simulation output through the 
flag value and flag strength calculations.  
This dissertation describes the process of algorithm development and how 
it fits into the wider scheme of explosives detection, including a review of current 
detection technologies. Early chapters involve the characterization of fast neutron 
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scatter in single-element targets as well as compounds such as the explosive 
RDX (C3H6N6O6), air, water, vegetable oil, and steel. Laboratory measurements 
using a D-D neutron generator and small scatter targets in a small-scale 
screening scenario confirmed the results of simulations. Later simulations 
combined explosive and inert cargo in idealized conditions to find the best places 
in the neutron and photon spectra to find potential flags. These flags were then 
tested under more realistic conditions, including a shielded neutron generator, 
surrounding environment, different types of cargo, and a realistic distribution of 
cargo within a container.  
Finally, the flags were combined into a detection algorithm that took into 
account several variables in typical screening scenarios, such as cargo type and 
cargo inhomogeneities. This detection algorithm has been integrated into a 
preliminary screening system design containing a shielded D-T neutron 
generator, seven liquid scintillation neutron detectors, and at least one 
scintillator-based detector for photons. This system would measure the neutrons 
and photons produced at during neutron interrogation at several points along the 
length of the container, calculate flag values at each of these points, and use the 
flag-based algorithm to determine if explosives are present. 
 4 
Chapter 2: The Detection of Explosive Materials: Review 
of Considerations and Methods 
 
Abstract 
With increasing terrorist threats of different types, explosives detection for 
various types and forms of explosives is of growing interest. This paper reviews 
the broad array of possible methods of explosives detection, both using nuclear 
and non-nuclear based instruments, with their advantages and disadvantages for 
different scenarios. An explanation of the fundamental physics for each approach 
is accompanied by its general applicability and citations to the relevant scientific 
literature. 
Introduction 
The issue of explosives detection, although hardly new, has become 
increasingly pertinent with the rise in successful terrorist attacks in recent years 
and subsequent tightening of security. The problem is complicated by the fact 
that hidden explosives may come in many chemical forms and configurations and 
threaten security under vastly differing circumstances. Detection scenarios may 
range from buried landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed 
along roadways to small bombs hidden in the mail or under clothing to large 
vehicle-mounted devices capable of destroying large structures. Especially 
sensitive is the security needed at airports due to the vulnerabilities of in-air 
aircraft to explosive damage and terrorism. Also of concern are explosives 
smuggled across national borders in sea-land shipping containers. All of these 
scenarios differ considerably in the potential size of the explosive device, but all 
require screening methods of high specificity, with a negligible number of missed 
positives and a low false positive rate. Also necessary in the vast majority of 
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screening scenarios are short examination times, as these scenarios require 
large throughputs. Many different strategies of explosives detection have been 
studied, with varying results. These methods exploit several different 
characteristics of explosive materials, including geometry, auxiliary components, 
smell, density, and chemical composition. 
This review paper outlines some of the characteristics of explosives that 
either facilitate or detract from their detection and summarizes most of the vast 
array of detection methodologies in use today. These methodologies may be 
based on the trace detection of small amounts of explosive material, or the 
detection of larger amounts of bulk explosives. Included are methodologies 
ranging from chemical trace technologies, biological systems, and interrogation 
by both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Advantages and disadvantages of all 
included methods are discussed.  
Characteristics of Common Explosive Materials and Devices 
One of the traditional methods of explosive weapons detection relies on 
the presence of metallic components such as casings or detonator components. 
Trained operators can use metal detectors or traditional X-ray machines to scan 
for suspicious material. However, many explosive devices contain little or no 
metal and are therefore difficult to discern from surrounding material in that 
fashion. In such cases it is necessary to detect the explosives material itself. 
Many explosive materials have a density between that of most innocuous 
material and metallic objects. This means that explosive devices would be 
discernable on a typical X-ray, if the shape of the explosive material was such as 
to arouse suspicion. However, there is no typical shape for explosive devices, as 
evidenced by recent attempts to smuggle explosives in shoes or under clothing, 
and without a priori knowledge it would be very difficult to distinguish most 
explosive materials using only the density knowledge provided by a traditional 
X-ray machine. Another characteristic of most explosive materials is that these 
compounds tend to be quite “sticky,” in that residue tends to cling to hands, 
clothing, and other surfaces that come in contact with the explosive [1]. Several 
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explosives-detection techniques exploit this fact through the use chemical trace 
analysis of air sampling or physical swabbing of potential carriers of explosives 
residue. 
The most successful explosives detection methods all rely on the chemical 
composition of the energetic materials themselves. This may include the 
response in the olfactory organs of canines or rats, the ion mobility present in 
explosive vapors, or the characteristic ratios of the elements hydrogen, carbon, 
oxygen, and nitrogen. These ratios have proven especially useful, as most 
explosive materials have relatively high nitrogen and oxygen densities as well as 
correspondingly low amounts of carbon or hydrogen [1,2]. It is this high 
concentration of nitrogen that has pushed the development of several methods 
enlisting nuclear science. 
Other explosive materials, such as gasoline, black powder, or 
peroxide-based liquid explosives, do not contain any nitrogen, and will therefore 
slip past a vast majority of the nuclear-based detection methods. It is therefore 
often necessary to use several complementary methods in many security-
screening scenarios. These methods can be divided into those that detect trace 
amounts of explosive residue and those that detect the entire explosive device, 
known as a bulk explosive detection method. 
Overview of Non-Nuclear Explosives Detection Methods 
Chemical trace-based explosives detection methods 
Ion mobility spectrometry 
Many of the explosives-detection techniques rely on the detection of trace 
amounts of nitro-organic explosive materials that cling to surfaces such as 
clothing, skin, or luggage. One of the most common applications of this principle 
is found in ion mobility spectrometry (IMS). The ions needed for IMS may be 
collected through both physical swiping of the sample or through the use of air 
“puffers” and vacuum collection that gather trace residue from the clothing and 
skin of people passing through a checkpoint. The IMS method exploits the 
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proclivity of explosive materials to form stable, negative ions at atmospheric 
pressure. These ion are passed through a weak magnetic field and are then 
characterized by their movement in the field, which will depend on the ions 
molecular mass as well as the magnitude of the negative charge.3 
Gas chromatography  
One way to improve the efficiency of many trace detection techniques is to 
maximize the number of negative ions, generally nitro (NO2) or nitrate (NO3) 
groups, collected from the explosives residue. One way of accomplishing this is 
through gas chromatography (GC), a process that separates a mixture of 
different substances by type. In GC, a vapor sample is passed through a 
chromatographic column, a hollow tube packed with beads covered by a 
substance that reacts at a different rate with different substances, causing the 
different molecules to exit at different times. This process isolates the negative 
ions present in explosive residue, which may then be detected using methods 
such as electron capture, mass spectroscopy, flame ionization, 
chemiluminescence, or surface acoustic wave methods [1,3]. 
Electron capture detection 
 In electron capture, a method usually applied to detection of explosives in 
soil, an electron capture detector (ECD) uses a beta source, usually 63Ni, whose 
particles collide with detector gas to produce a reference current at the detector 
anode [4]. This steady stream of low-energy electrons provides a reference 
current. When negative ions from the GC, such as those produced by explosives, 
reach the detector active volume they are swept out in a voltage pulse, which 
maintains a constant current. The frequency of these pulses is proportional to the 
concentration of negative ions [4]. 
Mass spectroscopy 
 In mass spectroscopy (MS), the relative amounts of a sample’s 
component elements are determined by passing ions through a magnetic field 
and measuring atomic mass by the amount of displacement. MS is highly specific 
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and shows promise in trace explosives detection, though is rarely used due to 
high cost, complexity and the necessity of maintaining a high vacuum. 
Furthermore, detection limits are highly dependent on the chemical structure of 
the explosive [1,5]. Recent advancements in faster gas chromatography and 
lower detection limits of mass spectroscopy have improved measurement times 
and reduced the need for pre-concentration [6]. 
Flame ionization 
 A flame ionization detector uses a hydrogen-air flame that ionized carbon 
in the sample, which is then detected through current induced in the nearby 
collector place [7]. This method is not widely used in explosives detection, as it is 
sensitive to carbon, but not nitrogen.  
Chemiluminescence 
Chemiluminescence is based on the characteristic emission of radiation, 
by a substance when in an excited electronic state, as triggered by an 
exothermic chemical reaction [1,8]. This principle has been applied to explosives 
detection by creating nitric oxide (NO) from the explosive molecules, which then 
react with ozone (O3) in the detector to form excited nitrogen dioxide (NO2*) 
molecules. The excited NO2* molecules then fall back to ground state, releasing 
infrared radiation with a frequency between 0.6-2.8 µm [1]. 
Surface acoustic wave  
Surface acoustic wave (SAW) detectors are based on the principle that 
when materials of different masses condense on the surface of a piezoelectric 
crystal, the resonant frequency with respect to acoustic waves of the crystal will 
change [1]. For explosives detection, the several piezoelectric crystals are coated 
with film that preferentially absorbs molecules from different types of explosive 
compounds. When an explosive is present the increased condensation will 
change the resonant frequency of at least one of the crystals, creating a 
response pattern that is easily recognizable. Many SAW systems rely on 
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equipment that pre-concentrates the explosive material, such as a GC system, 
though it is not always required [1,9]. 
Antibody 
Another vapor-detection technique is based on the use of highly specific 
antibodies. This system works by coupling the antibodies to a fluorescent-labeled 
explosive analog. When an explosives molecule is present in the sample 
airstream, it will displace the labeled analog, which is easily detectable 
downstream [10]. This method is fairly inexpensive and fast, as well as easily 
automated, but antibodies for every possible explosive material compound 
variant are needed. 
Human and biological-based methods 
Animal 
 Trained dogs with experienced handlers are commonly used for 
explosives detection. Advantages of canine screening include reliable and 
efficient operation in a wide range of situations, including airports and border 
crossings [11]. Disadvantages include the extensive training and “calibration” 
time, as well as the limitations associated with use of animals, such as rest, 
feeding, and medical care. More recently, researchers have explored the use of 
other animals, such as trained rats [12] or conditioned honeybees [13]. 
Manual inspection 
 In scenarios for which canine screening is impractical, or in order to 
confirm a positive identification, a trained professional often performs a manual 
inspection of the possible explosive. One example of this is the established 
method of humanitarian landmines using a combination of metal detectors and 
probing rods in the hands of experienced personnel [14,15]. Although well 
established, such methods are time consuming and pose a considerable risk to 
personnel.  
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Non-ionizing radiation based methods  
Electromagnetic Induction  
Many explosives-detection techniques are based on electromagnetic 
induction metal detection [10]. Metal detectors based on electromagnetic 
induction function through use of a pulsing electromagnetic field that stimulates 
creation of an electromagnetic field in any nearby conducting objects. This 
induced magnetic field may then be detected either in the transmitter coil, or in a 
separate receiver coil, where the changing magnetic field induces a measurable 
current in the receiver. The obvious disadvantage to using metal detectors is that 
the lack of significantly large metal components in many explosive devices 
makes them difficult to discern using only electromagnetic induction techniques. 
However, they may be used in conjunction with a bulk detection method, 
increasing the detection efficiency of the bulk detection method [16]. 
Radar interrogation 
Radar interrogation is useful in determining the presence, proximity, and 
size of objects within interrogation range through the reflection of radio waves off 
solid objects. When the high-energy radio waves are focused under the ground, 
and reflection from the surface filtered out, the presence of underground objects 
may be discerned by examination of the reflected radio waves due to the 
different material densities and changing interaction with radar waves at the 
object boundary. This forms the basis for one of the most promising methods for 
detecting buried explosives, ground-penetrating radar, when used with 
complementary technology, such as neutron backscatter or other bulk detection 
method [17,18]. 
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
Nuclear magnetic resonance analysis techniques are based on the 
principle that the nuclei of isotopes containing an odd number of nucleons have a 
half-integer total spin, and will therefore align themselves along the magnetic 
field lines when subjected to an external magnetic field. Magnetic resonance is 
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determined by perturbation of the aligned nuclei by a specific radiofrequency 
pulse, related to the difference between ground and excited state, and measuring 
the rate of return to alignment. The resonance frequency of this magnetic 
moment depends on the strength of the external magnetic field and the hydrogen 
content of the substances involved. Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) 
techniques, especially those that concentrate on hydrogen content have been 
investigated for explosives detection [19]. However, as samples must pass 
through the powerful magnetic coils of the aligning magnetic field and any 
metallic shielding completely obscures the target, commercial application of this 
technology has proven difficult [1]. 
Nuclear quadrupole resonance 
Like NMR, nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) is another technique that 
relies on the resonance of target nuclei alignment with incident radiofrequency 
radiation. However, unlike NMR, NQR does not require a strong external 
magnetic field to measure nuclei with spin !1, such as 14N, 35Cl, or 63Cu.  These 
nuclei have a distinct quadrupole moment and show a distinct precession in the 
internal electric field of crystalline solids containing the elements. The rate of 
precession depends on the type of material. NQR interrogation equipment 
contains a radiofrequency (RF) power source, a coil to produce the excitation RF 
pulse and a receiver coil, along with other support components. When a 
radiofrequency pulse of the same frequency as characteristic precession 
interrogates a target material, the changing angle of the nuclei will induce an 
electric potential in the receiver coil. As this method is very specific, prior 
knowledge of the type of explosive, as may be the case in landmine detection, is 
helpful [20]. NQR has the advantage of being specifically sensitive to the material 
of choice, but is unable to sense liquid explosives and can easily be completely 
obscured by metallic shielding. Furthermore, NQR is sensitive to RF interference, 
especially when scanning for the common explosive TNT, as the resonant 
frequency of TNT falls within the amplitude modulated (AM) radio frequencies 
[20]. 
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Terahertz imaging and spectroscopy 
Terahertz (THz) radiation, also known as sub-millimeter radiation or 
T-rays, refers to the range of the electromagnetic spectrum between high-energy 
microwaves and the far infra-red wavelengths. As such, they easily penetrate 
materials such as clothing and paper, while are absorbed by metal, water, and 
other dense media. The THz radiation used in explosives-screening scenarios is 
generally produced by illuminating a voltage-biased ultrafast semiconductor, 
such as GaAs, with an ultrashort pulsed near-infrared laser, such as 
titanium-sapphire (Ti:Al2O3). The movement of the charge carriers in the 
semiconductor produces THz radiation, which is then emitted from an integrated 
antenna. THz radiation is detected using a similar semiconductor-laser 
combination, as the THz radiation will induce a measurable current in the 
unbiased semiconductor with amplitude proportional to THz energy [21]. 
Advantages of using terahertz interrogation include a higher penetrability 
than other non-ionizing radiation, the unique spectral response of certain 
materials to electromagnetic waves in the THz range, and the fact that, as it is 
non-ionizing, will not provide a radiation dose [21,22]. Furthermore, THz radiation 
may be used to both image target structure and provide spectral fingerprints 
unique to the material of interest. The unique spectral fingerprints come from the 
resonant absorption of THz radiation when the energy of the incoming radiation 
matched that of the rotational motions of dipoles in the material or the vibrations 
of atoms within the molecular lattice. However, metallic objects are opaque to 
terahertz radiation, and therefore metallic shielding may prevent a thorough 
investigation. Additionally, although crystalline high explosives have 
characteristic signatures, homemade or improvised devices do not. THz imaging 
and spectroscopy is also limited by current technology related to stand-off 
distance [21]. 
Millimeter wave interrogation 
Recent deployment of full-body scanners based on millimeter wave 
technology at several airports has brought this technology into intense public 
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scrutiny. Millimeter waves, which lie right below terahertz radiation and in the 
upper frequencies of the microwave range in the 30-300 GHz range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, are able to penetrate through most clothing, but will 
reflect off tissue or concealed objects to produce images with resolutions of 1-10 
mm [23]. Like other microwave devices, millimeter waves may be produced 
through use of vacuum tube devices, such as magnetrons, or solid-state devices, 
and are then directed and focused with an antenna. In the systems currently 
deployed in several airports, the millimeter waves are transmitted over a person’s 
body by two rapidly rotating antennas [24,25]. The reflected millimeter waves are 
detected in much the same was as other microwaves, with broadband detectors 
and antenna-coupled bolometers.  
Recent applications seek to create three-dimensional holographic images 
through use of two simultaneously-emitting transmitting antennas as they circle 
the target body. Advantages of this method include excellent spatial resolution 
and the lack of radiation dose due to the use of non-ionizing radiation. Currently, 
the most prominent deterrence to widespread deployment of millimeter wave 
imaging technology are the privacy concerns associated with human scanning 
[24]. The controversy associated with privacy concerns stems from the 
high-resolution holographic images formed by the distinct reflection of millimeter 
waves reflecting off tissue. Millimeter wave holography produces recognizable 
images of individuals and therefore presents significant privacy concerns, 
especially in the imaging of minors. Current protocols in airports call for the 
blurring of facial features and anonymity of image screening by personnel. Other 
safeguards include the fact that the images, seen on a monitor in another room, 
are never stored, transmitted, or printed and are deleted immediately after 
viewing [25]. 
 14 
Nuclear-Based Methods for Explosives Detection 
Ionizing photon interrogation 
Photon transmission 
X-ray transmission imaging has been in use for many years at screening 
checkpoints, but is mainly concerned with finding the metallic objects associated 
with explosive device and not the explosive material itself, as the relatively low-Z 
components of explosives show very low contrast on transmission X-ray images 
[1]. Photon transmission techniques are limited to the scanning of luggage and 
other inanimate cargo due to the potentially high radiation doses. Isolation of the 
signals of low-Z materials, such as explosives, is improved with the use of two 
different energies of X-rays. By contrasting the X-ray attenuation at two specific 
different energies it is possible to isolate materials with a certain equivalent Z as 
explosives [2]. The most sophisticated method relying solely on transmitted 
X-rays is computed tomography (CT) [26]. CT, which is widely used in the 
medical fields and could prove useful in explosives detection, would still only 
provide information on localized electron density and may therefore alarm with 
inert materials of a similar electron density to that of explosives, such as many 
plastics [2]. It has been shown that dual energy CT is better able to discern 
explosives than single energy CT, though difficulties still remain [27]. Similarly, 
gamma-rays may be used to create transmission images, though these 
techniques have the same problems telling the difference between low-Z 
materials [1]. 
Photon scattering 
Backscatter X-ray techniques are generally better at discerning low-Z 
materials than transmission X-ray methods are, as the larger relatively higher 
Compton scatter component of photon interactions in low-Z materials means that 
more photons are scattered than transmitted [1,28]. Direct backscatter imaging, 
while very simple to implement using an X-ray source and imaging plate, also 
suffers from difficulty in differentiating between explosives and other low-Z 
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materials due to their very similar electron density. Several other X-ray scatter 
techniques have been studied including X-ray diffraction, which provides 
information on target crystalline structure [29], and coded aperture methods, 
especially useful in landmine detection [30]. 
One way of improving photon scatter methods is to employ the use of 
coded aperture masks when creating an image of the target using scattered 
photons. The masks, containing a known configuration of transparent and 
opaque pixels, can focus incoming photons in much the same way as a pinhole 
camera. The large number of transparent pixels works to drastically increase the 
number of photons collected, but create a pattern of overlapping images that 
must be deconstructed using computer algorithms. This is an effective way of 
improving backscatter photon images [31,32]. Another way to improve 
backscatter photon images is through use of a Compton camera, which uses a 
combination of photon scatter in one detector plane and absorption in another 
detector plane to localize the scatter event in the target [27,30]. Several systems 
have been deployed in airports that are used to screen passengers through the 
use of backscatter X-ray imaging. As in the case of millimeter wave imaging, 
several privacy issues have been raised [25]. 
Gamma-ray resonant absorption  
The photon-based techniques discussed thus far have depended on 
changes in target electron density, and therefore atomic number, in finding 
hidden explosives. Another way of finding explosives is to exploit particular 
nuclear reactions unique to nitrogen instead of relying solely on relative electron 
density. As these methods do not have as good an imaging capability as some of 
the techniques discussed above, the two methods are often combined.  
One such method used the highly probable, 2 b cross section, nuclear 
resonance absorption of 14N of 9.17 MeV gamma rays [33,34]. In this technique, 
monoenergetic gamma rays are transmitted through the target and a high level of 
attenuation indicates the presence of large amounts of nitrogen. Although this 
method is well understood theoretically, difficulties arise in the production of 
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monoenergetic 9.17 MeV gamma rays [28]. Another possible reaction of choice 
is the positron emission of 13N via the 14N(!,n)13N reaction that occurs with a 
when a gamma ray of energy at least 10.6 MeV is used to interrogate the target 
and the resulting coincident 511 keV photons are detected [35]. The main 
disadvantage of this method is the low interaction probability, 1 mb, of the 
14N(!,n)13N reaction, which is more than twenty times smaller than the analogous 
reaction in copper, a common component in electronics, and therefore easily 
interferes with explosives detection [28]. 
Nuclear resonance fluorescence 
The method of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF), in which an 
incident gamma ray excites target nuclei to an energetic state, from which they 
emit characteristic gamma rays as they fall back to ground state. Strengths of 
NRF include its ability to quantify the presence of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, 
and will not activate cargo, though it is blind to hydrogen concentration. Other 
difficulties include the production of high-energy monoenergetic gamma rays of 
the specific energies needed [28]. 
Neutron interrogation methods  
Due to their highly penetrating nature, and the fact that they interact 
directly with target nuclei, active neutron interrogation has been widely studied as 
an explosives detection technique. Various strategies have employed either fast 
[36] or thermal neutrons [28,37]. The interrogating neutrons may be 
monoenergetic or widely varying in energy. Fast neutron interrogation may be 
based on one of three different neutron interactions with target materials: fast 
neutron absorption, neutron inelastic scatter (NIS), and neutron elastic scatter 
(NES). Other technologies, such as associated particle imaging (API) and 
fast-pulsed neutron generators discussed below have become increasingly 
relevant as the technology associated with neutron generators and the detection 
of the associated particles as improved in the past few years. 
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Thermal neutron activation  
Some of the best and longest-studied explosives detection strategies are 
based on thermal neutron activation (TNA) [37]. Most of these techniques involve 
incident fast neutrons that thermalize inside the target, are absorbed through 
(n,!) reactions, and emit characteristic gamma rays, as the use of incident fast 
neutrons improves target penetration in larger targets. In some cases, the use of 
additional moderating material increases the production of these characteristic 
gamma rays, while decreasing personnel dose [38]. The most important capture 
gamma for explosives detection is the 10.8 MeV photon from the activation of 14N 
[36,38,39]. The high-energy photons produced via TNA are easily detectable, as 
there is little neutron background in the 10 MeV range. However, reaction cross 
sections for neutron activation reactions are relatively low and the method leaves 
target materials mildly radioactive [40,41]. 
Neutron backscatter 
Thermal neutrons have also been used in backscatter measurements that 
screen for buried explosives [16,42,43,44]. In this backscatter technique, fast 
neutrons, usually from an isotopic source, are directed towards the ground and 
the thermal neutron flux emanating from the surface is measured. This method 
relies on the principle that hydrogen is more efficient at moderating fast neutrons 
to thermal energies than heavier elements, such that changes in the amount of 
reflected thermal neutrons is indicative of target hydrogen content.  
Thermal neutron imaging 
Transmission imaging using thermal neutrons is a well-established 
technology that is often used to image hydrogenous matter inside metallic or 
other high-Z materials. In traditional neutron radiography, spatial maps of neutron 
attenuation factors are created by passing monochromatic thermal neutron 
beams through the target. Recent advances, such as the use of polarized 
neutron beams and Bragg-edge radiography have improved spatial resolution 
and allowed exploration of target interior magnetic fields [45]. Thermal neutron 
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transmission imaging may be used to image small objects for the presence of 
hydrogenous or other highly neutron-absorbing materials such as boron or 
cadmium [28]. However, thermal neutrons are only able to penetrate a few 
centimeters into most target materials, so incident fast neutrons are more useful 
to scan large objects. 
Fast neutron absorption 
In fast neutron absorption, as in thermal neutron absorption, the incident 
neutron is absorbed into a target nucleus, which then decays, emitting a 
characteristic photon. Although this photon is generally high-energy and 
therefore easily detectable, neutron absorption is highly unlikely at fast incident 
neutron energies, so one must either wait for the neutrons to thermalize in the 
target or use a large incident flux. This creates problems in personnel dose, large 
amounts of shielding, and induced target radioactivity [2]. 
Neutron inelastic scatter 
Probably the most common application of fast neutron interrogation 
depends on the detection photons produced in inelastic neutron scatter 
[36,46,47]. In this interaction, fast neutrons collide with target nuclei and excite 
them to a higher energy state. When the target nuclei decay back to their ground 
state, characteristic photons are emitted. Many of the most relevant photons in 
neutron inelastic scatter may be seen in Table 2.1. Advantages of this method 
include a higher interaction probability, and therefore lower personnel dose, as 
compared with neutron absorption and the distinct photons produced during 
nuclei de-excitation. 
Neutron elastic scatter 
The final way in which fast neutrons interact with target nuclei is through 
fast neutron scatter. In this reaction, by far the most common at fast neutron 
energies, no photon is produced as the neutron scatters off the target, 
conserving kinetic energy and momentum. Use of neutron elastic scatter 
depends on the collection of pulse height distributions of scattered neutrons with 
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sufficient energy resolution to distinguish between the scattered neutrons from 
carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen collisions. The advantage of this method is that an 
accurate measurement of a singly-scattered neutron’s energy and scatter angle 
provides clear knowledge of the target’s atomic mass [46,48,49]. In this way a 
clear picture of a target’s relative amounts of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, 
which is characteristic of the material, may be determined.  
Advancements in neutron interrogation: pulsed neutron sources 
In recent years several innovations have increased the feasibility of 
widespread application of neutron-based explosives detection techniques. 
Several of the discussed methods have the potential to improve greatly if 
time-of-flight calculations are used to minimize signal noise due to multiple 
scatters, localize the relevant neutron scatter reactions in the target, as well as 
provide more accurate information on neutron energy. New advances in 
sub-nanosecond timing of the pulsed neutron generator have made this possible 
[50,51]. This information on collision location allows for an elimination of much of 
the neutron background scatter and vastly improved imaging capabilities [36,52]. 
Tagged neutrons and associated particle imaging 
One of the problems associated with time-of-flight, and therefore neutron 
energy, calculations is the expense of reaching sub-nanosecond pulses from 
neutron generators as well as the difficulty in collimating neutrons [36]. Another 
innovation driving the use of neutron interrogation in explosives detection is the 
development and optimization of API technology. API techniques are based on 
measurement of the associated 3He or 4He nuclei produced in the D(D, n)3He or 
D(T, n)4He reactions in D-D or D-T neutron generators. API technology allows 
time-of-flight neutron calculations by “tagging” the neutron as it is produced by 
measuring the angle and exact timing of the coincident alpha particle emitted in 
the opposite direction from the neutron [53,54]. APIs are generally used in 
conjunction with neutron inelastic scatter techniques [55], though have also been 
applied the TNA and neutron radiography techniques [56], or in conjunction with 
other screening technology [57,58]. Applications range from baggage screening 
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[59], automotive screening [60], cargo containers [61,62], to even underwater 
applications [63]. 
Conclusions 
As has been shown, there is enormous variety in the different 
technologies used to find hidden explosives, ranging from trained animals, 
chemical trace analysis, to interrogation with ionizing radiation. A summary and 
comparison of these methods may be found in Table 2.2. The enormous range of 
target environments, from buried landmines, air and mail cargo, to human 
screening means that no one method is superior to others in all situations. The 
constraints of fast measurement times, negligible false negatives, minimal 
false-positives and expensive equipment combine to define a very difficult 
problem that will remain an issue for some time to come. Perhaps the best 
solution would come in the form of hybrid methodologies that make use of as 
much information possible and tailored to the screening scenario.  
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Tables 
Table 2-1. Relevant photons in neutron inelastic scatter. 
 
Isotope De-excitation photon (MeV) 
1H none 
12C 4.43 
14N 1.64, 2.31, 5.11 
16O 6.13 
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Table 2-2. Summary of explosives detection methods. 
 Applications Detection mechanism Major advantages and disadvantages 
Ion Mobility  luggage, mail Concentration of NO2- and NO3- ions Specific, difficulties in collection of sufficient ions 
Gas chromatography luggage, mail Concentration of NO2- and NO3- ions Better ion collection, slower analysis 
Electron capture  luggage, mail Concentration of NO2- and NO3- ions 
High sensitivity, cannot tell exact type of 
explosives 
Mass spectroscopy luggage, mail Relative concentrations of C, N, O as signatures 
Highly specific, complex and expensive 
equipment 
Flame ionization luggage, mail Concentration of carbon Fast, limited sensitivity to nitrogen content 
Chemiluminescence luggage, mail Concentration of nitrogenous compounds 
High sensitivity, cannot tell exact type of 
explosives 
Surface acoustic 
waves luggage, mail 
Presence of specific explosive 
compound Specific to particular explosive compounds 
Antibody luggage, mail Presence of specific explosive compound Specific to particular explosive compounds 
Animal almost all  Olfactory signal of explosive compound 
Fast and inexpensive, time-intensive training 
needed 
Manual inspection almost all  Recognition by trained personnel Inexpensive, slow, dangerous to operators 
Non-ionizing radiation interrogation  
Electromagnetic 
induction 
luggage, buried, 
human Presence of metal components Fast, inexpensive, limited to metallic objects 
Radar interrogation buried Suspicious outline in radar image Mainly confirmatory for metal detector 
Nuclear magnetic 
resonance luggage, mail 
Suspicious outline in hydrogen 
concentration image Expensive, requires strong magnetic field 
Nuclear quadrupole 
resonance 
buried, luggage, 
mail 
Resonance signal of nitrogen in 
specific explosive compounds 
N sensitive, no external magnetic field, highly 
specific, RF interference 
Terahertz  human Suspicious outline in image formed by THz image 
Good spatial resolution, non-ionizing, privacy 
concerns 
Millimeter wave  human Suspicious outline in millimeter wave image 
Good spatial resolution, non-ionizing, privacy 
concerns 
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Table 2-2. Summary of explosives detection methods (continued). 
 Applications Detection mechanism Major advantages and disadvantages 
Ionizing radiation (nuclear) interrogation    
Photon 
transmission 
almost all except 
buried and human  
Suspicious outline in electron-
density image 
Well established, difficulty in discerning low-Z 
materials 
Photon scattering almost all except human  
Suspicious outline in electron-
density image 
Difficulty in discerning low-Z materials, 
though better than photon transmission 
Gamma-ray 
resonant absorption 
almost all except 
human  Concentration of 
14N in target Good 
14N detection, difficult to produce 
incident photons 
Nuclear resonance 
fluorescence 
almost all except 
human 
Relative concentrations of C, 
N, and O 
Good 14N detection, difficult to produce 
incident photons, competing reactions 
Thermal neutron 
activation 
luggage, mail, 
other small cargo Concentration of 
14N in target Easily detectable signal, high flux and latent target radioactivity 
Neutron 
backscatter buried 
Changing flux of reflected 
neutrons due to presence of H 
Inexpensive source and detector, signal not 
very specific 
Thermal neutron 
imaging 
luggage, mail, 
other small cargo 
Suspicious outline in thermal 
neutron attenuation image Low target penetrability 
Fast neutron 
absorption 
luggage, mail, 
other cargo Concentration of 
14N in target Easily detectable signal, high flux and latent target radioactivity 
Neutron inelastic 
scatter 
luggage, mail, 
other cargo 
Relative concentrations of C, 
N, and O 
Clear signal, difficulty in localization of 
interactions 
Neutron elastic 
scatter 
luggage, mail, 
other cargo 
Relative concentrations of C, 
N, and O 
 Highly probably reactions, good neutron 
spectroscopy needed 
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Chapter 3: Simplified Simulation of Fast Neutron 
Scattering for an Explosives Detection Application 
 
Abstract 
In developing applications for fast neutron scattering in explosives 
detection, Monte Carlo simulations were completed that characterized the 
scattering behavior of fast neutrons in a simplified geometry. Targets included C, 
N, O, and Fe, as well as air, water, oil and the explosive RDX (C3H6N6O6). Work 
included a study of energy binning, particle histories, and statistical uncertainty. 
Results of the simulations closely matched expected scatter behavior. Energy 
bins of 0.2 MeV and 1 x 108 particle histories provided ample statistical certainty.  
Introduction 
Neutrons in explosives detection scenarios 
There are several reasons why active neutron, as opposed to photon, 
interrogation techniques have been pursued in explosives detection [1-5]. This is 
mainly because neutron interrogation is much better at separating the signals 
from low atomic weight materials, such as explosives and many common inert 
cargos [6]. Furthermore, fast neutrons are highly penetrating and can easily pass 
though metallic shielding. Some difficulties encountered in neutron-based 
interrogation methods include the challenges inherent in performing neutron 
spectroscopy with a reasonable detection efficiency and energy resolution, 
production of a well-defined monoenergetic neutron beam, and personnel 
shielding [2,7]. 
Several different neutron interrogation strategies have been pursued in 
contraband detection. Thermal neutron activation analysis formed the basis of 
many material composition analysis techniques, as the characteristic gamma 
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rays provide a clear indicator of target identity [8-11]. Incident fast neutrons that 
then thermalize are often used in this method, as thermal neutron beams are 
quickly attenuated. Further issues involve excessive measurement times due to 
the low interaction probability and decreased detection efficiency of high energy 
gamma-rays [1]. 
Inelastic neutron scatter has been thoroughly studied, as the characteristic 
de-excitation photons provide a measurement of the relative atomic abundances 
in an unknown target [12-14]. Much of the recent work has centered around 
combining de-excitation gamma-rays with neutrons that have been “tagged” 
using associated particle technology [15,16]. Unfortunately, it relatively low 
interaction probability requires higher neutron fluxes in order to achieve adequate 
detection sensitivity [17]. Other methods include neutron radiography, 
backscatter and attenuation methods, in which changes in the strength of the 
neutron beam provide information on target elemental composition [18,19]. 
Neutron interactions 
There are three basic types of neutron interactions that are utilized in 
explosives-detection scenarios. These include neutron absorption (n, !), neutron 
inelastic scatter, (n, n’), and neutron elastic scatter (n, n). Other neutron 
interactions, such as proton- and alpha-producing charged particle reactions, 
multiple neutron-producing reactions, and fission, were not studied here. This is 
because these reactions do not occur in the low atomic number target materials, 
have quickly-absorbed products, or require very high-energy incident neutrons.  
In neutron absorption, with a very low cross section outside the thermal 
neutron energy range, the incident neutron is absorbed into the target nucleus, 
increasing its atomic mass by one.  If radioactive, the activated product will 
undergo beta decay and may release one or more characteristic gamma-rays.  
Fast neutrons, defined as those with more than 100 keV of kinetic energy, 
have interactions that are dominated by neutron scattering [20]. In neutron 
inelastic scattering the incident neutron scatters off the target nucleus and leaves 
it at an excited state. This nuclei will then fall back to ground state, emitting a 
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characteristic gamma-ray equal in energy to the difference between the two 
energy levels [21]. In neutron elastic scatter, the most probable interaction for 
fast neutrons, the incident neutron imparts kinetic energy to the target nucleus 
and continues traveling in a different direction with a lower energy. Because of 
conservation of kinetic energy, it is possible to determine target atomic mass by 
measuring recoil neutron energy and angle. This may be expressed in the 
laboratory frame of reference as:  
 
E '= E0 1!
2A 1! cos"( )
1+ A( )2
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( ,   (3.1) 
where E’ is the scattered neutron’s energy, Eo the incident neutron’s energy, A 
represents the mass number of the target nucleus, and ! is the scatter angle of 
the neutron [21]. 
Monte Carlo techniques 
There are several advantages inherent to using computer simulations at 
this very preliminary stage. These include a high level of control of variables in 
the screening scenario, ease and minimal expense of optimization and exploring 
different variables, and the ability to isolate the results of the neutron interactions 
without the influence of detector response or surrounding materials. Of course, 
the results achieved via simulations are not necessarily an accurate portrayal of 
physical scenarios and should therefore be benchmarked against actual 
measurements once the detection system has been developed. 
An explosives-detection technique based on neutron scatter 
The method now being developed will combine both the neutron and 
photon information produced by simulated neutron interactions. Strategic data 
points will comprise decision-point flags as part of an explosives-detection 
algorithm. Use of the information produced by both inelastic and elastic neutron 
scatter will decrease the number of interrogating neutrons, and therefore the 
measurement time and dose to personnel. Although the data presented here 
shows the results from both D-D and D-T incident neutrons, it is highly probably 
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that the final system will only use D-T neutrons. However, even these neutrons 
would undergo significant attenuation, with only 1 in 106 passing through 2 m of 
cargo unaffected, with most of the remaining neutrons still present at lower 
energies. Because the discussed method depends on the results of specific data 
points produced with interrogation by a commercially-available neutron 
generator, the need for expensive imaging equipment is minimized. 
The information presented here on the scattering behavior of fast neutrons 
in a variety of materials provides the raw data needed in order to develop and 
optimize an explosives-detection algorithm. The final algorithm may include the 
aforementioned flags as well as neutron absorption photons or neutron 
transmission information.  
Materials and Methods 
Monte Carlo simulation 
The efforts described in this paper were devoted to characterizing the 
behavior of incident fast neutrons on a variety of targets relevant to explosives 
screening scenarios. This work mainly consisted of MCNP5 [22] radiation 
transport simulations. In some cases MCNP5-PoliMi [23] was used to simulate a 
realistic 252Cf source. 
Simulation geometry, materials and sources 
The basic geometry used in all simulations is shown in Fig. 3-1, and 
consisted of a standard air-filled steel cargo container. This container had 
dimensions 2.4 m x 6.2 m x 2.6 m, with 0.317 cm thick walls, and was centered 
on very large 93 cm radius target sphere. This large sphere was later replaced by 
a more realistic sphere of radius 18.72 cm to allow full target penetration by 14.1 
MeV neutrons. A conical approximation of an isotropic neutron source was 
located 3.04 m from the target center and was biased towards the detector to 
save computational resources.  Sources simulated included D-T (14.1 MeV) 
neutrons, D-D (2.4 MeV) neutrons, and the built-in 252Cf source found in 
MCNP-PoliMi, which included both a fission neutron spectrum and the relevant 
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source gamma rays. Seven hemispherical surfaces of 0.78 m radius surrounded 
the container 3.04 m from target center. These tally surfaces covered 180° range 
of azimuthal scatter. The large hemispherical surfaces were used in order to 
improve counting statistics as well as blur the angular resolution of the scattered 
neutrons. 
The simulated cargo container was composed of steel, density 7.87 g 
cm-3, which was also used in characterization simulations as a target sphere. The 
first set of simulations used target spheres of natural isotopic mixtures of the 
elements carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen. Other simulations used vegetable oil 
(C55H103O6), density 0.918 g cm-3, water at unit density, and the explosive RDX 
(C3H6N6O6), density 1.82 g cm-3. Dry air, density 0.0012 g cm-3 and containing 
78.4% N2, 21.1% O2, 0.46% Ar, and 0.02% CO2 [24], was included in all 
simulations, both inside and outside the cargo container. An example of MCNP 
input for a RDX target may be found in Appendix A. 
Simulation detector and energy tallies  
While eventual implementation will depend on detector capabilities, at this 
preliminary stage it was considered more important to get an accurate 
representation of the neutron scattering behavior than to simulate the actual 
detector response. Therefore, neutron and gamma current (MCNP F1) tallies 
were calculated on the inside surface of the seven hemispheres described 
above. Separate tallies for photons and neutrons used 0.2 MeV energy bins from 
0 to 15 MeV, with one additional bin for any 15-20 MeV neutrons. This uniform 
bin distribution is finer than a typical neutron detector energy resolution and will 
later be multiplied by an appropriate detector response function.  
Particle histories, variance reduction, and counting statistics  
In order to find an appropriate balance between computational time, 
energy bin width, and statistical certainty a series of simulations was completed 
using the 14.1 MeV neutron source on a sphere of RDX inside the cargo 
container. The number of particle histories varied from 1 x 106 to 8 x 108 with 
energy bins widths of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, or 0.4 MeV. The results were compared with 
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special attention given to the statistical uncertainty of bins corresponding to 
peaks in the neutron spectrum as well as to the separation between the peaks. 
Acceptable levels of uncertainty were chosen to be less than 5% for physically 
possible scattered neutrons and less than 1% for bins corresponding neutron or 
photon peaks.  
To further decrease computational time neutrons were discounted after 
their energies fell below 0.05 MeV. While significantly decreasing computational 
time, this energy cut-off eliminated all thermal neutron interactions, including 
neutron absorption. However, this was not an issue, as the purpose of this paper 
focuses on single neutron scatters. MCNP5 provides for many other 
variance-reduction strategies, such as particle splitting, which were not utilized at 
this time. 
Results and Discussion 
Elemental target simulations 
The neutron tallies from the simulations of C, N, O, and Fe targets for 
252Cf, D-D, and D-T sources showed both the expected elastic scatter peaks and 
several inelastic scatter peaks. The energy of each of these peaks changed as a 
function of neutron scatter angle, as shown in Fig. 3-2. Scatter peaks were most 
prevalent in the 165° to 180° scattered neutrons, with peak magnitude 
decreasing with decreasing scatter angle with the exception of low-angle elastic 
scatter, which increased in magnitude as more uncollided or weakly collided 
neutrons penetrate the large target. The values of the peaks for backscattered 
(180°) neutrons for D-D and D-T sources are shown in Table 3-2 for the cases of 
MCNP tally and calculated using eqn (3.1). Neutron energy distributions for the 
D-T neutron source is shown in parts a of Figs. 3-3 through 3-6, with the relevant 
neutron scatter peaks labeled. 
Due to the low average energy and continuum nature of the 252Cf neutron 
spectrum, it was impossible to discern the elastic scatter peaks for any of the 
nuclides of interest. Furthermore, only a few 252Cf neutrons are energetic enough 
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to produce inelastic photons. This source, used alone, would thus not be a viable 
choice for the proposed new method. 
As expected, the energy of the peaks produced from the photon current 
tallies did not depend on the source-target-detector angle, consistent with the 
physics of inelastic neutron scatter. Photon emission was mildly anisotropic, with 
the tally surfaces corresponding to the highest incident particle scatter showing 
the highest photon peak magnitudes. These photon peaks are listed in Table 3-3, 
with energy distributions from the backscatter tally surface shown in part b of 
Figs. 3-3 through 3-6. Only one energy level in 14N is low enough to be excited by 
2.4 MeV incident neutrons, so only the 14.1 MeV source produced significant 
inelastic scatter photon peaks. Especially prominent among these were the 6.4 
MeV and 5.8 MeV peaks in the 12C and 16O tallies, respectively. These 
correspond to energy levels at 4.44 and 6.05 MeV, which are found in the 4.5 
MeV and 6.1 MeV energy bins. Other neutron peaks were also discernable, 
though they were not as prominent, but may still be used in future detection 
algorithms.  
Compound target simulations  
As expected, the results from simulations containing the compounds 
water, oil, air, or RDX resembled a superposition of the results from the 
component elements with the relative peak magnitudes corresponding to the 
atom percents and interaction cross sections of the constituents. Neutron and 
photon energy distributions from the tallies for a D-T source and water, oil, or 
RDX targets may be seen in Figs. 3-7 through 3-9. Especially interesting, and of 
importance to the energy bin width investigation, was the separation of the C, N, 
and O neutron elastic scatter peaks.  Due to the physics of elastic scatter, this 
separation was greater with higher energy source particles and increased angle 
of scatter. In the case of a D-T neutron source, a 0.2 MeV energy bin width was 
sufficient to distinguish between the neutron elastic scatter peaks of C, N, and O.  
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Particle histories, energy bin width and statistical uncertainty 
The median uncertainties for nonzero backscattered neutron energy bins 
as a function of energy bin width and number of particle histories are compared 
in Fig. 3-10a . Due to the simplicity of the variance reduction strategies 
employed, the median uncertainty drops as one over the square root of the 
number of histories. Similarly, the decrease in uncertainty drops with the same 
relationship in increasing energy bin size, as shown in Fig. 3-10b. Using the 0.2 
MeV energy bin and 1 x 108 particles, the median nonzero uncertainty was found 
to be 3.9%, with a less than 1% uncertainty for the energy bins corresponding to 
the neutron scatter peaks. Median uncertainty levels for physically achievable 
energy bins falls from 6.4% with 0.05 MeV energy levels to 2.4% with 0.4 MeV 
energy bins. This decrease by a factor of 2.7 is close to the factor of 2.8 
decrease that would be expected for an eight-fold increase in particle histories 
that would be found if the energy distribution was uniform. Future simulations 
containing realistic detector response will use the information provided here to 
determine the appropriate number of particle histories and if additional variance 
reduction efforts are needed. 
Application to explosives detection 
There are several factors that must be considered when applying the 
results found here to an actual explosives-detection system. First of all, the high 
degree of neutron scatter in the cargo container contents and surrounding 
environment will obscure the signal produced by single neutron scatters off the 
explosives. Furthermore, many of the neutrons that actually do interact with 
explosives may undergo additional scatter before reaching the detector and the 
original information will be lost in this multiple scatter. The explosive device 
would be hidden inside an unknown benign cargo at an unknown location and 
amount. Another issue stems from the difficulty in performing neutron 
spectroscopy with good energy resolution and efficiency. Introduction of shielding 
around the neutron source will also degrade the monoenergetic nature of the 
generator-produced neutrons and further obscure the desired signal. Also, the 
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scan must take place quickly and with high accuracy, as throughput is very high 
and the consequences of a false negative very serious. Other concerns 
associated with nuclear techniques include shielding and personnel dose 
concerns, high equipment costs, and the difficulty in penetrating large targets 
such as cargo containers. The proposed method, for which the results presented 
here plays a crucial role, will use information based on both the neutrons and 
photons produced during fast neutron interrogation in combinations that best 
compensate for changing screening scenarios. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Simulations have been completed that thoroughly model the neutron 
scattering behavior off C, N, O, Fe, air, the explosive material RDX, water, and oil 
inside a standard cargo container. These highly simplified simulations 
demonstrated that it is possible to discern neutron scatter peaks as well as the 
photons produced through neutron inelastic scatter. In particular, neutron elastic 
scatter peaks were clearly defined in the neutron tally produced using a 
simulated D-T neutron generator. Other neutron peaks were visible in this tally, 
including inelastic scatter peaks, which corresponded to characteristic photons in 
the photon tally.  
Considerable efforts were spent analyzing the statistical uncertainties of 
the neutron tallies. It was found that 1 x 108 particle histories were sufficient to 
bring the median uncertainty for physically achievable neutron tally bins to 3.2% 
with energy bins of 0.2 MeV. These efforts found that the expected relationship 
between number of particle histories, energy bin width, and statistical uncertainty 
holds true and provided guidance on the number of histories needed for future 
simulations.  
The proposed method of using the elastically scattered neutrons as the 
basis for explosives detection merits further studies. Future simulations should 
include more various sizes, types, and locations of explosives, a variety of cargo 
container contents and surrounding environments, and more realistic detector 
responses. These will allow a clearer definition and optimization of the specific 
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detection algorithm that takes advantage of all the scattered neutron and 
de-excitation photon information produced in fast neutron interrogation.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Cross-sectional view for the MCNP5 simulation, showing the steel 
cargo container, target sphere, neutron source and detector tally surfaces. 
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Figure 3-2. Illustration of downward shifting of neutron scatter peaks with 
increasing scatter angle. Small peak magnitude of lower scatter peaks due to 
attenuation in target. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-3. Energy distribution for simulated 12C target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) backscattered neutrons with elastic and 
inelastic scatter peaks and b) photons, with 4.4 MeV de-excitation peak. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-4. Energy distribution for simulated 14N target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) backscattered neutrons with 10.6 MeV 
elastic and several inelastic scatter peaks and b) photons, with several 
de-excitation peaks. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-5. Energy distribution for simulated 16O target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) backscattered neutrons with 11.0 MeV 
elastic and several inelastic scatter peaks and b) photons, with several 
de-excitation peaks, including prominent 6.1 MeV peak. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-6. Energy distribution for simulated 56Fe target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) backscattered neutrons with 13.2 MeV 
elastic and several inelastic scatter peaks and b) photons, with several 
de-excitation peaks. 
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a. 
  
b. 
Figure 3-7. Energy distribution for simulated water target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) neutrons with prominent 11 MeV oxygen 
elastic scatter peak and several inelastic scatter peaks and b) photons, with 
several de-excitation peaks for both oxygen and iron. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-8. Energy distribution for simulated oil target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) neutrons with prominent 10.1 MeV carbon 
elastic scatter peak and several inelastic scatter and b) photons, with several 
de-excitation peaks for both carbon, oxygen and iron. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3-9. Energy distribution for simulated RDX target and 14.1 MeV 
monoenergetic neutron source for a) neutrons with carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen 
elastic scatter peaks and several inelastic scatter peaks for carbon, nitrogen, 
oxygen and the iron container and b) photons, with several de-excitation peaks 
for both carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and iron. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 3-10. Backscattered neutron tally statistical uncertainty as a function of a) 
number of particle histories and b) energy bin width. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 3-11. Backscattered neutron spectra for 108 particle histories, with energy 
bin widths equal to a) 0.05 MeV, b) 0.1 MeV, c) 0.2 MeV, and d) 0.4 MeV. 
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c. 
 
d. 
Figure 3-11 (continued). Backscattered neutron spectra for 108 particle histories, 
with energy bin widths equal to a) 0.05 MeV, b) 0.1 MeV, c) 0.2 MeV, and d) 0.4 
MeV. 
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Tables 
Table 3-1. A comparison of the median nonzero statistical uncertainties for 
neutron current tallies corresponding to neutron scatters as a function of energy 
bin width and number of particle histories. 
 
Particle histories 
(millions) 0.5 1 10 50 100 200 400 800 
0.05 MeV energy bins 0.433 0.351 0.159 0.087 0.064 0.047 0.034 0.025 
0.1 MeV energy bins 0.347 0.270 0.118 0.061 0.045 0.033 0.024 0.018 
0.2 MeV energy bins 0.269 0.210 0.085 0.043 0.032 0.024 0.017 0.013 
0.4 MeV energy bins 0.213 0.160 0.063 0.032 0.024 0.018 0.012 0.009 
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Table 3-2. Expected and tallied neutron backscatter peaks for carbon, nitrogen, 
oxygen, and iron with the most prominent peaks shown in bold. Neutron peak 
energies specified by median of 0.2 MeV energy bin. 
 
Target Expected (D-T source) 
Tallied 
(D-T source) 
Expected 
(D-D source) 
Tallied 
(D-D source) 
12C, elastic 10.1 10.1 1.72 1.7 
12C, inelastic 3.75, 6.37 3.7, 6.3 none none 
14N, elastic 10.59 10.5 1.80 1.7 
14N, inelastic 
0.99, 1.81, 1.97, 
2.82, 3.03, 3.13, 
5.07, 5.71, 6.2, 6.37 
0.9, 1.9, 2.9, 
3.1, 5.1, 5.7, 
6.3 
none none 
O, elastic 11.0 10.9 1.87 1.9 
16O, inelastic 0.72, 1.46, 1.48, 1.57, 3.29, 5.69 
0.7, 1.5, 3.3, 
5.7 none none 
56Fe, elastic 13.1 13.1 2.23 2.3 
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Table 3-3. Expected and observed photon peaks for carbon, nitrogen, and 
oxygen with the most prominent peaks shown in bold. Neutron peak energies 
specified by median of 0.2 MeV energy bin. 
 
Target Expected (D-T source) 
Tallied 
(D-T source) 
Expected 
(D-D source) 
Tallied 
(D-D source) 
12C 4.44 4.5 none 1.7 
14N 
1.64, 2.31, 3.68, 
4.40, 5.11, 6.2, 
7.03 
1.7, 2.3, 3.7, 
4.5, 5.1, 6.1, 
6.7, 7.1 
none 1.9 
16O 2.74, 3.66, 3.80, 6.13, 7.12 
2.7, 3.7, 6.1, 
7.1, none 1.9, 0.7 
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Chapter 4: D-D Neutron-Scatter Measurements for a 
Novel Explosives-Detection Technique 
 
Abstract 
A series of measurements has been completed that provides a benchmark 
for Monte Carlo simulations related to an algorithm for explosives detection using 
active neutron interrogation. The original simulations used in algorithm 
development, based on sea-land cargo container screening, have been adapted 
to model active neutron interrogation of smaller targets. These smaller-scale 
measurements are easily accomplished in a laboratory environment. 
Benchmarking measurements were completed using a D-D neutron generator, 
two neutron detectors, as well as a variety of scatter media including the 
explosives surrogate melamine (C3H6N6). Measurements included 90°, 120°, or 
150° neutron scatter geometries and variations in source-detector shielding, 
target presence, and target identity. Comparisons of measured and simulated 
neutron fluxes were similar, with correlation coefficients greater than 0.7. The 
simulated detector responses also matched very closely with the measured 
photon and neutron pulse height distributions, with correlation coefficients 
exceeding 0.9. The experiments and simulations also provided insight into 
potential application of the new method to the problem of explosives detection in 
small objects such as luggage and small packages. 
Introduction   
Explosives detection with active neutron interrogation 
Thermal neutron activation (TNA)-based explosives detection relies upon 
the detection of characteristic photons produced when target nuclei absorb 
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incident neutrons. Another strategy relies on the characteristic de-excitation 
photons emitted when incident neutrons undergo inelastic scatter. A third 
strategy strategy uses measurements of the interacted neutron beam, such as in 
transmission imaging, neutron flux measurements, or neutron spectroscopy. 
Each strategy has its own advantages and disadvantages, including interaction 
probability, optimal target size, and ease of signal discrimination [1-3].  
Neutron scatter measurements for the detection algorithm 
The explosives-detection technique explored for this work represents a 
unique combination of the prior approaches. It uses the neutron and photon 
information produced during fast-neutron interrogation to calculate specific flags 
that are part of an explosives-detection algorithm. These flags are generally in 
the form of ratios of specific neutron or photon measurements at two different 
scatter angles. Earlier work was devoted to characterizing the neutron scatter in 
large targets [4] and identifying flags in simplified [5] and semi-realistic [6] 
screening scenarios of sea-land cargo containers. Some flags are used to 
determine the type of cargo, which determines which other flags are best suited 
for detecting explosives in that particular cargo. Specific changes in these 
explosives-sensitive flags then used to “trigger” in the presence of a possible 
explosive. 
This paper presents various benchmarking measurements for the 
generalized type of neutron-scatter characterization simulations essential to the 
development of the method. Although on a considerably smaller scale than the 
original simulations, these measurements provide justification for the simulated 
detector responses, demonstrate the close relationship between measurements 
and simulations, and provide insight into future efforts concerning smaller targets, 
such as luggage screening. Measurements included targets of the 
explosives-surrogate melamine, vegetable oil, water, and paper. Three different 
scatter angle geometries were considered, as the cargo screening system will 
utilize photon and neutron measurements at several different angles. 
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equipment constraints, only a D-D generator, with its 2.45-MeV neutrons, was 
available to perform the measurements.  
The available detectors provided two avenues of comparison with Monte 
Carlo simulations. The first involved the change in total neutron flux at the 
detector due to shielding between it and the source, as well as presence of 
scattering media in the target location. Furthermore, limited neutron 
spectroscopic capabilities in one of the detectors allowed similar comparisons for 
the higher energy unscattered- or slightly-scattered neutrons reaching the 
detector. Similar results for the experiments and simulation would demonstrate 
that the approximations made in the simulation geometry are appropriate to 
neutron scatter measurement scenarios. The second point of comparison with 
simulations was the accurate calculation of the liquid scintillation detector 
response to scattered neutrons and associated photons. Simulations that 
showed similar pulse height distributions (PHDs) to those actually produced by 
the neutron detector would provide an important benchmark as to the reliability of 
the simulations.  
Neutron-Interrogation Methods 
Materials for neutron-scatter measurements 
Facility and infrastructure 
Irradiations were conducted behind cinderblock shielding on adjoining 
wooden tables that held the neutron source, target material, neutron detectors, 
and in some cases source-detector shielding. The first table was 0.60 m wide " 
1.8 m long " 0.05 m thick wooden tabletop with 0.9 m tall metal legs, while the 
other was 0.91 m wide " 0.76 m long " 0.05 m thick. Both tabletops were 
approximately 1 m above a concrete floor.   
Neutron source  
 A D-D neutron generator (MP320, Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. 5074 List 
Drive, Colorado Springs, CO 80919) provided fast neutrons. It produced 
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monoenergetic 2.45-MeV neutrons at a rate of 2 " 106 n s-1 and was operated at 
a 100% duty cycle for all measurements.  
Neutron detectors 
One neutron detector used in the scatter measurements, hereafter 
referred to as detector A, was a customized neutron spectroscopy and dosimetry 
system (Microspec-2, Bubble Technology Industries Inc., 31278 Hwy 17, Chalk 
River, Ontario, Canada K0J1J0) with the addition of a neutron probe module [7]. 
This system contained a 5-cm diameter, 5-cm long NE-213 liquid scintillator for 
fast neutrons and a 3He counter for energy ranges from thermal to 1.5 MeV. A 
pulse shape discrimination (PSD) algorithm (FERDOR) incorporated into the 
computer software was used to reject photons at a ratio of approximately 1000:1 
[8], enabling both dosimetric measurements and neutron spectroscopy [9]. The 
unfolding algorithm sorted neutrons into 0.5-MeV energy bins for energies < 2.0 
MeV, 1-MeV bins for 2.0-10 MeV neutrons, and 2-MeV intervals for 12-18 MeV 
neutrons. One experimental complication was that the short physical connection 
between the detection system control box and detector prohibited remote 
activation after the neutron beam was established. Therefore, the counting period 
commenced prior to beam ramp-up, which produced some inconsistencies in 
calculated count rates due to variations in generator ramp-up and shut-down 
between measurements. 
Another type of detector, hereafter referred to as detector B, used in 
scatter measurements used a 12-cm diameter, 13-cm long, 0.5-cm thick, 
aluminum-walled cylinder filled with EJ-309 liquid scintillator fluid (Eljen 
Technology, 2010 E. Broadway, Sweetwater, TX 79556, USA), with an attached 
photomultiplier tube (XP4512B, Photonics, Berkshire Common PO Box 4949, 
Pittsfield MA 01202, USA) and 12-bit, 250-MHz waveform digitizer (V1720, 
CAEN Technologies, Inc., 1140 Bay Street, Suite 2C, Staten Island, NY 10305). 
Commercially available mathematics software package (MATLAB, 3 Apple Hill 
Drive, Matick, MA 01760, USA) was employed to implement an optimized PSD 
method. This method was based on tail-to-total integrals of the waveforms for 
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separating photon- and neutron-produced pulses [10,11], with a minimum 
threshold set to 80 keVee. The Compton edge in the PHD for a 137Cs check 
source, at 447 keV, was used to determine the detector light-output-to-energy 
conversion factor.  
Scattering media 
Several different types of scatter media were used. Melamine (C3H6N6) 
has a relatively high nitrogen content and is a common substitute for explosives 
[12,13]. Either one or two 2.5-kg containers (11.4 cm " 11.4 cm " 20.3 cm) of 
melamine (Acros Organics, Janssen-Pharmaceuticalaan 3a, Geel, 2440, 
Belgium) were used as scatter targets. Other targets included 2.3-L (10.2 cm " 
14.2 cm " 22.9 cm) containers of tap water, 3.8-L (12.7 cm " 14.0 cm " 25.4 cm) 
containers of vegetable oil, and a 2.25-kg (15 cm " 15 cm " 16 cm) ream of office 
paper. Either the above containers of water or larger 12-L (19 cm " 29 cm " 23.5 
cm) containers of tap water were used in some measurements as shielding 
between the source and detector.  
Neutron-Interrogation Measurements 
Detector A with 90°, 120° and 150° neutron scatter  
For the first set of neutron scatter measurements, scatter media was 
placed 1.2 m from the source and 0.53 m from detector A such that a 90° scatter 
angle was present between the source, target, and detector. Each of these 
twelve measurements lasted 7 min. The six target configurations included no 
target, two containers of melamine, oil, or water, as well as two measurements in 
which two containers of melamine were concealed by the two containers of either 
water or oil. Six measurements were made with no source-detector shielding and 
the other six contained two of the smaller water containers placed between the 
source and detector A. A photograph of the melamine target with source-detector 
shielding is shown in Fig. 4-1a, with the corresponding simulation geometry in 
Fig. 4-1b. 
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 These six target geometries were again used in six 7-min measurements, 
and corresponding simulations, in which the targets were placed 91 cm from the 
source and 58 cm from the detector for a 120° neutron scatter. A further six 
7-min measurements were taken using a 150° neutron scatter geometry, in which 
source-target and target-detector distances were 81 cm and 91 cm, respectively.  
The change in the number of total and singly-scattered neutrons with and 
without source-detector shielding was calculated for the 90° scatter 
measurements and simulations. Further calculations involved the change in the 
number of total and singly-scattered neutrons due to the presence of scatter 
media in the target location in all scatter geometries for both measurements and 
simulations. The results for the simulations and measurements were then 
compared. 
Detectors A and B with 90° neutron scatter 
Further measurements were made using a 90° neutron scatter geometry 
and both detector A and detector B. Three 6-min measurements were made with 
a source-target location of 41.9 cm and 30.5 cm between the target and both 
detector A and detector B, as illustrated in the photograph shown in Fig. 4-2a, 
with the corresponding simulation input geometry shown in Fig. 4-2b. One 6-min 
count was made with no target and no source-detector shielding to compare the 
relative efficiencies of the two systems. The other two 6-min measurements in 
this geometry had the larger blocks of water placed between the source and both 
detectors A and B to shield them from unscattered neutrons. The target was 
either absent or one container of melamine.  
In a final set of five 5-min measurements the same 90° scatter geometry 
was used, though a redistribution of laboratory equipment during the intervening 
time period required the change of a wooden lab bench and wooden stool in the 
place of the two wooden tables used in all other measurements. This 
necessitated a decrease in the source-target and target-detector distances, 
which should magnify the effect of target media presence. All five measurements 
utilized the larger containers of water as source-detector shielding. Target 
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materials included one container of melamine, water, oil, or a ream of paper as 
defined above, or no target. In addition, two 30-min measurements were made, 
one with no target and one with a single container of melamine.  
Computational Methods 
Monte Carlo Simulations 
All Monte Carlo simulations were completed using Monte Carlo N-Particle 
5 (MCNP5) [14] or the related software MCNP-PoliMi, which is better able to 
simulate time-analysis quantities [15]. Simulated material compositions, drawn 
from the literature as appropriate [16,17], appear in Table 4-1. Although efforts 
were made to model the measurements as faithfully as possible, simplifications 
were present in the geometries of the surrounding environment, neutron 
generator, and neutron detectors.  
The simulations used a simplified surrounding environment in which two 
wooden tables, or a table and chair, were centered in an air-filled 6 m " 7 m " 3 
m room with 1-m thick concrete walls and floor, and none of the piping or other 
surrounding features. The D-D neutron generator was approximated by a 55.8 
cm long, 0.5 cm thick, 10.2 cm exterior diameter aluminum tube. The tube interior 
was filled with 1.2 " 10-5 g cm-3 air and contained a 2.45-MeV isotropic neutron 
point source 14 cm from one end. On top of the cylinder was a 20.3 cm " 53.3 
cm " 20.3 cm box containing a homogenous approximation of typical electronics.  
Three different MCNP5 F1 tallies were calculated at the front surface of 
the active volume of the simulated detector A. These included neutron and 
photon tallies with 0.2-MeV energy bins and a neutron tally utilizing the same 
energy bins as detector A, as described above. Two F1 tallies with 0.2-MeV 
energy bins for photons and neutrons were similarly calculated on the front 
surface of the simulated detector B.  
The same geometries, source, and tallies described above were used in 
the MCNP-PoliMi simulations that also calculated realistic detector responses. 
Options in the MCNP-PoliMi input files were set to force analog Monte Carlo 
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processes instead of statistics-based approximations, specify the detector active 
volume for data collection, format for data output, and a neutron and photon 
cutoff of 0.1 MeV. Sample MCNP input files for 90° scatter geometry with one or 
two detectors and a 120° scatter geometry may be found in Appendix A. 
Pulse height distributions 
Calculation of the simulated PHDs required both MCNP-PoliMi as well as 
a custom Fortran-based post-processor [11] that calculated detector response, 
compiling the interaction data into pulse height and time-of-flight distributions. To 
accomplish this, the post-processor calculated light output (MeVee) in the 
detector such that the light produced by photon interactions was equal to the 
energy deposition (MeV). The relationship between neutron energy deposition 
and light production was more complicated, such that: 
 
 
L = 0.03495E 2 + 0.1424E ! 0.036 , (4.1) 
 
in which light output in detector B, L (MeVee) was a quadratic function of neutron 
energy deposition, E (MeV) [11]. The resulting calculated neutron PHDs were 
compared with the measured neutron PHD that was isolated using 
aforementioned PSD techniques.  
Data analysis 
Once the percent change in both total and singly-scattered neutron flux 
was calculated for the detector A measurements and Monte Carlo simulations a 
statistics package (SPSS v19, IBM Corporation, 1 New Orchard Rd, Armonk, NY 
10504, USA) was used to run two-tailed, paired t-test and bivariate correlations 
on the data. Similarly, the statistics package was used to calculate the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the measured and simulated photon and neutron 
PHDs. The later necessitated resampling the simulated PHDs so that the same 
number of data points was used for the simulations and measurements. The 
paired t-test calculated p-values, which demonstrated statistically significant 
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differences if they were below 0.05, while the correlation coefficients represented 
a close match if they were close to 1.0. 
Results and Discussion 
Detector A in a 90°, 120° , and 150°  neutron scatter geometries 
For the measurements using only detector A in a 90° scatter geometry, 
the six geometries showed an 83% ± 2.2% decrease in the total count rate when 
the water shielding blocks were present. Similarly, the total number of measured 
2.0-3.0 MeV, unscattered or slightly scattered, neutrons decreased by 80% ± 
5.1% when the shielding was in place. This, along with the corresponding results 
of the MCNP5 simulations, is shown in Table 4-2. The results of the simulations 
agreed with the measurements, falling within 10% for the change in total neutron 
count and ~5% for the change in 2.0-3.0 MeV neutrons. This dramatic decrease 
is expected, as the mean free path of a 2.45 MeV neutron is only a couple of 
centimeters in water.  
Because of this low neutron penetration of the source-detector shield, the 
vast majority of the neutrons reaching the detector when the shield is in place are 
those that scatter off surrounding material such as the table or target media. 
Therefore, the presence of target media is expected to increase both the total 
number of neutrons and singly-scattered neutrons reaching the detectors, with 
the amount of change more due to the amount than type of scatter material. As 
seen in Table 4-3, a 3-6% increase in the total number of neutrons was 
measured without the source-detector shield, and this change increased to 7-
13% when the shielding was present. The number of 2-3 MeV neutrons 
increased by 3-4% when scatter media was present in the unshielded cases, but 
varied between 5% and 16% for the shielded scenarios. However, this variation 
was within the expected 5% from the mean due to propagation of the uncertainty 
associated with counting statistics. As expected, there was a larger, by a factor of 
~2, change in neutron flux when the shield was present. For most cases there 
was reasonably good agreement between the measured and simulated results in 
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that the measured and simulated changes in neutron flux were within one 
standard deviation of each other.  
The changes due to presence of different scatter targets in the 120° and 
150° neutron scatter geometries are summarized in Table 4-3. For the 120° 
scatter geometry, the presence of scatter media increased the total number of 
neutrons by 8-18%. D-D Neutrons undergoing a single 120° elastic scatter off 
carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen decrease in energy to 1.9-2.0 MeV. The bin 
containing these neutrons, 1.5-2.0 MeV, increased by 7-8% for oil-containing 
targets, but changed by less than 1% for the other targets. The simulations of the 
120° scatter geometry showed similar results. In these simulations the total 
number of neutrons increased by 4-10%. The number of singly-scattered 
neutrons increased by 7-12% for most cases, but by less than 3% for melamine 
and water targets.  
Table 4-3 also shows the changes in total and singly-scattered neutron 
flux for the 150° neutron scatter scenarios. The measured total neutron flux 
changed by less than 2% for all cases. The change in singly-scattered neutron 
flux was also relatively small, less than 4% for all cases except for a 7.9% 
change with the melamine and oil combined target. The results of the 150° 
simulations all showed increases of less than 2.5% for both the total and 
singly-scattered neutron tallies. Although all simulations showed the expected 
increase in neutron tallies, the differences are too small to draw any clear 
conclusions.  
A paired t-test of the data shown in Table 4-3 found p-values of 0.076 and 
0.309 for the total and singly-scattered neutron flux, respectively. As both 
p-values are above 0.05, there is no statistically significant difference between 
the simulated and measured neutron fluxes. A bivariate correlation calculation 
found relatively high Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.919 for the change in 
total neutron flux and 0.757 for the change in singly-scattered neutron flux. The 
weaker correlation in the singly-scattered neutron flux is probably due to errors 
introduced in the unfolding of the measured neutron pulse height distribution.  
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Furthermore, other errors in the measured neutron flux are due to the fact that 
many of the singly-scattered neutrons do not deposit their full energy in the 
detector’s active volume. 
Though there was significant variation in the neutron flux change for 
different targets in the 120° and 150° scatter scenarios, most of the simulated 
and measured results were within the margin of error of each other. Exceptions 
were present in the case of melamine and melamine with oil at 120° scatter and 
melamine with oil at 150° scatter. Several of the cases showed no significant 
change in the number of measured singly-scattered neutrons. This is partially 
because the longer distances between source-target-detector as compared to 
the source-detector distance for these two scatter geometries. Therefore, very 
few of the singly-scattered neutrons actually interacted in the target media when 
compared to the large number scattered in the environment near the source and 
detector. This leads to both small changes in neutron flux measurements, as well 
as relatively large errors. 
Measurements using two neutron detectors at 90° neutron scatter 
For the final set of measurements both detectors were used to measure 
neutrons in a 90° scatter geometry. Furthermore, the decreased source-target 
and target-detector distances magnified the effect of target media presence. The 
results of the simulations and detector A results are shown at the bottom of Table 
4-3. These results were more dramatic than previously measured, with increases 
of between 11-30%, with counting errors in the range of 1% for total neutrons. 
The change in singly-scattered neutrons was a smaller 3-8% ± 1%. The results of 
the 30-min measurement showed a similar 18% increase in the total number of 
neutrons and a 12% increase in 3-4 MeV neutrons when melamine was present. 
The simulated detector A tallied similar increases in the total number of neutrons: 
10% for melamine, 25% for oil and water, and 19% for paper. The change in 
singly-scattered neutrons ranged from 2-10%, with statistical uncertainties 
around 3%. Of all the scatter geometries, the ones with dual neutron detectors 
showed the closest agreement between measurement and simulation. Except for 
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the case of total neutrons and paper target, all neutron flux simulations, for both 
detectors, were within the margin of error of the measurements.  
Measurements using detector B found an increase in neutron count rate 
for every case that contained additional scatter media. A comparison of the 
change in total and neutron count rates for measurement, MCNP5, and 
MCNP-PoliMi due to the presence of scatter media are shown in Table 4-4. For 
almost all cases, both the MCNP5 and MCNP-PoliMi simulations were within 
25% of the measured change in count rates. Furthermore, changes in the total 
neutron flux were very similar for measurements using detector A and detector B 
when oil and paper targets were used, and within 15% for melamine and water 
targets. As expected, there was very close agreement between the MCNP5 and 
MCNP-PoliMi neutron counts. There was about 3% difference between the 
MCNP5 and MCNP-PoliMi total counts, probably due to the differences in photon 
production between the two methods.  
Pulse height distributions 
The tallied neutron and photon energy distributions at the surface of 
detector B, an example of which is shown in Fig. 4-3a, are reflected in the 
calculated photon and neutron PHDs, which are shown in Fig. 4-3b for a 
melamine target. The corresponding measured PHDs are shown in Fig. 4-3c. In 
both cases, the Compton edge for 2.2 MeV photons occurs around the expected 
1.9 MeVee, though this is more blurred in the measured PHDs. The maximum 
value of the neutron PHD at ~0.5 MeVee is very close to the expected value of 
0.51 MeVee caused by 2.45 MeV neutron scatter in the liquid scintillator. 
Furthermore, the neutron PHDs of the five different targets were very similar, as 
is illustrated in Figs. 4-4a and 4-4b. It should be noted that data points are 
spaced every 0.01 MeVee in the simulated data, but 0.04 MeVee in the 
measured data. 
A comparison of the measured and MCNP-PoliMi simulated photon PHDs 
may be seen in Fig. 4-5a, with the neutron PHDs shown in Fig. 4-5b. In both 
figures the number of counts has been normalized to the maximum value to more 
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accurately compare the curve shapes. The shapes of the PHDs are very similar, 
with most of the variation found in the photon PHD at the highest energies, where 
the majority of the signal is due to interactions of photons in the liquid scintillator. 
Another major difference in the photon PHDs is the increased width of the 
measured PHD as compared to the simulation results. The measured PHD has a 
more gradual increase and decrease when compared to the idealized case of the 
simulation. This is mainly due to factors such as the idealistic light collection and 
timing resolution of the simulation. Statistical analysis of the measured and 
simulated PHDs led to very high Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.98 for the 
photon PHDs and 0.97 for the neutron PHDs.  
Neutron scatter as part of an explosives-detection algorithm 
As mentioned earlier, limitations in the available equipment required that 
the experiments be confined to the 2.45 MeV neutrons in a scenario closer to 
luggage-screening than cargo containers. Use of 2.45 MeV neutrons also limited 
the study of photons produced during inelastic scatter interactions, as the vast 
majority of de-excitation reaction in hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen 
require neutron energies of more than 2.45 MeV. However, it has been shown 
that the neutron scatter behavior of D-D neutrons may be closely approximated 
using Monte Carlo modeling and that a realistic detector response can be 
accurately modeled.  
These measurements also showed that the simulated changes in neutron 
flux in detector A varied from the measured fluxes by about 25% for the total 
neutron flux, and by about 32% for the singly-scattered neutron flux when cases 
of more than 100% variation were ignored. This is partially explained by the large 
variations in measured flux rates within a single scatter geometry and with similar 
targets. This signifies that much of the disagreement is due to errors in 
measurement with detector A. However, detector B showed a much closer 
agreement with the simulations, averaging about 11% difference with MCNP5 
and 8% difference with MCNP-PoliMi. This signifies that an error margin of about 
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10% from MCNP-PoliMi simulations would be expected in future measurements 
using this detector.  
This close agreement between simulation and detector B response 
presents the very real possibility that the explosives-detection flags found using 
simulated 14.1 MeV neutrons in a cargo-screening scenario would work in actual 
screening measurements [15,5,6]. The computer simulations, with their inherent 
precision and customization potential may then be used to determine where to 
look for the flags that best signal the presence of explosive. Furthermore, these 
measurements could easily be used to justify future simulations dealing with 
other explosives-detection scenarios, such as luggage screening.  
Conclusions 
A series of measurements has been completed to investigate the 
scattering behavior of monoenergetic 2.45 MeV neutrons at several angles and a 
variety of target materials, including the explosives surrogate, melamine. The 
scenarios have also been also been modeled using the Monte Carlo software 
MCNP5 and MCNP-PoliMi. Favorable comparisons of the simulated and 
measured neutron flux in a variety of scatter scenarios demonstrated that the 
level of detail in the simulations was adequate to accurately model the scatter 
scenarios. Further comparisons were made between calculated and measured 
detector response to the neutron flux demonstrated that it was possible to 
accurately model detector response in a mixed radiation field scenario. 
Comparisons of the simulated and measured neutron flux showed close 
agreements, with correlation coefficients of 0.92 and 0.76 for the total and 
singly-scattered neutrons, respectively. A paired t-test showed no statistically 
significant difference between measurement and simulation. Furthermore, almost 
all of the neutron flux calculations for simulations and measurements agreed 
within the margin of statistical error. Exceptions were present, especially in the 
120° and 150° neutron scatter scenarios, in which most of the singly-scattered 
neutrons were scatters from the environment due to the relatively large 
source-target-detector distance. Favorable comparisons of the measured and 
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simulated pulse height distributions (PHDs) were also found, although the 
simulated PHDs were considerably narrower and, as expected, showed greater 
detail than the measured PHDs. Correlation coefficients matching simulation and 
measurement were very high, 0.98 and 0.97 for the photon and neutron PHDs, 
respectively.  
The results of this study showed that basic approximations in the 
simulation geometry, such as simplifications in the surrounding environment, 
allow an accurate portrayal of neutron scatter in a screening scenario, especially 
when smaller source-target-detector distances are considered, such as in 
luggage-screening scenarios. Furthermore, this study has shown that it is 
possible to accurately model the response of the neutron detectors used in the 
neutron scatter measurements.  
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Figures 
 
a. 
 
b.  
Figure 4-1. D-D neutron generator and detector A in a) measurement and b) 
simulation with melamine target shielded by scatter media of water or oil, and 
water shielding block between source and detector active volume. Other cases 
eliminated the source-detector shielding or scatter media, or used other target 
materials.
  72 
 
 
a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 4-2. D-D neutron generator, source-detector shielding and dual detectors 
in a 90° scatter geometry for a) measurement with melamine target and b) 
simulation. Possible target materials in both simulations and measurements 
included melamine, water, oil, or paper. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 4-3. Example detector B output for a 90° neutron scatter and melamine 
target scenario with a) the simulated neutron and photon MCNP5 F1 tallies on 
the detector face, b) the simulated detector response, and c) the measurement 
detector response. The 56Fe photons are due to interactions in the table legs. 
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c. 
Figure 4-3 (continued). Example detector B output for a 90° neutron scatter and 
melamine target scenario with a) the simulated neutron and photon MCNP5 F1 
tallies on the detector face, b) the simulated detector response, and c) the 
measurement detector response. The 56Fe photons are due to interactions in the 
table legs. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 4-4. a) Simulated and b) measured neutron pulse height distributions for 
no target and various target materials. Differences between the cases are shown 
in the detail boxes. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 4-5. Comparison of the measured and simulated a) total and b) neutron 
pulse height distributions. 
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Tables 
Table 4-1. Atom percent compositions of all materials used in simulations. 
 
Material 
Density 
(g cm-3) H C N O Other 
Air 0.0012  0.01% 75.5% 23.2% 1.30% Ar 
Steel 7.87  0.32%   
99.6% Fe, 
0.050% S, 
0.04% P 
Wood11 0.65 47.6% 28.6% 23.8%   
Water 1.0 66.7%   33.3%  
Melamine 1.57 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%   
Oil 0.92 62.8% 33.5%  3.7%  
Paper11 0.60 47.6% 28.6% 23.8%   
NE213 0.87 54.8% 45.2%    
Electronics 0.33 25.7% 1.87%  46.8% 
2.59% Al, 
12.3% Si, 
10.4% Ni, 
0.27% Fe 
Concrete11 2.3 30.4% 0.29%  49.9% 
0.92% Na, 
1.03% Al, 
15.1% Si, 
0.71% K, 
1.49% Ca, 
0.16% Fe 
Soil11 1.75 29.4% 1.87%  50.5% 
2.59% Al, 
13.5% Si, 
1.43% K, 
0.27% Fe 
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Table 4-2. Percent decrease in the number of neutrons due to the presence of 
water shielding block between detector A and source for a 90° scatter geometry. 
Error estimation reflects the uncertainty introduced by counting statistics. 
 
Scatter 
target 
Measurement: 
total n 
Simulation: 
total n 
Measurement: 
2.0-3.0 MeV n 
Simulation: 
2.0-3.0 
MeV n 
No target -84 ± 1% -94 ± 1% -79 ± 2% -84 ± 2% 
Melamine -84 ± 1% -94 ± 2% -80 ± 2% -84 ± 3% 
Oil -81 ± 1% -94 ± 1% -79 ± 2% -84 ± 2% 
Water -80 ± 1% -94 ± 2% -79 ± 2% -84 ± 3% 
Melamine 
+ oil -86 ± 1% -93 ± 2% -80 ± 2% -84 ± 3% 
Melamine 
+ water -83 ± 1% -94 ± 2% -82 ± 2% -84 ± 3% 
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Table 4-3. The percent increase in the number of neutrons at detector A when 
scatter targets are present. Elevated changes in multiple detector data are due to 
decreased target-detector distance. Single-scatter neutrons represent the 1.5-2.0 
MeV neutron energy bin in the 120° and 150° scatter scenarios and 2.0-3.0 MeV 
for the 90° cases. Error estimation reflects the uncertainty introduced by counting 
statistics. 
 
Total neutrons Single-scatter neutrons Scatter 
angle Scatter target Measurement Simulation Measurement  Simulation 
No source-detector shield 
90° Melamine 3.2 ± 0.8 3.4 ± 1.1 3.8 ± 1.1 3.4 ± 3.6 
90° Oil 4.4 ± 0.8 3.4 ± 1.1 3.4 ± 1 3.5 ± 3.6 
90° Water 6.1 ± 0.7 3.3 ± 1.1 3.3 ± 1.1 4.6 ± 3.6 
90° Melamine + oil 4.7 ± 0.7 3.9 ± 1.1 3.4 ± 1.1 3.7 ± 3.6 
90° Melamine + water 4.5 ± 0.7 3.7 ± 1.1 3.6 ± 1 4.0 ± 3.6 
Source-detector shield present 
90° Melamine 9.1 ± 1.9 8.3 ± 2.2 4.9 ± 5.1 7.4 ± 5.4 
90° Oil 9.8 ± 1.8 9.1 ± 2.2 5.3 ± 5.3 4.8 ± 5.4 
90° Water 12 ± 1.8 6.4 ± 2.2 9.4 ± 5.4 4.3 ± 5.4 
90° Melamine + oil 7.4 ± 1.9 9.1 ± 2.9 13 ± 5.0 19 ± 6.7 
90° Melamine + water 13 ± 1.8 14 ± 2.9 16 ± 5.4 14 ± 6.7 
120° Melamine 9.3 ± 1.3 4.1 ± 1.5 -0.36 ± 3.8 1.3 ± 8.2 
120° Oil 10 ± 1.3 8.0 ± 1.5 8.1 ± 3.8 9.5 ± 8.4 
120° Water 8.4 ± 1.3 5.8 ± 1.5 -0.18 ± 3.7 2.9 ± 8.4 
120° Melamine + oil 18 ± 1.3 10 ± 1.5 7.1 ± 3.6 12 ± 8.4 
120° Melamine + water 8.4 ± 1.3 8.5 ± 1.5 -0.73 ± 3.9 6.7 ± 8.4 
150° Melamine 0.4 ± 0.7 0.87 ± 0.9 0.42 ± 1.08 0.68 ± 4.45 
150° Oil 0.2 ± 0.7 1.5 ± 0.89 0.63 ± 1.12 1.9 ± 4.46 
150° Water 1.5 ± 0.7 1.1 ± 0.89 3.1 ± 1.11 1.8 ± 4.46 
150° Melamine + oil 0.1 ± 0.7 2.3 ± 0.89 7.9 ± 1.1 2.2 ± 4.46 
150° Melamine + water 1.0 ± 0.7 1.8 ± 0.89 2.1 ± 1.1 1.6 ± 4.46 
Source-detector shield, multiple detectors present 
90° Melamine 11 ± 0.96 10 ± 0.67 3.8 ± 1.1 2.2 ± 2.7 
90° Oil 20 ± 0.94 25 ± 0.66 7.1 ± 1.1 5.1 ± 2.8 
90° Paper 20 ± 0.94 19 ± 0.67 5.1 ± 1.1 6.1 ± 2.7 
90° Water 31 ± 0.93 24 ± 0.66 7.1 ± 1.1 10 ± 2.8 
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Table 4-4. Comparison of the change in the total and neutron count rates due to 
the presence of scatter media for simulation and measurement results in detector 
B. Error estimation reflects the uncertainty introduced by counting statistics. 
 
Scatter 
target 
Measurement: 
total 
MCNP5: 
total  
PoliMi:  
total  
Melamine 21 ± 1% 14 ± 0.5% 17 ± 0.5% 
Oil 22 ± 1% 21 ± 0.5% 24 ± 0.5% 
Paper 20 ± 1% 15 ± 0.5% 17 ± 0.5% 
Water 23 ± 1% 21 ± 0.5% 23 ± 0.5% 
 
Measurement: 
 neutrons 
MCNP5: 
neutrons 
PoliMi: 
neutrons 
Melamine 23 ± 2% 24 ± 0.3% 24 ± 0.3% 
Oil 19 ± 2% 18 ± 0.3% 18 ± 0.3% 
Paper 24 ± 2% 24 ± 0.3% 24 ± 0.3% 
Water 20 ± 2% 18 ± 0.3% 18 ± 0.3% 
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Chapter 5: Development of an Algorithm-Based Model 
for the Detection of Explosives Using Neutron 
Scattering Methods in Simulated Idealized Conditions 
Abstract 
Fast neutron interrogation has potential as a powerful tool in explosives 
detection, and combining all the information provided by induced photons and 
scattered neutrons into flags has the potential to minimize the necessary incident 
neutrons, and therefore the measurement time and personnel dose. This study 
involves an evaluation of Monte Carlo simulations of an idealized cargo container 
explosives detection scenario. Several strategies were used to determine 
possible flags for the explosive RDX (C2H6N6O6). These included changes in 
backscattered neutron spectra and neutron flux at specific energies as a function 
of scatter angle. Other flags compared neutron elastic scatter peaks, and 
photons from neutron inelastic scatter off light elements. An analysis of the effect 
of changing hidden explosive mass and position on the detectability of the 
explosive was completed. Preliminary analysis revealed several promising 
algorithmic flags. 
Introduction 
Nuclear-based explosives detection methods 
Contraband explosives detection has been widely studied, with strategies 
ranging from trained animals and chemical analysis to nuclear analysis 
techniques [1-3]. Traditional nuclear-based contraband detection technologies 
are often based on X-ray interrogation, which are limited by the similar electron 
density of explosives and inert material [4,5]. In addition, because neutrons are 
highly penetrating and react strongly with low Z targets, active neutron 
interrogation has been widely considered a promising alternative [1,5]. One 
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widely studied strategy uses thermal neutron activation (TNA), in which neutrons 
are absorbed by target nuclei, which then emit characteristic high-energy 
photons [1,6,7]. Inelastic neutron scattering methods rely upon the detection of 
the secondary photons, which have a high probability of emission at high incident 
neutron energies [1,8,9]. A different strategy involves the backscattered neutrons 
themselves, namely measuring the number of reflected neutrons, neutron energy 
spectroscopy, or neutron transmission imaging [8,10-12]. One advantage of 
these approaches is the greater number of signal carriers. However, neutrons 
are more difficult to detect and energy spectroscopy is challenging due to the 
high amount of scatter.  
Proposed detection method 
The method studied here combines the information from the 
backscattered neutrons, inelastic photons, and neutrons scattered at different 
angles. This increases the relative number of signal carriers used in the detection 
process per incident neutron, and thus potentially minimizes personnel dose and 
measurement time. Secondary radiation is analyzed to find specific mathematical 
combinations of signals, such as ratios of different signals, for which there is a 
significant difference between cases with and without explosive, e.g. RDX 
(C2H6N6O6). These specific mathematical combinations, or flags, would form the 
backbone of an algorithm-based approach in which an explosive’s presence is 
indicated when flag values, or combinations of flag values, fall within a specific 
range.  
In a previous study, neutron scatter behavior in a simulated cargo 
container geometry was characterized, with particular attention paid to the 
neutron and photon scatter peaks produced when 2.4- or 14.1-MeV neutrons 
interacted with targets of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen [13]. The results from 
these simulations showed how neutron and photon energy tallies from particular 
elements were superimposed when other materials were used and identified 
signals and their origins. This formed the basis for current simulation work in the 
isolation of potential flags.  
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This work identifies the flags that form the preliminary basis of the 
proposed algorithm-based approach. Future work will include laboratory 
measurements to validate the idealized scenarios simulated here. The strongest 
flags found using this simplified geometry will then be tested and the final 
detection algorithm optimized. Future investigations would include factors such 
as unknown cargo types, multiple scatter off surrounding materials, and realistic 
detector response. 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
The simulation work used MCNP5 [14] and the relatively simple geometry 
in Fig. 5-1. Included was an isotropic neutron source positioned 3.04 m away 
from the center of a standard cargo container with external dimensions of 2.4 m ! 
6.2 m ! 2.6 m and 0.346-cm thick steel walls. At a distance of 3.04 m from 
container center were seven 0.78 m radius detector hemispheres that sampled 
scattered neutrons at all possible scatter angles from transmission (0 degrees) to 
backscatter (180 degrees). Centered inside the container was a very large 
93.5-cm radius target sphere composed of either RDX or one of four shielding 
materials. Shielding materials included water, vegetable oil, paper, or steel, as 
specified in Table 5-1. This large sphere, equivalent to 6,230 kg of RDX, was 
primarily used because the large size would maximize the magnitude of the 
individual flags. An additional advantage was the large volume minimized the 
effect of non-centered targets to some degree. The shielding geometry consisted 
of one shielding material distributed evenly throughout the container volume with 
a density of 0.46 g cm-3, which approximated a typical total cargo mass. This 
artificially diffuse shielding drastically increased neutron mean free path in steel, 
but was used to simulate a realistic amount of material while maintaining the 
condition of content homogeneity.  
Current, or MCNP5 F1, tallies for both photons and neutrons were taken 
at the hemispherical detector surfaces. Energy bins of 0.2-MeV were used for all 
tallies. A 0.05 MeV neutron energy cutoff, well below the neutron and photon 
peaks of interest, was used to speed calculations. The isotropic neutron source 
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produced 2.4- or 14.1-MeV neutrons, approximating D-D and D-T neutron 
generators, respectively. To further conserve computational resources incident 
neutrons were biased towards the container in a conical beam. A sample MCNP 
input file may be found in Appendix A. 
Methods of Flag Calculation 
Tallies evaluated for use in flags included backscattered neutrons, 
inelastic photons, and ratios of neutron tallies at specific points. In all cases, flag 
determination was found by isolating the strongest flags, with flag strength and 
the general form of flag value as defined by eqns. (1.2) and (1.1), respectively. 
The final detection algorithm could combine several different flags from any of 
these methods. The 2.4-MeV D-D neutrons were expected to have limited use 
due to lower penetrability, but was still investigated as a possible neutron source.  
Flags formed using the backscattered neutrons 
The first type of flags relied solely on the backscattered neutron tallies. 
The neutron tallies for cases with and without RDX were subtracted and then 
examined manually to identify the neutron energies corresponding to the largest 
differences. The results for the subtracted backscattered neutron tallies for D-T 
neutron sources and each of the four shielding materials appear in Figures 5-2a 
and 5-2b. One of the most obvious features is the large positive peak near 
3.0-MeV in the oil, water, and paper-shielded simulations. This positive peak 
indicates presence in the RDX case and not in the no-RDX case, as would be 
expected as nitrogen has several inelastic scatter peaks between 2.7 and 3.1 
MeV, and these materials are nitrogen-poor in comparison to RDX. In the water 
and paper cases, but not the oil case, this large positive peak is followed by a 
significant negative peak around 3.2 MeV, probably due to the significant amount 
of oxygen in water and paper, with little in oil. The steel-shielded case showed a 
significantly smaller number of backscattered neutrons below 1.6 MeV when the 
RDX is present, probably due to the increased number of lighter elements. 
Perhaps the most interesting feature in all four shielding scenarios is the 
increased number of backscattered neutrons with energies between 10.2 and 
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11.2 MeV when RDX is present. As summarized in Table 5-2, this increase 
corresponds to flag values of 0.015, 0.028, and 0.016% in the number of 
backscattered neutrons for the oil, paper, and water cases. The flag value is two 
orders of magnitude larger, 2.1, in the steel-shielded case, which is unsurprising 
given how different RDX and steel are. This effect is similar to the backscatter 
“enhancement” found in other studies, and is due to the increased amount of 
elastic scatter off carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen when RDX is present [16]. It 
should be noted that some of this increase may be due to the addition of higher 
density material, RDX, in cases where there is already a significant amount of 
carbon and oxygen. 
 In a related calculation, the total number of backscattered neutrons was 
compared for cases with and without RDX. It has been shown that the presence 
of explosives can increase the reflected flux of thermal and high-energy neutrons 
[15-17]. For the cases with oil, water, and paper shielding flag values were 
0.019% to 0.036% difference, while the steel-shielded case had a flag value of 
0.11. 
One of the most direct ways of measuring the amount of carbon, nitrogen, 
and oxygen is to compare the magnitudes of their respective elastic scatter 
peaks, which fall at 10.2-, 10.6-, and 11-MeV when using 14.1-MeV neutrons. 
Ratios of these peaks appear in Table 5-2. The largest percent differences were 
found in the nitrogen-carbon ratio in the organically shielded scenarios and in the 
oxygen-carbon ratios for the water- and steel-shielded simulations. As expected, 
the simulations using metallic shielding showed much larger differences in peak 
ratios. This method merits further study, especially if the shield mass is small 
relative to the explosive mass or if neutron spectroscopy is improved and can 
differentiate among the backscatter peaks of similarly-massed elements.  
Advantages of using flags based on backscattered neutrons include the 
larger number of backscattered neutrons and, because the maximum amount of 
energy is transferred to the target nucleus, backscatter provides the maximum 
elastic scatter peak separation. Furthermore, in many one-sided applications it 
may not be feasible to measure neutrons at angles other than backscatter. The 
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most significant disadvantage is the interference due to uncollided neutrons, 
necessitating extensive shielding of the source, detector, or both. 
Flags formed using ratios at a given energy at different angles 
In the next strategy, ratios were taken of the neutron tally at a given 
energy for two different scatter angles such that flag strength ( ) is defined as: 
 
fs =
n E1,A1( )
n E2,A2( ) ,     (5.1) 
where  are the neutron tallies for one particular energy and two different 
angles. The most significant flags for all four shielding materials appear in Table 
5-3. These flags showed flag strengths of 5-10 for the oil, paper and water 
scenarios and exceeded 25 in the steel-shielded case.  
There was significant overlap between the flag identities in the different 
shield scenarios with D-T source neutrons, which would be ideal for use on 
unknown cargo. One major advantage of using this type of flag is related to the 
self-normalizing nature of comparing ratios, which compensates for some 
variations in target composition. Furthermore, other studies have shown that it is 
possible to sensitize fast neutron detectors to certain energies, which would allow 
an easier, less expensive detection alternative to full neutron spectroscopy [18]. 
Flags formed using neutron scattering peaks at different angles 
For the next flag strategy, the energy bins corresponding to inelastic and 
elastic neutron scatter peaks of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen were isolated for 
each of the seven scatter angle ranges, for a total of 100 peaks. Flags were 
formed by taking the ratio of each peak with all others for a total of 10,000 ratios.  
The most promising flags are shown in Table 5-4. Flag strength for the top five 
flags in oil, paper, and water scenarios ranged between 3.4 and 7.4. Flag 
strengths in the steel cases ranged from 48 to 62. Almost all the flags involved 
comparing one of the elastic backscatter peaks of carbon (10.2 MeV), nitrogen 
(10.6 MeV), or oxygen (11.0 MeV), with lower energy peak at transmission 
angles.  
 
fs
 
n(E,A)
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This strategy shares many of the advantages of the method discussed in 
section 4.2, but allows for greater flexibility in neutron energy, and a greater 
probability of exploiting a “sweet spot” related to specific neutron interactions. 
Obvious advantages of using peak magnitudes are the improved counting 
statistics, and the potential of sensitizing the neutron detectors using the same 
interactions. Furthermore, some of the top flags compare at two very different 
energies, which may lead to a system in which a high level of neutron energy 
resolution is unnecessary.  A comparison of the flags in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 
shows that somewhat larger differences may be found using the 
earlier-discussed method in the oil, water, and paper-shielded cases, but not the 
steel-shielded case.  
Flags formed comparing inelastic photon peak ratios 
The photon-comparison method took the form of comparing ratios 
between neutron inelastic scatter photon peaks in hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, 
and oxygen for cases with and without RDX. As mentioned earlier, there has 
been considerable study in using these types of photons in explosives-screening 
scenarios, but in this case they are being considered as part of a larger detection 
algorithm. The best flags using this method are in Table 5-5. Flag strength in 
photon peak tally ratios were around 0.30 to 0.46 for the oil, water, and 
paper-shielded cases, and approached 1.0 for the steel-shielded case.  
Flags as a function of explosive amount and position 
A major concern with the proposed method is the sensitivity of the specific 
flags to the position and amount of hidden explosive. A series of simulations was 
completed that investigated the effect on flag strength when either the amount or 
position of the explosive sphere was changed inside a cargo container filled with 
paper. Seven simulations were run with a sphere of RDX of mass 1000, 750, 
500, 250, 100, 50, or 10 kg centered in the container. Six simulations had a 
100-kg sphere positioned 75 cm from center in positive and negative x, y, and z 
directions. In the other four simulations, 100-kg spheres were positioned 130 cm 
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from center at vectors <1,1,-1>, <-1,1,1>, <-1, -1,-1>, and <1,-1,1> with respect 
to the center.  
As expected, the flag magnitude was shown to be dependent on RDX 
mass, with each type of flag reacting differently to the changing amounts of 
explosive. This relationship is illustrated in Fig. 5-3, where the magnitude of the 
prominent peak at 3 MeV seen in Fig. 5-2a for paper is plotted as a function of 
RDX mass on a log-log scale. A least squares fit displayed an R2 value of 0.958, 
indicating a clear exponential relationship. Similarly, there was a strong linear 
relationship in the log-log plot of total backscattered neutrons versus RDX mass 
with an R2 value of 0.984, as shown in Fig. 5-4. 
The flags corresponding to the relative magnitudes of the neutron elastic 
scatter peaks were nonlinearly dependent on RDX mass, as illustrated in Fig. 
5-5, although the values for the oxygen-carbon ratio comparison were so small 
that statistical uncertainties made clear determination of this relationship difficult. 
All of the flags formed by methods described in 4.2 and 4.4 showed a linear 
behavior, with respect to changing RDX mass, and R2 values greater than 0.98, 
as illustrated in Fig. 5-6. Therefore, these flags were the least sensitive to 
changes in RDX mass.  
The five different types of flags also had very different reactions to change 
of RDX position. Table 5-6 shows the average percent difference for each 
position relative to the center position for each type of flag. This table shows that 
the largest are found when the RDX sphere is moved towards the negative x 
direction, or closer to the neutron source, drastically decreasing the amount of 
shielding.  
Limitations of Idealized Simulations 
The simulated geometry is a simplification of an actual cargo container 
interrogation scenario. Typical surroundings, such as cement pad, ground, or 
personnel shielding, are not present. Cargo container contents are homogenous 
and the amount of simulated explosive was extremely large. The neutron sources 
are artificially collimated so they only irradiate the cargo container, ignoring the 
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necessary shadow shielding and associated secondary radiation. Finally, the 
idealistic detector surfaces count every neutron or photon crossing its surface 
with perfect efficiency, ignoring the inefficiency, energy resolution, and other 
limitations of actual detectors. This preliminary work, however, is useful in 
determining which flags merit further study, even though one would expect that 
the flags would decrease in strength for more realistic conditions. Only the 
strongest flags, such as those with >1.0 flag strength, would likely be included in 
the explosives-detection algorithm. Background radiation could also strongly 
affect neutron and photon signatures. In these idealized simulations, flags were 
identified using a comparison of containers with and without RDX, which is 
significantly different from actual screening scenarios and may even lead to 
pursuit of unfeasible flags. However, the strongest flags discussed here still show 
significant potential. 
Flag strength quantifications are useful in comparing one flag to another, 
but do not easily translate into the probability of actual explosives detection 
without considering the many factors and limitations found in screening 
scenarios, such as detector limitations, neutron interactions with surrounding 
materials, and container content inhomogeneities. Future work will quantify the 
effect of these and other factors to determine an accurate estimation of the 
detection probability, including the probabilities of false negatives and false 
positives. 
Conclusions 
There are many possible flags that may be used for determining the 
presence of hidden explosives in a simplified cargo container simulation. 
Because D-D neutrons have low penetrability of large targets, their use was 
eliminated in the explosives-detection system. Several of these flags showed 
very large percent differences between cases with and without the explosive 
RDX. It was further demonstrated that flags formed using ratios of neutron tallies 
at specific energies and angles are relatively independent of changes in 
explosive amount and position. Furthermore, many of the strongest flags have 
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similar energies and angles, such that it may be possible to combine these flags 
into other flags that require less rigorous neutron spectroscopy or combine 
different types of flags such as photon peak tallies with neutron total tallies. 
Future efforts will test the flags found here in more realistic scenarios, as well as 
quantify the robustness of the proposed algorithm-based approach when 
confronted with actual detection limitations as well as the expected variations 
found in field applications.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Simulation geometry showing cross section and top view of simulated 
cargo container with target and tally surface geometries and conical beam 
neutron source. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 5-2. Subtracted backscattered neutron tallies for the RDX case minus the 
no-RDX case with D-T source for a) oil-, water-, paper-, and b) steel-shielded 
targets.  
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Figure 5-3. The magnitude of a representative peak from a subtracted 
backscatter neutron tally is plotted as a function of the amount of hidden RDX 
(kg) in a case with paper shielding and 14.1 MeV incident neutrons. A least 
squares fit shows a relationship between peak magnitude, p, and RDX mass, m, 
such that p = (2.24 # 10-6) ! m1.658, with an R2 value of 0.958.  
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Figure 5-4. The change in the total number of backscattered neutrons per source 
neutron (n cm2), n, is plotted against the mass of RDX (kg), in a paper shielded 
cargo container with 14.1 MeV incident neutrons. A least squares fit shows a 
relationship of n = (5.44 ! 10-9) ! m1.715, with an R2 value of 0.984. 
  97 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Differences in flag values formed from ratios of neutron elastic scatter 
peaks with and without RDX are plotted as a function of RDX mass (kg) for paper 
shielded RDX spheres and 14.1 MeV incident neutrons. A second order 
polynomial fit gives R2 values greater than 0.99 for all three ratios. Some points 
with small RDX mass were discounted to limit biasing due to denser sampling at 
the lower explosive masses. 
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Figure 5-6. Flag strength for three types of flags as a function of RDX size for 
paper-shielded RDX and 14.1 MeV incident neutrons. The three types of flag, 
formed by taking ratios of neutron tallies at either a given energy at different 
angles, between different neutron peaks, or between different photon peaks, 
show a linear relationship between the percent difference and amount of RDX.  
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Tables 
Table 5-1. Elemental compositions in atom percent of materials used in 
simulations [19]. 
 
Element Air Steel RDX Water Paper Oil 
H 0.00%  28.6% 66.7% 47.6% 62.8% 
C 0.01% 0.32% 14.3%  28.6% 33.5% 
N 75.5%  28.5%    
O 23.2%  28.6% 33.3% 23.8% 3.70% 
P 0.00% 0.04%     
S 0.00% 0.05%     
Ar 1.30%      
Fe 0.00% 99.6%     
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Table 5-2. Flag strength for flags calculated using only backscattered neutrons.  
 
Cargo contents: Oil Paper Steel Water 
Total backscattered 
neutrons 
0.0228 ± 
0.0014 
0.0185 ± 
0.0011 
0.109 ± 
0.0053 
0.036 ± 
0.0026 
10-12 MeV backscattered 
neutrons 
0.0155 ± 
0.0005 
0.0196 ± 
0.0006 
2.08 ± 
0.035 
0.0158 ± 
0.00040 
Neutron backscatter 
peaks: O/C 
0.0723 ± 
0.0005 
0.0283 ± 
0.0001 
0.408 ± 
0.007 
0.288 ± 
0.0036 
Neutron backscatter 
peaks: N/C 
0.164 ± 
0.0015 
0.211 ± 
0.0015 
0.144 ± 
0.0023 
0.0603 ± 
0.00090 
Neutron backscatter 
peaks: N/O 
0.110 ± 
0.0012 
0.232 ± 
0.0017 
0.309 ± 
0.0047 
0.214 ± 
0.0019 
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Table 5-3. Top ten flags found by comparing neutron tallies at a given energy. 
 
Flag identity 
 (MeV, Degrees) 
Flag 
strength 
Flag identity  
(MeV, Degrees) 
Flag 
strength 
Oil (D-T source) Water (D-T source) 
(11.6,120)/(11.6,0) 8.07 ± 2.78 (11.2,150)/(11.2,0) 9.99 ± 2.65 
(10.6,150)/(10.6,0) 6.37 ± 1.96 (11.6,120)/(11.6,0) 7.52 ± 1.78 
(11.2,150)/(11.2,0) 5.03 ± 1.37 (10.6,150)/(10.6,0) 7.47 ± 1.65 
(11,180)/(11,0) 4.83 ± 1.36 (11,150)/(11,0) 5.94 ± 1.22 
(11,150)/(11,0) 4.55 ± 1.28 (11.4,120)/(11.4,0) 5.70 ± 1.24 
(10.8,150)/(10.8,0) 4.50 ± 1.23 (11,180)/(11,0) 5.61 ± 1.14 
(11.4,150)/(11.4,0) 4.18 ± 1.09 (11.4,150)/(11.4,0) 5.37 ± 1.15 
(11.4,120)/(11.4,0) 4.03 ± 1.05 (10.8,150)/(10.8,0) 5.30 ± 0.93 
(11.2,150)/(11.2,30) 0.90 ± 0.15 (10.6,150)/(10.6,30) 1.91 ± 0.25 
(11,180)/(11,30) 0.77 ± 0.11 (11,150)/(11,30) 1.19 ± 0.14 
Paper (D-T source) Steel (D-T source) 
(11.4,150)/(11.4,0) 10.0 ± 1.1 (11,150)/(11,0) 59.1 ± 2.4 
(11.4,120)/(11.4,0) 9.69 ± 1.11 (11.2,150)/(11.2,0) 40.7 ± 2.1 
(11.2,150)/(11.2,0) 5.99 ± 0.71 (11,150)/(11,30) 40.2 ± 1.6 
(11.6,120)/(11.6,0) 5.84 ± 0.61 (11,180)/(11,0) 29.0 ± 0.9 
(10.8,150)/(10.8,0) 5.10 ± 0.45 (11.6,120)/(11.6,0) 28.3 ± 1.8 
(11,150)/(11,0) 4.96 ± 0.44 (11.2,150)/(11.2,30) 26.4 ± 1.2 
(11,180)/(11,0) 4.87 ± 0.43 (10.6,150)/(10.6,0) 24.3 ± 0.9 
(10.6,150)/(10.6,0) 4.72 ± 0.43 (11.4,120)/(11.4,0) 24.3 ± 1.1 
(0.2,180)/(0.2,0) 2.62 ± 0.11 (10.8,150)/(10.8,0) 22.1 ± 0.8 
(0.2,150)/(0.2,0) 2.61 ± 0.11 (11,180)/(11,30) 19.5 ± 0.6 
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Table 5-4. Neutron peak energies (MeV) and scatter angle (degrees) of both 
peaks making up the neutron peak comparison flag for 14.1 MeV incident 
neutrons. 
 
Flag identity 
(MeV, degrees) Flag strength 
Flag Identity 
(MeV, degrees) Flag strength 
Water Oil 
(11.0, 150)/(10.0, 0) 6.76 ± 2.26 (11.0, 150)/(7.8, 0) 7.44 ± 1.84 
(11.0, 150)/(7.8, 0) 5.78 ± 1.87 (11.0, 150)/(10.0, 0) 5.3.0 ± 1.11 
(11.0, 150)/(9.6, 0) 5.67 ± 1.79 (11.0, 150)/(8.2, 0) 4.33 ± 0.79 
(11.0, 150)/(7.2, 0) 5.04 ± 1.35 (11.0, 150)/(9.6, 0) 3.41 ± 0.59 
(11.0, 150)/(8.2, 0) 4.62 ± 1.31 (11.0, 150)/(6.8, 0) 3.37 ± 0.53 
(11.0, 150)/(6.8, 0) 2.67 ± 0.54 (6.2, 0)/(11.0, 150) 3.28 ± 0.55 
(6.2, 0)/(11.0, 150) 2.37 ± 0.54 (11.0, 150)/(7.2, 0) 2.62 ± 0.42 
(11.0, 150)/(0.8, 0) 1.02 ± 0.13 (11.0, 150)/(0.8, 0) 1.64 ± 0.18 
(11.2, 150)/(1.0, 0) 0.74 ± 0.09 (11.0, 150)/(1.0, 0) 1.15 ± 0.13 
(11.0, 150)/(1.0, 0) 0.74 ± 0.09 (11.2, 150)/(1.0, 0) 1.06 ± 0.12 
Paper Steel 
(11.0, 150)/(10.0, 0) 5.42 ± 0.54 (11.0, 150)/(1.0, 0) 62.3 ± 1.6 
(11.0, 150)/(9.6, 0) 5.01 ± 0.44 (11.0, 150)/(8.2, 0) 54.5 ± 2.1 
(11.0, 150)/(7.8, 0) 4.98 ± 0.46 (11.0, 150)/(9.6, 0) 54.1 ± 2.0 
(11.0, 150)/(7.2, 0) 4.93 ± 0.36 (11.0, 150)/(10.0, 0) 52.0 ± 2.4 
(11.0, 150)/(8.2, 0) 4.69 ± 0.43 (11.0, 150)/(0.8, 0) 51.6 ± 1.3 
(6.2, 0)/(11.0, 150) 4.56 ± 0.36 (11.0, 150)/(7.8, 0) 51.0 ± 1.9 
(11.0, 150)/(6.8, 0) 4.07 ± 0.29 (11.0, 150)/(7.2, 0) 50.7 ± 1.8 
(11.0, 150)/(0.8, 0) 3.2.0 ± 0.18 (11.2, 150)/(1.0, 0) 49.4 ± 1.1 
(11.0, 150)/(1.0, 0) 2.64 ± 0.15 (6.2, 0)/(11.0, 150) 48.8 ± 1.6 
(11.2, 150)/(1.0, 0) 2.61 ± 0.15 (11.0, 150)/(6.8, 0) 48.6 ± 1.7 
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Table 5-5. Photon peak energies and flag values corresponding to the most 
promising flags based on a comparing photon peaks. 
 
Photons 
(MeV) Flag strength 
Photons 
(MeV) Flag strength 
Oil Water 
5.2 /2.6  0.49 ± 0.0036 7.2 /4.6  0.35 ± 0.0012 
5.2 /1.0  0.48 ± 0.0030 4.6 /2.6  0.34 ± 0.0016 
5.2 /3.4  0.47 ± 0.0036 4.6 /3.8  0.33 ± 0.0011 
5.2 /2.8  0.41 ± 0.0029 4.6 /2.8  0.33 ± 0.0012 
5.2 /4.6  0.38 ± 0.0024 4.6 /3.4  0.31 ± 0.0015 
5.2 /3.8  0.33 ± 0.0023 4.6 /1.0  0.30 ± 0.0010 
6.8 /1.0  0.30 ± 0.0026 5.2 /6.2  0.29 ± 0.0014 
7.2 /4.6  0.29 ± 0.0013 4.6 /1.8  0.27 ± 0.0011 
6.8 /4.6  0.29 ± 0.0025 7.2 /5.2  0.27 ± 0.0013 
6.2 /2.6  0.24 ± 0.0011 5.2 /2.6  0.26 ± 0.0015 
Paper Steel 
5.2 /2.6  0.46 ± 0.0027 4.6 /1.0  0.99 ± 0.0029 
5.2 /6.2  0.44 ± 0.0022 4.6 /2.6  0.95 ± 0.0032 
5.2 /3.4  0.44 ± 0.0027 4.6 /3.4  0.91 ± 0.0032 
5.2 /2.8  0.43 ± 0.0023 4.6 /1.8  0.90 ± 0.0030 
5.2 /3.8  0.41 ± 0.0021 4.6 /2.8  0.79 ± 0.0027 
5.2 /1.0  0.40 ± 0.0020 2.4 /4.6  0.78 ± 0.0027 
7.2 /5.2  0.38 ± 0.0020 6.8 /4.6  0.67 ± 0.0033 
5.2 /4.6  0.33 ± 0.0017 6.2 /1.0  0.57 ± 0.0019 
6.8 /1.0  0.26 ± 0.0018 6.2 /2.6  0.56 ± 0.0021 
6.8 /4.6  0.25 ± 0.0018 6.2 /3.4  0.55 ± 0.0021 
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Table 5-6. Average deviation in percent of flag strength magnitude for a given 
type of flag when the explosive is displaced from the center of the cargo 
container.  
 
Displaced 
position Backscatter 
1 Energy, 2 
angles 
Neutron 
peaks Photon peaks 
(0,0,75) 73% ± 50% 390% ± 640% 360% ± 640% 110% ± 150% 
(0,0,-75) 76% ± 53% 150% ± 450% 130% ± 260% 38% ± 45% 
(-75,0,0) 990% ± 1500% 240% ± 410% 280% ± 530% 1920% ± 3100% 
(75,0,0)  67% ± 150% 82% ± 220% 74% ± 110% 
(0,-75,0)  120% ± 290% 97% ± 220% 34% ± 45% 
(0,75,0)  110% ± 310% 77% ± 170% 22% ± 34% 
(75,-75,75)  120% ± 220% 110% ± 210% 2800% ± 4100% 
(75,75,-75)  170% ± 500% 130% ± 280% 65% ± 67% 
(-75,75,75) 120% ± 200% 420% ± 720% 390% ± 620% 500% ± 780% 
(-75,-75,-75) 120% ± 200% 190% ± 520% 160% ± 310% 230% ± 340% 
Average 
deviation 280% 200% 180% 580% 
Average 
error 390% 420% 350% 870% 
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Chapter 6: Simulations for Developing a Flag-Based 
Active Neutron Interrogation Method for Explosives 
Detection in Sea-Land Cargo Containers 
 
Abstract 
Fast neutron interrogation for explosives detection has shown potential for 
the screening of sea-land cargo containers. Simulations were completed 
investigating the neutron scatter behavior of 14.1 MeV fast neutrons in such 
screening scenarios. Earlier efforts centered on Monte Carlo (MCNP5) 
simulations to identify flags, or specific calculations based on photons or 
neutrons produced as a result of fast neutron interaction that signal the presence 
of the explosive RDX (C3H6N6O6). Those simulations consisted of a simplified 
target geometry with artificially collimated neutron source and generalized 
organic, hydrogenous, or metallic types of cargo materials. In this study, the 
MCNP5 simulation was expanded to include a more accurate representation of 
the neutron source, target geometry, detector response, and realistic and varied 
container contents. The flags found using the earlier simulations were applied to 
the more realistic scenario models in order to determine the feasibility of the 
flags’ use in a detection algorithm. Additional flags utilizing the simulated detector 
response were also investigated. The conditions under which specific flags were 
preferable were also examined. It was found that many flags performed well 
independent of the cargo type, while others, such as those using only neutron 
backscatter, were more highly dependent on cargo type. Furthermore, many of 
the best-performing flags were those that did not require stringent neutron 
spectroscopy, and would therefore be feasible with existing technology. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few decades, many different strategies have been proposed 
for the detection of hidden explosives [1]. Several promising methods of 
non-invasive detection of bulk explosives employed neutron interrogation [1-3]. 
Its major advantages include high neutron penetrability and the ability to 
differentiate among light elements of similar atomic mass. Its difficulties include 
the desired requirements of tunable neutron production, neutron spectroscopy, 
and shielding.  
Explosives screening is needed for relatively small explosive amounts, 
such as found in mail, landmines, improvised explosive devices, or hand-carried 
terrorist weapons. Other situations involve larger amounts, such as quantities 
sufficient to demolish large buildings that may be hidden inside vehicles or 
sea-land cargo containers. This study focused on the problem of bulk explosives 
detection in large cargo-filled sea-land containers.  
Explosives detection using active neutron interrogation 
There are three basic ways that neutrons are used in active interrogation 
of cargo [1-3]. In thermal neutron activation (TNA), the incident neutrons are 
absorbed by target nuclei, which then decay, emitting a high-energy 
characteristic photon, such as the 2.22 and 10.8 MeV photons produced by 1H 
and 14N, respectively [4-6]. Another method is based on inelastic neutron 
scattering, in which fast neutrons excite target nuclei, which emit characteristic 
photons as the fall back to ground state [7-10]. Important de-excitation photons 
include: 4.43 MeV from 12C, 6.13 MeV from 16O, and 1.64, 2.31, and 5.11 MeV 
from 14N [6]. In the third strategy the scattered neutrons are measured directly. 
This may consist of measuring the number of scattered neutrons at specific 
angles [11,12] or spectroscopic measurements, often based on time-of-flight 
technology [8]. 
There is a wide variety of both neutron and photon detectors that could be 
used in explosives-detection systems. Photon spectroscopy is significantly easier 
than neutron spectroscopy and an energy resolution comparable to the 0.2 MeV 
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energy bins presented here is easily achievable using semiconductor detector 
technology [13]. However, fast neutron spectroscopy with this level of energy 
resolution and reasonable detection efficiency is very difficult, if not impossible, 
with existing technology [13,14]. Furthermore, neutron energy calculations using 
time-of-flight are also quite difficult when scanning very large targets, such as a 
cargo container, due to uncertainties in interaction location and multiple scatters 
[8,15]. For this study, a simulated liquid scintillator (EJ-309, Eljen Technology, 
1300 W. Broadway, Sweetwater, TX 79556) detector was chosen for its high 
detection efficiency, ability to separate photon and neutron events, and neutron 
spectroscopic capabilities via pulse height distribution unfolding [16]. 
Application of active neutron interrogation in the flag-based algorithm 
The method discussed here involves use of both de-excitation photons 
and scattered neutrons. It therefore combines the advantages of two of the 
above strategies and makes efficient use of the interrogating neutrons, 
minimizing the personnel dose and screening time. Neutron activation was not 
considered at this point, as it requires significantly higher incident neutron flux 
due to lower interaction cross sections.  
This method was presented previously as part of an algorithm-based 
approach using 14.1 MeV incident neutrons [17,18]. Preliminary exploratory 
simulations characterized the neutron scatter behavior of D-T neutrons in pure 
samples of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and iron, as well as water, oil, paper, and 
the explosive RDX (C3H6N6O6) [18]. Refined simulations later examined a 
simplified explosives-detection scenario consisting of a large sphere of RDX 
centered in a steel cargo container surrounded by hydrogenous, organic, or 
metallic cargo materials [17]. In that work, several strategies were used that 
identified significant differences between cases with and without RDX. Specific 
flags, generally manifested as ratios of specific neutron or photon tallies at 
certain energies and angles, were identified that best isolated these differences. 
Calculation of these specific flags gave the flag value (f), defined by: 
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f = n(E1,A1)n(E2,A2)
    or     f = p(E1)p(E2) , (6.1) 
in which n(E,A) is the neutron tally at a particular energy or energy range and 
angle and p(E) is the photon tally at a particular energy or energy range. Flag 
strength (S) is a quantity that was used when determining which flags should be 
used to find explosives. This quantity is defined as:  
  
 
S = fe ! f if i ,     (6.2) 
in which the flag strength (S) is a function of the flag value with only inert cargo, 
(fi) and the flag value with an explosive present (fe). Flags with the greatest flag 
strength are the most sensitive to the presence of explosive and are potentially 
the best flags to use in a detection algorithm. Uncertainties in flag value and flag 
strength are determined by propagating the statistical error provided in the 
simulation output through the flag value and flag strength calculations. The flags 
identified in these simplistic simulations would later form an integral part of the 
explosives detection algorithm in which changes in specific flag values would be 
used to determine the type of cargo and “trigger” in the presence of explosives, 
with additional steps to and minimize false positives due to cargo irregularities.  
For this chapter, the flags found in the simplified explosives-detection 
scenario were tested in more realistic simulations. Added realism included the 
presence of environmental materials such as a concrete slab and soil or sand, 
and consideration of different container contents. Possible container contents, 
such as furniture, vegetables, or plastic, were approximated from a survey of 
cargo [19]. Other factors included a more realistic cargo distribution within the 
crate, a more accurate portrayal of the neutron source, and simulation of a 
neutron detector response. The simulated neutron detector response included 
both pulse height distributions (PHDs) and time-of-flight (TOF) distributions. It 
was expected that the inclusion of these realistic factors would result in signal 
degradation, with different flags displaying varying responses to each factor. 
These relationships are important to quantify to develop and further test the 
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viability of an optimal explosives-detection algorithm prior to any experimental 
work. 
It was observed in a previous work that many of the best-performing flags 
utilizing single-width 0.2 MeV energy bins were very similar [17]. For example, 
several consisted of a high-energy neutron tally at backscatter angles divided by 
a low-energy neutron tally at transmission angles. As an extension of this work, 
these “specific” flags were modified into new “combinatory” flags that utilized 
wider energy ranges instead of specific neutron energy bins. Similarly, these 
“combinatory” flags based on neutron energy ranges were translated into flags 
based on pulse height distribution (PHD) thresholds from the simulated neutron 
detector responses. Both the combinatory and PHD flags have the distinct 
advantage of less stringent neutron spectroscopy requirements. 
Materials and Methods 
Monte Carlo simulations 
The simulation work was undertaken using a combination of MCNP5 [20] 
and MCNP-PoliMi [21]. All outputs were provided output in the form of text files. 
These results were analyzed with a custom parser designed using common data 
analysis package (MATLAB, 3 Apple Hill Drive, Natick, MA, USA 01760), as well 
as spreadsheet software (Excel, Microsoft, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond WA, USA 
98052). The basic geometry was a standard steel cargo container with 2.4 m " 
6.2 m " 2.6 m exterior dimensions and 0.346 cm thick steel walls with an 
isotropic neutron source was located 4.44 m away from the container center. The 
cargo container was surrounded at 3.04 m by seven 0.78-m radius hemispherical 
surfaces that sampled scattered neutrons and photons at all possible scatter 
angles from transmission, 0°, to backscatter, 180°. An outer 10-cm radius 
sphere, centered around the cargo container, defined the outer limits of the 
simulation.  Current, or MCNP5 F1 tallies, for both photons and neutrons were 
taken over each hemispherical surface using 0.2 MeV energy bins. A sample 
MCNP input file may be found in Appendix A. 
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Neutron sources 
Because there were very few usable flags for 2.4 MeV incident neutrons 
due to their limited target penetrability and thresholds for inelastic scatter 
reactions of interest [17], only 14.1 MeV incident neutrons were utilized.  An 
artificially collimated monoenergetic neutron source was employed to shorten 
computation time in prior work [17,18]. However, as D-T neutron generators emit 
neutrons almost isotropically, the explosives-detection system would require 
shielding around the source to minimize operator and bystander dose. A neutron 
shield 50 cm thick with layers of polyethylene and steel was designed that could 
adequately shield the surrounding area and maintain the monoenergetic incident 
neutron flux [22]. Modifications were made to this shield to produce a more 
conical beam. This involved an isotropic source positioned 4.44 m from the 
container center, as shown in Fig. 6-1.  
Several simulations were completed using the shielded isotropic source. 
However, as these simulations took several days to run, later simulations used a 
biased conical neutron beam with a neutron energy distribution equivalent to the 
shielded source output as tallied at the container surface. This approximation 
was calculated using MCNP5 F1 tallies in concentric rings on a surface the same 
distance and orientation with respect to the shielded source as the side of the 
container facing the source. Further comparisons were made to ensure that the 
neutron flux, as measured in the detector surfaces, was not significantly different 
when the conical approximation beam replaced the shielded isotropic source.  
Surrounding environment 
Exclusion of materials in the surrounding environment, other than air, 
decreased calculation times, but resulted in falsely high signal-to-noise ratios due 
to eliminating the vast majority particle interactions outside the cargo container. 
To account for those interactions, the earlier simulation was changed such that 
cargo rested on a concrete slab 30 cm thick with the remainder of the outermost 
sphere below the slab filled with a standard soil [23] for a depth of at least 7 m 
below the source and cargo container. Additional simulations were completed 
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with the container on a 10 cm thick steel plate over at least 7 m of sandy soil, as 
defined in Table 6-1. These simulations also included the source shield, as this is 
both a source of secondary scatter and perturbs the incident neutron flux from its 
monoenergetic state. 
Container contents 
Simulated container contents drawn from the literature included RDX, 
concrete, wood, brick, polyethylene, rubber, and various plastics [24]. Furniture, 
vegetables, meat, and clothing are all rather heterogeneous in nature and may 
vary significantly between individual cargos. The elemental compositions and 
densities of these and other simulated materials appear in Table 6-1. Furniture 
was approximated as 40% wood, 25% plastic, 25% metal, and 10% cloth. 
Clothing was assumed to be 100% cotton fibers. Vegetables, in the form of 
potatoes, were simulated as 75% water, 15% starch, 4% sugars, 2% fiber, and 
2% protein, with a variety of trace elements [25]. Meat, in the form of lean beef, 
was considered to be 60% water, 22% protein, and 18% fat, also with a variety of 
trace elements [25]. 
Another part of the investigations presented here was observing the flag 
strength of the best-performing flags when interrogating containers with an 
explosive other than RDX. Therefore, flag strength was compared for cases with 
a paper-filled cargo container with 500 kg of explosive at its center. The identities 
and elemental compositions of the explosives considered are detailed in Table 
6-2. 
Cargo distribution 
Simulations were completed that approximated the wooden crates of 
cargo present in many sea-land shipping containers. These crates were 
composed of hardwood, 3 cm thick and had exterior dimensions 100 cm " 100 
cm " 20 cm. Each container enclosed stacks of crates containing steel (34 
crates), vegetables (77 crates), or clothing (82 crates), for a total cargo mass of 
21.6 metric tons. The crates were stacked on the container floor in 2 rows of 6, 
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with 30 cm between the rows. A 500 kg rectangular (28 cm wide by 163.5 cm 
long by 60 cm tall) block of RDX was placed on the floor in the center of the 
container. This geometry is included as Fig. 6-2 and an example MCNP input file 
appears in Appendix A. 
Neutron detector response 
An important part of the development and analysis of the 
explosives-detection algorithm involved an accurate representation of neutron 
detector response. Earlier studies showed that it was possible to calculate the 
total, neutron, and photon PHDs and TOF responses of liquid scintillator-type 
(EJ-309, Eljen Technology, 2010 E. Broadway, Sweetwater, TX 79556, USA) 
neutron detectors [26]. The software MCNP-PoliMi [21], with the same input 
geometries as outlined above, was used to simulate the exact interactions inside 
the simulated detector active volume. A custom Fortran-based post-processor 
[27] was then used to calculate the relevant PHDs and TOFs.  
The input files for the MCNP-PoliMi simulations included cards that 
specified analog mode (necessary for PoliMi), 0.01 MeV neutron and photon 
cut-off energies for data collection, and identification of the active detector 
volumes. These simulations used one of six different cargo materials: electronics, 
furniture, meat, paper, steel, and vegetables, each containing 500 kg of RDX. 
Inputs for the post-processor specified the type of detector ane the details of 
PHD and TOF calculation [27]. These included the integration time, amount of 
light output for neutrons and photons, and the time window for TOF calculations.  
Other types of explosives 
A series of simulations was completed that used one of several different 
explosives in place of RDX in scenarios in which a 500 kg sphere of explosive 
was placed inside a container homogenously filled with paper. These explosives 
included several nitrogenous materials: ammonium nitrate (NH4NO3), ethylene 
glycol dinitrate or EGDN (C2H4N2O6), octogen or HMX (C4H8N8O8), nitrocellulose 
(C6H7(NO2)3O5), nitroglycerine (C3N3H5O9), pentaerythritol tetranitrate or PETN 
(C5H8N4O12), and trinitrotoluene or TNT (C7H5N3O6) [24]. Other explosives 
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included acetone peroxide (C9H18O6), black powder, and fertilizer [24]. An 
estimate of algorithm response for these scenarios was completed by comparing 
the flag strengths of the previously-identified flags for cases with RDX and the 
explosive in question. The explosives surrogate melamine was also considered, 
in order to investigate the response to inert nitrogenous material. 
Application of explosives-detection techniques to simulation output  
Five different types of flags were investigated for use in the 
explosives-detection algorithm. Several of these, including the backscatter 
neutron, monoenergetic neutron, and monoenergetic photon flags, were 
introduced in an earlier paper [17]. Conclusions reached in that earlier study 
resulted in both the combinatory and PHD flags discussed below. 
The best flags of each type were determined by finding the top ten flags 
for every scenario in which 500 kg of RDX were concealed in cargo with the 
surrounding environment present. These top flags were identified by the largest 
flag strength in one of three categories: organic/hydrogenous cargo, 
inorganic/metallic cargos, and all/unknown cargo. 
Flags based on backscattered neutrons 
As discussed above, earlier simulations utilized an artificially biased 
conical source with no shielding. This allowed the 180° detection surface to be 
placed behind the source. However, when the shield was present the detection 
surface was forced in front of the source, overwhelming the tallies with incident 
neutrons. Therefore, the 150° detector surface was used in place of the 180° 
detector surface for those flags using only backscattered neutrons. These 
included comparing the total number and the 10-12 MeV neutrons for cases with 
and without RDX. Other types of flags that previously used backscattered 
neutrons were either eliminated or substituted the 150° scatter neutrons. 
Monoenergetic neutron flags  
There were two types of flags that used monoenergetic neutrons, defined 
as within one 0.2 MeV energy bin. The first type consisted of the ratio of the 
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neutron tally at one particular angle and energy with another at the same energy 
but different angle. These flags took advantage of resonance scatter and 
absorption in the target, while use of ratios worked to normalize the tallies by the 
number of neutrons of the same energy produced at different scatter angles. A 
total of fifty-one flags of this type, specifically the best ones identified in prior 
work for simplified conditions [17], were calculated for the more realistic 
conditions described above.  
The second type of monoenergetic neutron flag consisted of ratios of 
specific neutron elastic and inelastic scatter peak magnitudes and particular 
angles. The seventy most promising flags of this type, as identified in the earlier 
study [17,18], were calculated for the more realistic scenarios discussed above. 
This included comparing ratios of the elastic scatter peaks for carbon (10.2 MeV), 
nitrogen (10.6 MeV), and oxygen (11.0 MeV) at the 150° scatter surface, as a 
comparison of these three peaks provides one of the most direct measures of the 
relative elemental abundances.  
Monoenergetic photon flags 
As with the monoenergetic neutron flags, the photon tallies were divided 
into 0.2 MeV energy bins with a single bin defining the location of the photon 
peak. For the flags based on photon peak ratios, ratios of inelastic 
scatter-induced characteristic photons from carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and iron 
were compared for cases with and without RDX. As photon emission is isotropic, 
the peak energies are not dependent on neutron scatter angle, so utilizing the 
photon tallies from only one detector surface (150°) was adequate. The top 
twenty-eight flags found in an earlier study utilizing simplified conditions were 
applied to the various scenarios studied here [17].  
Combinatory flags 
It was observed in an earlier paper [17] that the identities of many of the 
strongest flags were similar to that of other strong flags. This presents the 
possibility of using flags that combine different types of neutron and photon tallies 
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to create flags that are both effective and require less rigorous neutron 
spectroscopy. A total of 47 of these combinatory flags were considered. These 
included ratios of all neutrons at two different angles and photon peak tallies 
normalized by these neutron tally ratios. Others were composed of ratios at 
different angles of neutron tallies below 1 MeV, above 10 MeV, or integrated from 
4 to 8 MeV.  
Neutron pulse height distribution (PHD) flags 
The post-processor output included neutron, photon, and total PHDs and 
TOF distributions for every detector, as well as the combined PHD and TOF. As 
photon spectroscopy in the actual scanning system would be accomplished using 
dedicated detectors, it was not necessary to consider the photon PHDs in the 
described liquid-scintillation detectors at this time. Possible PHD flags mirrored 
several of the combinatory flags discussed earlier in that they used ratios of the 
number of neutrons in given energy ranges. For the PHD flags, these 
corresponded to the number of neutrons inside specific pulse height windows, 
with the domains as defined through application the relevant energy deposition 
equations [26]. For example, given that 10 MeV neutrons may deposit up to 4.88 
MeVee in the liquid scintillator material, for the purpose of the flag the number of 
neutrons over 10 MeV was approximated by the integrated PHD greater than 
4.88 MeVee. The resulting flag strengths, as defined by eqn. (6-2), were then 
compared with each other, as well as the analogous combinatory flag strengths, 
to find potential flags for the detection algorithm.  
Results and Discussion 
The use of realistic neutron sources 
Isotropic vs. artificially collimated monoenergetic sources 
As expected, there were significantly more uninteracted 14.1 MeV 
neutrons tallied the 150° and 120° detector tallies when the unshielded isotropic 
source was used instead of the monoenergetic cone source. Unattenuated 
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neutrons in these two tallies were negligible for the conical source, but totaled 
30% and 9%, respectively, of the 180° detector tally for the isotropic source. This 
is expected, as the conical beam was such that these two surfaces were 
completely outside the beam path but the partial shielding from the container and 
proximity to the isotropic source led to significant source interference at these 
detector surfaces. Other differences in isotropic source tallies included an 
increase by a factor of two for neutrons below 4 MeV as well as a 45% increase 
in the number with energy between the 11 MeV backscatter off oxygen and 14.1 
MeV. This is mainly due to increased scatter off surrounding materials.  Similarly, 
the increased interaction with the surroundings changed the photon flux, with 
25% and 140% more photons tallied with energies at 3.8 and 5.2 MeV 
respectively for the isotropic neutron source. Due to the interference from the 
unshielded isotropic source, these simulations were not included in the 
identification of flags for the detection algorithm. 
Effect of shielding an isotropic 14.1 MeV neutron source 
A comparison of the neutron and photon tallies at the detector surfaces for 
cases with and without the neutron shield showed some distinctive differences. 
There was an ~99% reduction in the number of unscattered neutrons crossing 
the 150°, 120°, and 90° detector surfaces. Also expected was the large increase 
in low-energy neutrons tallied on all surfaces, due to the polyenergetic nature of 
the neutron beam caused by significant neutron scatter inside the shield. This 
increase varied from a factor of 2 for transmitted neutrons, 23 at the 90° detector 
surface, to a factor of 68 at the 180° detector surface. Furthermore, many 
photons were produced through interactions in the shielding, which accounted for 
a factor of 35 increase in the number of photons counted at the 180° detector 
surface when the shield was in place. Especially prominent among these were 
the 4.6 MeV photon from the de-excitation of 56Fe, a 1.0 MeV photon formed 
from several 56Fe de-excitation reactions, and a large number of lower-energy 
photons that were partially attenuated before exiting the shield.  
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Conical approximation of the shielded isotropic 14.1 MeV source 
The artificially-biased conical source showed a factor of 7.4 decrease in 
the number of unattenuated 14.1 MeV neutrons in the 150° detector surface due 
to incomplete shielding at the extreme edges of the conical shield. However, 
neutron tallies were otherwise very similar and the use of the artificially-biased 
conical approximation was used in order to conserve computational resources. 
One disadvantage of the conical approximation was that the photons produced in 
the shield by the isotropic source were no longer present so the number of 
photons measured in the 150° detector, especially the iron photons, was 
somewhat reduced. This artificial inflation of the photon flag strength could be 
partially compensated for by using the total number of photons in all detection 
surfaces, though this made no difference in which flags were identified for use in 
the detection algorithm. 
Neutron detector response 
An example of the detector response, as calculated using MCNP-PoliMi, 
for the liquid scintillator detector at the 150° scatter position is shown in Fig. 6-3. 
In this example the photon spectrum (Fig. 6-3a) shows several inelastic scatter 
photons at 2.2, 4.6, 6.2, 7.8, and 9.0 MeV, while the elastically scattered 
neutrons between 10-12 MeV are clearly visible. The photons correspond to the 
de-excitation photons with energies of 2.31 MeV from nitrogen, 4.43 MeV from 
carbon, 6.13 from oxygen, and 7.89 MeV and 8.88 MeV from iron. The photon 
pulse height distribution (Fig. 6-3b) shows corresponding Compton edges at the 
expected 2.1, 4.2, 6.0, 7.7, and 8.6 MeV. Due to the way fast neutrons deposit 
energy in the liquid scintillator material, the maximum light output in MeVee is 
less than the energy deposited such that the pulse height does not exceed 8.9 
MeVee for 14.1 MeV neutrons. As seen in Fig 6-3c, the majority of the photons 
started arriving at the detector after ~39 ns. This is similar to the 37 ns needed 
for 14.1 MeV neutrons to interact with the iron container and the resulting 
photons to reach the container, and significantly longer than the time needed for 
photons produced in the source shielding. This demonstrates that the majority of 
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the photons reaching the detector originate inside the cargo container or 
surrounding environment and not in the source shielding. The minimum time 
needed for 14.1 MeV incident neutrons to elastically scatter on the container and 
reach the detector is ~59 ns and the vast majority of the neutrons arrive after this 
time. 
Figs. 6-4a and 6-4b show an example of the PHD and neutron TOF 
distribution as a function of neutron scatter angle. As expected, the total 
proportion of high-energy neutrons decreased with decreasing scatter angle as 
fewer singly-scattered neutrons penetrated the necessary target thickness. The 
increasing source-detector distance is responsible for the shift in neutron arrival 
time. Figure 6-5 shows the neutron PHDs at the 150° for several different types 
of cargo material. Besides changes in the number of neutrons, the most 
significant differences are shown in the high-light output region between 9 
MeVee, corresponding to the maximum light output from elastically scattered 
neutrons. As seen in the figure, the structure of the hydrogenous materials: 
water, meat, and vegetables, are very similar in this region. Due to its high 
atomic number, the steel cargo shows the largest number of high-energy 
neutrons followed by the other inorganic materials: electronics and furniture. It 
was decided not to pursue flags based on the TOF distributions because large 
target size led to high uncertainties in interaction position. 
The average detection efficiency, as calculated by comparing the MCNP5 
current tallies and the integrated PHDs, was 20±7%. As expected, the simulated 
detection efficiency was higher when neutron energy was lower, averaging 
27±4% at the 0° detector and 11±2% at the 150° detector, where there were far 
more high-energy neutrons. 
Flags based on backscattered neutrons 
When the RDX mass was decreased from 6,000 kg, chosen in prior work 
as a position-independent means of determining optimal flags [17], to a more 
realistic 500 kg in a paper-cargo scenario, the flag strength based on the total 
number of backscattered neutrons decreased by a factor of ~2.5. Because of the 
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increased scatter from surrounding soil, ground cover, and source shielding, flag 
strength further decreased by an additional 50% [17]. This meant that the flag 
strength fell below 0.01 for all cases except for 0.038 when homogenous steel 
cargo was used. Therefore, this type of flag was abandoned as part of the 
detection algorithm. 
In the simplified cases of a previous study, it was observed that there was 
a significant difference in the number of backscattered neutrons with energies of 
10-12 MeV for cases with and without RDX [17]. This energy range corresponds 
to a single elastic scatter of a 14.1 MeV neutron off carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen. 
However, once cargo material, RDX mass, heterogeneous packing, and the 
surrounding environment was changed as detailed above, these flag values fell 
below 0.01 for almost all cases. However, because singly-scattered neutrons 
interacting with steel fall outside this range, the flag strength was a measurable 
0.10 when homogenous steel cargo was used. 
One rather direct way of measuring the relative amounts of carbon, 
nitrogen, and oxygen is to compare the relative magnitudes of their elastic scatter 
peaks. These flags showed several promising possibilities in the simplistic cases 
[17], but the flag strengths dropped significantly when the surrounding soil and 
concrete slab or metal plate was included. Only the homogenous steel case 
exceeded flag strengths of 0.01, with 0.082 for oxygen-carbon, 0.063 for 
nitrogen-carbon, and a small 0.017 for nitrogen-oxygen peak ratio flags. 
Furthermore, distinguishing between peaks that vary by only 0.2 MeV is very 
difficult using current neutron spectroscopy technology.  
Due to the small differences between RDX and no-RDX cases when using 
any of the described backscatter-based methods, the explosives-detection 
algorithm cannot rely solely on these types of calculations. However, neutron 
backscatter strategies have shown definite promise in cases in which the cargo is 
largely metallic in nature. This represents about 27% of cargo containers [19]. 
Therefore, backscatter-based methods, in combination with other flags, have the 
potential to form a powerful explosives-detection tool.  
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Monoenergetic neutron flags 
The best overall flags that are calculated from ratios of single bin neutron 
tallies at different angles are shown in Table 6-3. Although there was variation in 
which flags were best for each type of cargo, every single one of the top five 
flags for each category of cargo type were in the top ten overall flags shown in 
Table 6-3. Furthermore, flag values were consistently either positive or negative 
for all cargo types. It was observed that many of these flags consisted of a ratio 
of the neutron flux at a relatively high energy, between 10.5 and 11.6 MeV, at two 
very different scatter angles (0°-30° and 120°-150°). This is essentially 
comparing the unscattered or slightly scattered neutron flux with the amount of 
single elastic scatter off elements heavier than carbon. Similarly, the flags based 
on neutron peaks generally consisted of the extremes of energy and angle. 
Inclusion of the surrounding environment decreased flag strength for any 
given cargo type, although this effect was far less pronounced than for the 
backscatter-based flags. For example, adding the concrete slab and soil 
decreased the flag strength from over 0.90 in the idealistic case to between 0.50 
and 0.75 for most of the flags shown in Table 6-3. Similarly, decreasing the RDX 
mass from 6,000 kg in the idealistic case to 500 kg decreased the flag strength 
by a roughly proportional amount. As expected, the lowest flag strengths were 
found in the crated geometries, as these simulations utilized both a smaller RDX 
mass, heterogeneous cargoes, and more realistic source. However, even these 
simulations had flag values in excess of 0.17 for at least one of the flags listed in 
Table 6-3.  
Because of their relatively strong flag strength and relative insensitivity to 
shielding material, flags based on neutron tallies at a given energy and multiple 
angles are strong candidates for inclusion in an explosives-detection algorithm.  
Monoenergetic photon flags 
The best flags based on comparing relative photon peak magnitudes are 
shown in Table 6-4, these include the top five flags for each cargo category. 
Three of the most important photons in these flags are found in the 4.6, 5.2, and 
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6.2 MeV energy bins, corresponding to the 4.4, 5.1, and 6.1 MeV characteristic 
photons of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, respectively. The main disadvantage of 
this flag type is the comparatively low flag strengths. When using either neutron 
scatter-based flag, every simulation showed at least a 0.05 flag strength for at 
least one flag. However, most of the strongest photon-based flag calculations for 
any particular scenario were around or below 0.05. Although the relatively low 
flag magnitudes make it more difficult to discern the presence of RDX, photon 
energy spectroscopy is considerably more precise and accurate than neutron 
spectroscopy. Furthermore, there is a distinct advantage in using a different type 
of radiation for the source and the signal.  
Combinatory flags 
The strongest combinatory flags for organic, hydrogenous, inorganic, and 
unknown cargos are shown in Table 6-5. As may be seen in the table, there is 
significant overlap in flag identity between the different cargo types, and the flag 
strengths are considerably higher than for the more spectroscopy-intense flags 
discussed above. Furthermore, the relative uncertainty in flag strength, as 
calculated from the counting statistics of the signal collection, is only a small 
fraction of the average flag strength. Furthermore, there is much less variation, 
i.e. smaller $, in flag strength over the different cargos. Many of the strongest 
flags would not require neutron spectroscopy at all, as they are based on a 
measurement of specific photon energies normalized by total neutron counts at 
two different angles. Most of the other strongest combinatory flags are based on 
a measurement of only the fastest neutrons at two different angles. This could be 
potentially measured using either time-of-flight or a threshold-based method. 
Neutron pulse height distribution (PHD) flags 
Table 6-6 shows the average flag strengths for the top neutron PHD flags 
over the six cargo materials. Statistical uncertainties were relatively low, 
generally below 0.05, due to the large number of particles in each pulse height 
range. In most cases, the PHD flag strengths were higher than the corresponding 
combinatory flag strengths. An exception to this was found for the steel cargo, 
  124 
due to its very different composition compared to RDX. As seen in the table, 
there were several flags in which using the PHD was a significant improvement 
over the combinatory flags. These flags, especially in combination with the 
partially photon-based combinatory flags, have strong potential for use in the 
explosives detection algorithm, especially because they do not require unfolding 
of the neutron PHDs to get the neutron energy spectrum. 
Flags and other explosives 
When comparing the flag strengths for the top flags shown in Tables 6-3 
and 6-5 for paper-filled containers with different types of explosives it was found 
that, with the exception of fertilizer, the flag response was stronger for the other 
explosives than it was for RDX. This means that a flag triggering on RDX would 
also trigger on any of the given explosives except fertilizer. Furthermore, it was 
found that, with a few exceptions, the flags fell in the same order of increasing 
strength for RDX and the other explosives, i.e. the best or strongest flag for RDX 
was the best or strongest flag for all other explosives except fertilizer. The 
explosives surrogate melamine also showed flag strengths exceeding that of 
RDX, illustrating that other nitrogenous material could fool the proposed 
flag-based method. 
Use of flags in the detection algorithm 
As discussed earlier, methods relying on only backscattered neutrons are 
of limited use unless the cargo is metallic in nature. Furthermore, many of the 
highest performing flags were monoenergetic neutron flags, which are practically 
infeasible due to current limitations in neutron spectroscopy technology. 
However, many of these flags, such as neutron peak comparison flags with 
metallic cargo, were strong enough that they were still included in the event of 
improvements in neutron spectroscopy before deployment of the proposed 
system. As flag strength is strongly dependent on cargo material, the explosives 
algorithm will use different flags, depending on what type of cargo is present. 
Therefore, flag strengths were compared within the material groups of organic, 
hydrogenous, and inorganic/metallic in order to identify the best flags for each 
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category of cargo. The top-performing flags for each category, as well as for an 
unknown cargo type are shown in Table 6-7. These flags will form the backbone 
of the explosives detection algorithm. It should be noted that PHD flags may be 
substituted for combinatory flags where appropriate.   
Conclusions and Future Work 
Several explosives-detection flags developed for active neutron 
interrogation using a D-T generator show promise under relatively realistic 
simulated conditions such as a realistic shielded source, varied bomb size and 
position, inclusion of the surrounding environment, several different cargo types, 
and complex cargo geometries. Simulation of realistic neutron detector response 
led the calculation of additional flags that were not dependent on stringent 
neutron spectroscopy.  
Many flags demonstrated a high degree of independence with respect to 
cargo type and would therefore be very useful in scenarios in which the cargo is 
unknown. Other flags displayed higher flag strengths for certain classes of cargo 
material, such as the number of high-energy backscattered neutrons when RDX 
is hidden inside metallic cargo. These cargo-dependent flags may still be a 
valuable contribution to a flag-based algorithm, as they provide a definitive 
decision point when other methods have been used to determine the cargo type. 
Many of the strongest flags were formed from combinations of these more 
specific types of flags or from the neutron pulse height distributions (PHDs) 
themselves, which have the added advantage of requiring minimal neutron 
spectroscopy. 
Now that the best flags for explosives detection in different types of cargo 
have been identified, future efforts are needed to further refine, define, and 
optimize the detection algorithm. Realistic photon and neutron detector 
responses, background contributions, and multiple scatters should be included in 
calculations considering the likelihood of false positives and false negatives. This 
optimization should also include consideration of factors such as system cost, 
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ease of operation, and dose to personnel before proceeding with experimental 
verification.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Geometry of shielded D-T source showing standard sea-land cargo 
container, hemispherical tally surfaces at seven ranges of neutron scatter, and 
isotropic neutron source in a cylindrical layered shield.   
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Figure 6-2. Example of crated geometry with block of explosive hidden in the 
center between crates of inert material. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 6-3. An example of a) the neutron and photon energy distributions, b) the 
pulse height distributions, and c) the time-of-flight distributions produced in the 
150 degree detector. 
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c. 
Figure 6-3 (continued). An example of a) the neutron and photon energy 
distributions, b) the pulse height distributions, and c) the time-of-flight 
distributions produced in the 150 degree detector. 
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a. 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 6-4. Example of calculated detector response using MCNP-PoliMi and 
postprocessor with a) neutron pulse height as a function of scatter angle and b) 
neutron time-of-flight spectrum as a function of scatter angle for a paper-filled 
cargo container. 
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Figure 6-5. Neutron PHDs at the 150 degree detector for several different cargo 
materials. 
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Tables 
Table 6-1. Densities and compositions, expressed as atom percents, of materials 
used in MCNP simulations. 
 
Material 
Density 
(g cm-3) H C N O Other 
Air 0.0012  0.01% 75.5% 23.2% 1.3% Ar 
Steel 7.87  0.32%   99.6% Fe, 0.05% S, 0.04% P 
RDX 1.82 28.6% 14.3% 28.5% 28.6%  
Soil23 1.75 29.4% 1.87%  50.455 
2.59% Al, 13.54% 
Si, 1.43% K, 0.27% 
Fe 
Sand 1.6   trace 65.5% 29.3% Si, 3.8% Al, 1.21% Ca 
Concrete24 2.3 30.4% 0.29%  49.9% 
0.92% Na, 1.03% 
Al, 15.1% Si, 0.71% 
K, 1.49% Ca, 
0.16% Fe 
Brick24 1.8    66.3% 0.39% Al, 32.3% Si, 0.72% Ca 
Wood/paper24 0.70/0.60 47.6% 28.6% 23.8%   
Clothing 0.3 47.6% 28.6%  23.8%  
Melamine 1.57 40% 20% 40%   
Furniture 0.2 41.5% 31.7%  20.8% 3.03% Fe, 3.04% Al 
Vegetables25  0.4 62.8% 5.7% 0.07% 31.4% 0.07% K, trace Ca, Fe, Mg, P, Na, S 
Meat25 1.1 60.4% 14.5% 0.72% 24.2% trace K, P, Fe, Mg, Ca, Na 
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Table 6-2. Densities and atom percent compositions of explosive materials used 
as cargo in MCNP simulations. 
 
Material Density H C N O Other 
Acetone 
Peroxide 1.22 55% 27%  18%  
Ammonium 
Nitrate 1.73 44%  22% 33%  
Black 
Powder 1.04 51% 7% 7% 23% 7.6% K, 3% Si 
EGDN 1.49 29% 14% 14% 43%  
Gasoline 0.68 69% 31%    
HMX 1.9 29% 14% 29% 29%  
Nitrocellulose 1.66 29% 25% 13% 33%  
Nitroglycerin 1.13 25% 15% 15% 45%  
PETN 1.77 29% 17% 14% 41%  
RDX 1.82 29% 14% 29% 29%  
TNT 1.65 24% 33% 14% 29%  
Fertilizer 0.99 0%   0% 1% Na, 50% Cl, 48% K, trace Mg, Ca, Br 
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Table 6-3. Best-performing monoenergetic neutron flags over all cargo materials 
with 500 kg explosive and surrounding environment [17]. Shown are the average 
flag strengths and uncertainties as well as the variation in flag strength ($) for the 
flag with different cargo materials. The level of variation is indicative of the flags’ 
dependence on cargo type. 
 
Neutron flag Identity  
(MeV, degrees) 
Average flag 
strength 
Flag strength 
variation  
 
(11.6 MeV,120°)
(11.6 MeV,0°)  0.73 ± 0.16 1.5 
 
(11.4 MeV,120°)
(11.4 MeV,0°)  0.61 ± 0.16 1.1 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(10.0 MeV,0°)  0.61 ± 0.45 0.92 
 
(11.2 MeV,150°)
(11.2 MeV,0°)  0.58 ± 0.13 1.1 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(9.6 MeV,0°)  0.56 ± 0.45 0.79 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(11.0 MeV,0°)  0.54 ± 0.13 0.9 
 
(11.4 MeV,150°)
(11.4 MeV,0°)  0.53 ± 0.17 0.89 
 
(10.8 MeV,150°)
(10.8 MeV,0°)  0.53 ± 0.16 0.88 
 
(10.6 MeV,150°)
(10.6 MeV,0°)  0.50 ± 0.23 0.76 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(8.2 MeV,0°)  0.48 ± 0.28 0.72 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(6.8 MeV,0°)  0.42 ± 0.18 0.56 
 
(11.0 MeV,150°)
(7.8 MeV,0°)  0.42 ± 0.21 0.63 
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Table 6-4. Best-performing monoenergetic photon flags over all cargo materials 
with 500 kg explosive and surrounding environment. Shown are the average flag 
strengths and uncertainties as well as the variation in flag strength ($) for the flag 
with different cargo materials. 
 
Photon flag 
identity 
Average flag 
strength 
Flag strength 
variation 
 0.016 ± 0.0027 0.014 
 0.013 ± 0.0041 0.013 
 0.014 ± 0.016 0.017 
 0.012 ± 0.004 0.011 
 0.0080 ± 0.013 0.0070 
 0.012 ± 0.0036 0.013 
 0.0080 ± 0.014 0.007 
 0.0070 ± 0.005 0.0090 
 0.011 ± 0.0017 0.013 
 0.016 ± 0.0027 0.014 
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Table 6-5. Best-performing combinatory flags over all cargo materials with 500 kg 
explosive and surrounding environment. Shown are the average flag strengths 
and uncertainties as well as the variation in flag strength ($) for the flag with 
different cargo materials. 
 
Flag identity (MeV) Average flag strength 
Flag strength 
variation 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  0.39 ± 0.067 0.20 
 
(> 10 MeV,180°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  0.39 ± 0.059 0.19 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  0.39 ± 0.064 0.19 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon  
0.24 ± 0.017 0.12 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon  
0.24 ± 0.009 0.11 
 
(total neutron,90°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon  
0.23 ± 0.007 0.12 
 
(total neutron,90°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon  
0.23 ± 0.009 0.11 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
N photon  
0.23 ± 0.006 0.11 
 
(total neutron,180°)
(total neutron,0°)  0.23 ± 0.001 0.10 
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Table 6-6. Identities and strengths of flags based on neutron PHDs averaged 
over six cargo materials: electronics, furniture, meat, paper, steel, and 
vegetables. Also shown is average difference in flag strength between equivalent 
PHD and combinatory flags, with positive values indicating an improvement. PHD 
flag strengths were generally larger, except in the case of steel cargo.    
 
Neutron flag ID Average flag strength 
Average flag 
strength 
difference 
Average non-steel 
flag strength 
difference 
 
(6 !10 MeV,150°)
(6 !10 MeV,0°)  0.74 ± 0.033 0.23 0.25 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  0.72 ± 0.023 -0.63 -0.09 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  0.71 ± 0.024 -0.62 -0.09 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(4 - 8 MeV,0°)  0.67 ± 0.046 0.26 0.25 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  0.38 ± 0.055 0.05 0.26 
 
(< 1 MeV,150°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  0.37 ± 0.056 0.14 0.27 
 
(< 1 MeV,120°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  0.37 ± 0.056 0.13 0.27 
 
(< 1 MeV,90°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  0.35 ± 0.057 0.12 0.26 
 
(< 1 MeV,60°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  0.34 ± 0.06 0.10 0.25 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(< 3 MeV,30°)  0.19 ± 0.022 -0.01 0.13 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(< 1 MeV,30°)  0.18 ± 0.054 -0.02 0.12 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,30°)  0.17 ± 0.025 0.07 0.16 
 
(4 - 8 MeV,90°)
(< 1 MeV,30°)  
0.17 ± 0.056 0.00 0.13 
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Table 6-7. Best-performing flags of any type for organic, hydrogenous, inorganic, 
and metallic cargo with 500 kg explosive and surrounding environment. Shown 
are the average flag strengths and uncertainties as well as the variation in flag 
strength ($) for the flag with different cargo materials. 
 
Flag identity 
(MeV, deg) 
Average 
flag 
strength 
$ Flag identity (MeV) 
Average 
flag 
strength 
$ 
Organic cargo Hydrogenous cargo 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.51 ± 
0.064 0.47 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.26 ± 
0.0144 0.06 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.51 ± 
0.064 0.48 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.26 ± 
0.0144 0.06 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(10 MeV,0°)  
0.45 ± 
0.45 0.66 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(11 MeV,0°)  
0.15 ± 
0.048 0.034 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(9.6 MeV,0°)  
0.44 ± 
0.45 0.71 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(10 MeV,0°)  
0.16 ± 
0.065 0.029 
 
(6 !10 MeV,150°)
(6 !10 MeV,0°)  
0.29 ± 
0.0068 0.36 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon
 
0.15 ± 
0.0024 0.05 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon  
0.23 ± 
0.0072 0.14 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon
 
0.15 ± 
0.0016 0.05 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon  
0.24 ± 
0.004 0.14 
 
(total neutron,180°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon
 
0.15 ± 
0.0024 0.05 
 
(total neutron,90°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon  
0.23 ± 
0.0072 0.14 
 
(total neutron,90°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon  
0.15 ± 
0.0024 0.05 
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Table 6-7 (continued). Top flags of any type for organic, hydrogenous, inorganic, 
and metallic cargo with 500 kg explosive and surrounding environment. Shown 
are the average flag strengths and uncertainties as well as the variation in flag 
strength ($) for the flag with different cargo materials. 
 
Flag identity 
Average 
flag 
strength 
$ Flag identity (MeV, deg) 
Average 
flag 
strength 
$ 
Inorganic cargo All cargos 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
1.89 ± 
0.0055 2.56 
 
(> 10 MeV,120°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.99 ± 
0.0639 1.49 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(< 1 MeV,0°)  
0.61 ± 
0.0169 0.76 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
1.0 ± 
0.0665 1.5 
 
(> 10 MeV,150°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
1.9 ± 
0.0165 2.58 
 
(> 10 MeV,180°)
(> 10 MeV,0°)  
0.99 ± 
0.0587 1.48 
 
(10.8 MeV,150°)
(10.8 MeV,0°)  
1.1 ± 
0.04 1.5 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(10 MeV,0°)  
0.61 ± 
0.45 0.92 
 
(11 MeV,150°)
(11 MeV,0°)  
1.1 ± 
0.05 1.5 
 
(11.4 MeV,120°)
(11.4 MeV,0°)  
0.61 ± 
0.16 1.13 
 
(11.2 MeV,150°)
(11.2 MeV,0°)  
1.3 ± 
0.05 1.9 
 
(11.6 MeV,120°)
(11.6 MeV,0°)  
0.73 ± 
0.15 1.5 
 
(11.6 MeV,120°)
(11.6 MeV,0°)  
1.7 ± 
0.04 2.6 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
C photon
 
0.42 ± 
0.0172 0.48 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
N photon  
0.74 ± 
0.0045 0.82 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
N photon
 
0.42 ± 
0.0059 0.49 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon  
0.71 ± 
0.0082 0.76 
 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
O photon
 
0.41 ± 
0.0093 0.45 
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Chapter 7: A Flag-Based Algorithm and Associated 
Neutron Interrogation System for the Detection of 
Explosives in Sea-Land Cargo Containers 
 
Abstract 
Recent efforts in the simulation of sea-land cargo containers in active 
neutron interrogation scenarios resulted in the identification of several flags that 
indicated the presence of conventional explosives. These flags, defined by 
specific mathematical manipulations of the neutron and photon spectra, have 
been combined into a detection algorithm for screening cargo containers. The 
detection algorithm’s steps include classifying the cargo type, identifying 
containers filled with explosives, triggering in the presence of concealed 
explosives, and minimizing the number of false positives due to cargo 
heterogeneity. The algorithm has been implemented in a simulated system that 
includes both neutron and photon detectors. This system will take less than ten 
minutes to scan a container and cost approximately $1M to construct. Dose 
calculations resulted in estimates of less than 0.5 mSv for a person hidden in the 
container, and an operator annual dose of less than 0.9 mSv.   
Introduction 
Explosives detection at sea ports 
Due to the high throughput, limited personnel, and short time constraints, 
less than 2% of sea-land cargo containers are screened at United States ports of 
entry [1]. Smuggled conventional explosives are of particular concern and are 
detected by either searching for chemical traces left by the explosives, or 
scanning for the bulk material itself [2]. Many of these bulk detection methods are 
nuclear in nature and function through active interrogation with either photons or 
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neutrons. The most common methods, X-ray or gamma ray interrogation, are 
relatively insensitive to the explosive material itself, as its electron density is 
generally quite similar to that of the surrounding cargo. Furthermore, X-ray 
interrogation of large targets is difficult due to low target penetration. Neutron 
interrogation has been widely studied as an explosives-detection technique due 
to high penetrating ability and direct interaction with target nuclei [1,3]. 
 This chapter presents a neutron interrogation-based algorithmic approach 
that screens for explosives inside standard sea-land cargo containers using a 
shielded monoenergetic 14.1 MeV neutron source. Neutron and photon 
measurements at different angles around the container are used to calculate 
flags, defined by specific mathematical manipulations of the neutron and photon 
spectra. The detection algorithm‘s output is a simple “yes/no”, reached after 
combining specific flags in a series of steps that classifies the cargo material, 
identifies potential explosives-containing containers, and minimizes certain false 
positives. A major advantage of this method is that it combines several other 
detection methods, which maximizes signal carriers and thus reduces 
measurement time and personnel dose. Furthermore, combining the results from 
several other detection strategies into one algorithm exploits all the advantages 
of the other methods, while minimizing the detriment cause by their respective 
shortcomings. 
Earlier papers on the algorithmic approach characterized the neutron 
scatter behavior of fast neutrons [4] and compared neutron scatter simulations 
with laboratory experiments [5], laying the groundwork for further simulations. 
Later work identified promising flags in idealistic as well as more realistic 
conditions [6,7] and tested combinations of flags to minimize the need for neutron 
spectroscopy [7]. This chapter discusses combining these flags into a coherent 
explosives-detection algorithm and presents a screening system that implements 
the detection algorithm in simulations. 
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Equipment for explosives detection with neutron interrogation 
Neutron sources 
Neutron sources for active neutron interrogation include isotropic sources, 
particle accelerators, and fusion-based neutron generators. Due to the inclusion 
of certain neutron and photon peaks in flag calculations, a monoenergetic source 
is desirable. A D-T neutron generator was chosen, as they are considerably less 
expensive than most accelerator-based sources and provide better target 
penetration than D-D neutron generators. In a 100% duty cycle, a D-T generator 
typically produces neutrons at a rate of 5 " 108 to 2 " 1010 n s-1, with a slight 
forward bias to the outgoing neutrons [8]. Another advantage of neutron 
generators is the availability of associated particle imaging (API) technology 
which allows for both TOF measurements and “tagging” incident neutrons that 
are traveling in the desired direction [9,10,11].  
Neutron detectors 
Fast neutron detectors are based on either neutron moderation, fast 
neutron interactions, or elastic recoil reactions [2]. Detectors using neutron 
moderation contain a low energy neutron detector inside a moderating material, 
but are relatively slow and provide limited information on incident neutron energy. 
Other fast neutron detectors are based on the reactions 6Li(n,%) and 3He(n,p). 
However, these detectors have relatively low detection efficiency and problems 
arise due to competing reaction above a couple MeV. The most common fast 
neutron detectors are hydrogen-rich scintillators that are based on elastic recoil 
interactions inside the detector active volume. Plastic and liquid scintillators are 
relatively inexpensive, easily formed into a wide variety of shapes and sizes, and 
have fast response times. Liquid scintillators may also use pulse shape 
discrimination to isolate neutron and photon counts [12].  
Photon detectors 
The most common detectors used in gamma-ray spectroscopy are 
inorganic scintillators, such as thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) and 
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bismuth germanate (BGO). Scintillators are relatively inexpensive and can have 
relatively detection efficiencies. Semiconductor detectors, such as high-purity 
germanium (HPGe), have much better energy resolution, but must be cooled 
while in operation and are much more expensive. Recent advancements in room 
temperature semiconductor detectors, such as cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe) 
and mercuric iodide (HgI2), have demonstrated excellent energy resolution, but 
may still be prohibitively expensive in terms of widespread deployment in cargo 
screening scenarios [12]. 
Implementation of flag-based detection algorithm 
Previous simulations showed that flag values are strongly dependent on 
the identity of cargo material. Furthermore, a significant number of cargo 
manifests show human error and containers may have multiple cargo types [1]. 
One way to compensate for unknown or mistaken cargo is to maintain a 
database of certain flag values and use template-matching techniques to 
determine the material type before applying appropriate explosives-detection 
flags. An alternative strategy would be irradiating at several locations and looking 
for changes in certain explosives-sensitive flags as a function of container length. 
This second technique has the advantage of relative independence of cargo 
manifest accuracy or cargo type. Furthermore, multiple measurements are 
necessary for both strategies, as the 3.1 m container center-to-end distance is 
too far to be adequately penetrated by 14.1 MeV neutrons. 
 In the presented system, the flag values at five irradiation points, as well 
as the average flag values for the entire container, are used in a decision 
tree-type algorithm to determine if explosives are present.  For the first step of 
the algorithm, average values of material-sensitive flags determine the type of 
cargo present. Explosives-sensitive flags for this type of cargo then determine if 
explosives are present by looking for deviations from average flag value at 
individual locations along the container length. An additional step would compare 
the average flag values with pure-explosives templates in case a container is 
filled with explosives. Finally, other steps would be included that minimize false 
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positives, such as might result from inhomogeneities in the cargo distribution. 
This chapter is devoted to elucidating the structure and flag identities in the 
detection algorithm, as well as the associated equipment configuration.  
Materials and Methods 
Monte Carlo simulations 
All simulations used either MCNP5 [13] or MCNP-PoliMi [14]. The 
simulated neutron detector responses were calculated using PoliMi and a 
post-processor [15]. All output text files were analyzed with a custom parser 
(MATLAB, 3 Apple Hill Drive, Natick, MA, USA 01760), as well as spreadsheet 
software (Excel, Microsoft, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA, USA 98052). 
Similarly, custom software was used to calculate the relevant flag values, flag 
strengths, and statistical uncertainty in flag calculations.  
Scanning geometry 
The simulations discussed here were based on the geometry shown in 
Fig. 7-1, with materials defined in Table 7-1. These simulations contained a 
sea-land cargo container with 2.4 m ! 6.2 m ! 2.6 m exterior dimensions and 
0.346 m thick steel walls centered in a 20 m diameter sphere that defined the 
outer limits. The container was surrounded by air and rested on a 25 cm concrete 
slab over soil that filled the space between the slab and the 20 m sphere. A 
rectangular hole 130 cm wide ! 243 cm long ! 210 cm deep in the slab and soil 
contained the shielded neutron source, with additional space provided for the 
120° and 150° detectors. For the five irradiations, the container was shifted such 
that the source faced the container at locations of 62 cm, 186 cm, 310 cm, 434 
cm, and 558 cm from container end. An example MCNP-PoliMi input file for this 
geometry is shown in Appendix A. 
Neutron and photon detection 
Eleven cylindrical liquid scintillator detectors were distributed in 30° 
intervals at a distance of 2.25 m from the center of the container. Each had a 
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radius of 40 cm and a thickness of 20 cm. The liquid scintillator EJ-309, as 
detailed in Table 7-1, was chosen because of its superior pulse shape 
discrimination capabilities [16]. Current, or MCNP5 F1, tallies sorted photons and 
neutrons into 0.2 MeV energy bins and symmetrical, i.e. same scatter angle, 
detectors were combined into the same tally. Due to isotropic emission, all 
photon tallies were combined into one tally. Neutron detector response functions 
were calculated in each detector using MCNP-PoliMi and the postprocessor.  
Neutron source 
Previous studies [4,6,7] relied on a shielded conical 14.1 MeV neutron 
source. However, simulations of the five-scan screening technique required a 
fan-shaped beam with limited overlap in irradiated volume. This beam had an 
isotropic D-T neutron source placed at the bottom of the rectangular well behind 
at least 50 cm of shielding, as illustrated in Figs. 7-1 and 7-2. The shield’s 
composition was equivalent to an equal volume mixture of polyethylene and 
steel. The opening of the shield projected a 70 cm " 244 cm area on the facing 
container surface, which permitted full container width irradiation and 10% 
length-wise overlap between the five measurements.  
Container cargo 
The development of the detection algorithm required several types and 
distributions of cargo inside the cargo container. For the single-irradiation 
simulations that identified the material-sensitive flags, the inert materials were 
distributed evenly throughout the container volume, with density correspondingly 
adjusted to model typical cargo mass, with densities of 0.2 to 0.6 g cm-3 [1]. 
Similarly, cargo was homogeneously distributed in the five-scan simulation that 
found appropriate triggering thresholds in the detection algorithm. Cargos 
simulated included cloth, electronics, furniture, paper, steel, vegetables, and 
wheat, as defined in Table 7-1. An additional set of simulations was completed 
for use in the final step of the algorithm that used 500 kg spheres of artificially 
dense inert material inside homogenously distributed cargos of the same 
material. 
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Cargo container on a trailer bed 
One potential difficulty in implementation of the algorithm is that the 
simulated conveyance of a moving surface or rail system may be impractical in a 
seaport environment. An alternative geometry was simulated in which the 
container was carried on a flatbed trailer with a 10 cm thick aluminum deck, six 
sets of two vulcanized rubber tires, and three steel axles, as shown in Fig. 7-3. 
An example of MCNP-PoliMi input for this geometry is shown in Appendix A. 
Determination of the explosives-detection algorithm 
As discussed above, the explosives-detection algorithm consists of 
several steps and results in a yes/no answer about the presence of explosives. 
These steps first determine the type of cargo material, as organic or 
hydrogenous cargos use different flags than inorganic or metallic cargos. The 
second step involves identifying the containers that might be filled with very large 
amounts of explosive. The next step involves applying flags appropriate to the 
given cargo type to find hidden explosives. Finally, containers with possible 
hidden explosives undergo a final step that minimizes false positives due to 
cargo heterogeneities. These steps require the calculation of three different types 
of flags, all of which are based on measurements of the exiting neutron and 
photon flux. These include material-sensitive, explosives-detection, and 
density-discriminatory flags. Due to the fact that many of the flags isolated earlier 
[6,7] require stringent neutron spectroscopy, two alternative detection algorithms 
were explored, one which uses the best-performing flags and one that uses the 
best flags that are currently technically feasible. The specific calculations in the 
algorithm were completed using a common mathematics and data analysis 
package (MATLAB). 
Specification of cargo material 
The identification of the material-sensitive flags was accomplished by 
examination of the results from simulations utilizing homogenous cargo 
distributions of the materials listed in Table 7-1. The chosen flags displayed the 
most consistent values, i.e. the smallest percent standard deviation, within a 
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particular cargo type and the largest difference in average flag value compared to 
the other cargo type.  Only two categories, organic/hydrogenous and 
inorganic/metallic, were examined, as finding explosives in low-Z, 
explosive-similar organic/hydrogenous materials uses different flags than the 
higher-Z inorganic/metallic materials. The material-sensitive flags were then 
organized into a material sub-algorithm by finding threshold flag values that 
successfully categorized cargo materials, with each step further narrowing down 
the identity of the unknown cargo. This was accomplished through an iterative 
trial and error process.  
Identification of explosives-filled containers 
It is also possible that the entire container could be packed with 
explosives. Therefore a step was included that identifies this type of threat 
through comparison with templates of certain flag values. Templates may consist 
of either absolute flag values, or the ratios of certain flags. A preliminary 
database of these templates was created using simulations of containers 
homogeneously filled with the eleven explosive materials listed in Table 7-2.  
Triggering in the presence of hidden explosives 
The next step in the algorithm involved the actual triggering in the 
presence of hidden explosives using the previously identified 
explosives-detection flags [7], and the results of the five-scan simulations. The 
flag values as a function of scanning position for cases without explosives were 
examined to determine appropriate triggering thresholds based on the highest 
flag values expected when explosives are not present. 
Minimization of false positives due to cargo heterogeneity 
The final step of the explosives-detection algorithm involved minimizing 
false positives due to heterogeneities in inert cargo distribution. To identify the 
density-discriminatory flags for this step, the results from simulations containing 
artificially dense objects was compared with those from equivalent simulations 
containing RDX. A comparison of the flag strengths for the two cases quantified 
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the dependence of flag response on the density of hidden objects. Flags were 
identified that triggered only in the presence of explosives as well as those that 
triggered only in the presence of inert, dense objects. 
Estimates of dose to personnel and cargo activation 
An important concern is the expected radiation dose to both operators and 
people hidden inside a container during screening [17]. Dose was calculated 
using MCNP-PoliMi for the worst-case scenario in which an empty container 
went through all five scans of the explosives-detection system. Dose was 
estimated by multiplying the tallied neutron and photon fluence (MCNP F5) at a 
point by dose conversion factors found in ICRP Publication 574 [18] and ICRU 
report 47 [19]. A sufficient number of histories were calculated to keep statistical 
uncertainty below 2%. 
Dose was calculated at seventeen separate points in and around the 
container. Outside the container, six calculations were made in one-meter 
increments from 2 m to 7 m from the container center normal to the long side. 
Other dose calculations were made centered inside the container above the scan 
1, scan 2, and scan 3 positions at a height of 9 cm, 62 cm, and 128 cm from the 
container floor. Finally, two additional calculations were performed 128 cm from 
the floor above the scan 3 position, but were displaced laterally 60 cm and 120 
cm from the center of the container.  
Also considered was the residual activity when neutrons activate cargo 
materials. The interactions with the highest potential of significantly activating 
cargo appear in Table 7-3 [20,21]. Two worst-case scenarios were considered, 
one in which the entire cargo was aluminum, and another with a cargo of rock 
salt (NaCl). Another calculation utilized a cargo of potatoes, with the thought that 
any activation is more of a concern if the cargo is meant for human consumption. 
Calculations were carried out using activation software [22] based on standard 
decay [23] and cross section [24,25] data. 
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Results and Discussion 
Detection algorithm 
A diagram of the algorithm structure is shown in Fig. 7-4. Because many 
of the best flags required stringent neutron spectroscopy [6,7], two variations in 
the algorithm are presented. Although very similar in structure, the spectroscopic 
variation uses all of the best-performing flags [6,7], while the PHD algorithm is 
limited to the best-performing flags that do not require unfolding of the neutron 
pulse height distribution [7]. Sample MATLAB code for the detection algorithm is 
found in Appendix B. 
Identification of explosives-filled containers 
The first step in the algorithm was the identification of any cargo 
containers that are entirely filled with explosive through comparison with a stored 
template. Because flag values are highly dependent on the exact cargo 
composition and configuration, relative flag values, normalized to a single flag, 
were used instead of absolute flag values. A set of preliminary templates for 
several explosives: RDX, trinitrotoluene (TNT), fertilizer, and ethylene glycol 
dinitrate (EGDN), are shown in Table 7-4. However, as both the final templates 
and level of precision in template application will be highly dependent on the 
specific equipment, exact explosive, and cargo distribution they are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Materials determination 
Five flags were identified for both algorithm variations that showed both 
the most consistent flag values within one cargo type, and the largest difference 
between the two types of cargo, and are shown in the first two columns of Table 
7-5. It was found that better material categorization was accomplished using 
threshold values of certain ratios and sums of these five flags, with threshold 
values listed in column three of Table 7-5. Furthermore, step four of the material 
sub-algorithm, shown in Fig. 7-4, was not needed in the PHD algorithm. Testing 
of the materials algorithm showed correct sorting into organic/hydrogenous or 
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inorganic/metallic categories for all of the homogenously distributed, 
single-material cargos studied here. As expected, there was more ambiguity in 
the case of heterogeneously distributed or mixed cargo, such as furniture.  
Triggering in the presence of hidden explosives 
For the cases in which smaller explosives are hidden in larger inert cargo 
masses, the algorithm depends on finding specific changes in certain flags, listed 
in Tables 7-6a and 7-6b, as a function of irradiation position [6,7]. The triggering 
technique identified here first required calculation of the height (h) of each flag at 
all positions (p). This is defined as:  
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in which fp=i is the flag value at position i. The peak height for the flag (hf) is then 
defined as the maximum hp value for that particular flag. This calculation of the 
peak height can be thought of as the maximum percent difference between a flag 
value at one position and the average flag value at the other four positions. To 
compare the peak heights of different flags, the hp values are shifted such that 
the minimum value is at zero. This is illustrated in Fig. 7-5 for the case of a large 
explosive hidden at position four, which creates a systematic increase in flag 
height of several of the flags from Table 7-6b at that position. Finally, the trigger 
value (ht), defined as the maximum peak height over all the flags, is compared 
with a threshold value to determine if explosives are present. Examination of the 
cases without explosive showed that their trigger values exceeded 0.1 in only 
one case, so a trigger value of 0.1 was chosen as the threshold value. However, 
about 40% of inert materials exhibited an unusually high trigger value at an edge 
position, illustrated in Fig. 7-6. Therefore, a threshold value of 0.2 was used at 
edge positions. In some simulations without explosive there was a small 
asymmetry between the relative flag height at positions 1 and 5, probably due to 
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a slight geometrical bias towards scanning position 1 generated from rounding 
errors when determining scanning positions. 
Minimization of false positives due to cargo heterogeneity 
The flags used in minimizing false positives due to cargo heterogeneity 
are listed in Table 7-7. To eliminate the false positives, trigger values were 
calculated for these two types of flags in the same manner as discussed above. If 
the trigger value of the density-only flags was greater, the possible explosive was 
dismissed as an inert object. It should be noted that the flags in this step have 
trigger values of less than 0.1, so it would not be useful to include these 
explosives-only-triggering flags in the previous stage of the detection algorithm.  
Implementation of the explosives-detection algorithm 
Neutron source 
Implementation of the explosives-detection algorithm requires a 
fan-shaped beam produced by a D-T neutron generator, which have typical 
production rates of 5 " 108 to 2 " 1010 n s-1. This fan beam will irradiate the 
standard 6.2 m-long cargo container a total of five times at distances of 0.62, 1.9, 
3.1, 4.3, and 5.6 m from the end of the container. The generator shield has 50 
cm thick walls of polyethylene and steel that produces a beam 2.6 m by 0.62 m 
at the surface of the container closest to the source, as shown in Figs. 7-1 and 
7-2. Calculations based on statistical uncertainty in the simulation [4] and 
detection efficiency showed that 9 " 1010 incident neutrons per scan were 
sufficient to produce statistical uncertainties of less than 2% in all flag 
calculations.  
Supporting infrastructure 
Transport through the scanning apparatus is accomplished through use of 
a conveyor that carries the container over the neutron source under a roughly 
circular scaffold that holds the detectors equidistant from the container center. 
This scaffold should hold the detectors as close as reasonably possible to the 
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container in order to maximize detection efficiency, so a distance of 2.5 m from 
container center, or at least 0.58 m from container edge, was chosen. The 
conveyor system may be either ground-based, such as series of rollers, or 
crane-based, suspending the containers from above.  
One alternative to a conveyor-based system is to drive the container 
through the scanner on a flatbed truck. Simulations of the truck-based 
conveyance shown in Fig. 7-3 found that the presence of the wheels and axles 
significantly impacted the triggering flags such that trigger values for all cases 
were very high in the fifth scanning position, where two sets of axles and wheels 
were present, as illustrated in Fig. 7-7. This shows that the conveyance method 
should have the same distribution of support material along the length of the 
container. Therefore, future versions of the system could use a wheeled 
conveyance, as long as the wheels are evenly distributed or correction factors 
are used. 
Photon detection 
To maximize detection efficiency, several large photon detectors should 
be placed on the scaffold, either far enough from the source to minimize 
interference from the source, or collimated such that only photons originating in 
the container are detected. As the algorithm only requires 0.2 MeV energy 
resolution, an inorganic scintillator, such as NaI(Tl) or BGO, is sufficient. The 
photon detectors must be reasonably thick to maintain a high photon detection 
rate. NaI(Tl) crystals have good light output, sufficient energy resolution, and 
over 75% intrinsic efficiency when 10 cm thick [12]. Large NaI(Tl) crystals, such 
as those tested for use in portal monitors [26] have cross-sectional areas of 410 
cm2 (10 cm " 41 cm) and a 10 cm thickness. An array of 12 of these detectors 
would count approximately 8 " 108 photons in the two minute period, which would 
yield statistical uncertainties of around 3%.  
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Neutron detection 
Currently available neutron spectroscopy technology makes 
implementation of the spectroscopic difficult at this time. However, the PHD 
algorithm was designed such that all neutron-based flags could be calculated 
using the response functions of EJ-309 liquid scintillators. The presented system 
includes eleven large EJ-309 neutron detectors distributed along the scaffold in 
30° increments. These large neutron detectors have a 40 cm diameter and are 
20 cm thick.  
Measurement time, throughput and the total number of neutrons 
Simulations of the presented system utilized 5 " 109 particle histories and 
yielded flag value statistical uncertainties of less than 3% for all but a few of the 
neutron flags in the spectroscopic algorithm, which were 5 to 8%. When the 
~20% intrinsic efficiency of the neutron detectors, ~40% intrinsic efficiency [26] 
and decreased cross-sectional area of the photon detectors are considered, a 
total of 9 " 1010 incident neutrons are needed per scan to maintain the statistical 
uncertainty levels. This leads to a measurement time of a few seconds to a 
maximum of 2 minutes per scan, with a more typical measurement time of 1 
minute, depending on the operating intensity of the neutron source. When the 
five irradiations, as well as physical positioning and transit are considered, total 
scanning time is approximately 10 minutes per container. This rate of only six 
containers per hour means that the system should either function as a secondary 
screening system, or several systems will be required at a given seaport. 
Measurement time could decrease to 5 to 6 minutes given the most powerful 
neutron generator. 
Estimated cost 
The production costs of the proposed system are reasonable, with the 
largest single expense the D-T neutron generator at around $300,000. The 
eleven neutron detectors, associated digitization, power hardware and computer 
should cost between $190,000 and $200,000. The NaI(Tl) photon detection 
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system will cost another $70,000 to $100,000 [27]. Other costs will include 
shielding materials and the physical infrastructure of the detector structure and 
conveyance system for the containers. In all, the equipment needed for the 
system will be approximately $1M. Once the system is operational costs should 
be minimal, as the algorithm will be automated and operators will need little 
training. 
Estimated dose 
The estimated doses for ten locations in and around the container during a 
single five-scan application with 9 " 1010 neutrons per scan are shown in Table 
7-8. As expected, the highest dose rates were near the container floor. However, 
the calculations show that an individual hidden in the container during a five-scan 
screening would receive between 0.15 mSv and 0.41 mSv. This is less than the 
6.2 mSv average annual dose to a member of the public and similar to that 
received in a chest x-ray [28]. An operator, assuming six scans per hour and 
2,000 hours worked per year, would be exposed to the radiation of approximately 
12,000 scans. Without any added shielding an operator standing 5 m from the 
center of the container would receive a dose of approximately 39 mSv per year, 
which exceeds the occupational dose limit of 20 mSv per year. This dose is 
lowered significantly with the addition of 1 m of concrete shielding to 0.86 mSv, 
which is less than the average annual dose to a member of the public.  
It was calculated [22] that the total activity in 21,600 kg cargo was 2.4 
MBq for the rock salt and 160 MBq in the aluminum. This level of radioactivity is 
insufficient to cause significant dose in personnel. Furthermore, much of this 
activity is due to nuclides (38Cl, 28Al) with half-lives on the order of minutes. 
Fortunately, most of these nuclides are only present in small or trace amounts in 
edible cargos. A calculation for 21,600 kg of potatoes yielded a total induced 
activity of approximately 2.1 kBq, with the majority of the activity from 
radionuclides such as 19O, 49Ca, and 42K, with half-lives of 27 s, 8.7 min, and 12 
h, respectively. This shows that neutron activation of cargo in the proposed 
system is of trivial concern. 
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Future work 
Future efforts will determine the capabilities of the explosives-detection 
system in cases with heterogeneous cargo distributions as well as determine the 
minimum detectable amount of explosive. Also of concern is the possible 
decreased detection probability when explosives are placed between scanning 
positions and the effect of measurement error, scatter in the environment, and 
photon detection concerns such as escape peaks. Furthermore, a more thorough 
statistical analysis of the relationship between flags and algorithm performance, 
as well as increased optimization of the trigger threshold values should improve 
the detection algorithm. 
There are several possible improvements to the scanning system that 
should be explored in future work. It is possible that using photon detectors with 
higher energy resolution, such as CdZnTe, would improve algorithm performance 
enough that the added cost is worthwhile. Another possibility would be to scan 
multiple locations at the same time. While this may reduce scanning time by 2 to 
5 minutes per container, it is very expensive and there may be significant 
interference. Another alternative is to use an associated particle imaging (API) 
system and capture-gated neutron detectors or a pulsed neutron generator and 
TOF calculations instead of neutron energy calculations [19]. However, the very 
large target and corresponding event position uncertainty greatly complicate 
these calculations and significantly increase measurement time.  
Conclusions 
An active neutron interrogation-based explosives-detection system has 
been presented that uses measurements at five different locations to determine 
the presence and approximate location of hidden explosives in cargo containers. 
The detection algorithm relies on both neutron and photon output from neutron 
elastic and inelastic scatter reactions by calculating flags formed from specific 
ratios of these measurements. These flags form the backbone of an algorithm 
that includes steps for cargo identification, identification of concealed explosives, 
and the minimization of false positives due to cargo heterogeneity. An additional 
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step identifies containers filled with explosives. Implementation of the detection 
algorithm requires eleven liquid scintillator neutron detectors with pulse shape 
discrimination capabilities as well as several inorganic scintillators for photon 
spectroscopy. Dose estimates are well within acceptable levels for both system 
operators and concealed persons within a container. Materials for the proposed 
system should cost approximately $1M, and will be able to screen containers at a 
rate of at least six per hour. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 7-1. Illustration of container scanning geometry with empty container, 
except for explosive, located within ring of eleven detectors and over a shielded 
D-T neutron source. Irradiations take place at five locations along container as it 
moves through the detector array. 
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Figure 7-2. Detail of source shield of isotropic neutron source. 
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Figure 7-3. Alternative geometry with vehicular transport of container through the 
scanning apparatus. 
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Figure 7-4. Flow chart of explosives-detection algorithm. 
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Figure 7-5. Example of change in explosives trigger flags as a function of 
container position for 300 kg of RDX at position 4 in a furniture-filled cargo 
container. Each line shows the response of one of the ten PHD explosives-
detection flags in Table 7-6b. 
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Figure 7-6. Example of the systematic bias in many cargo materials at the edge 
positions that mandates a 0.2 trigger threshold for these positions. In this 
example the container is homogenously filled with vegetable oil. 
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b. 
 
Figure 7-7. Comparison of flag heights for a) conveyor-based and b) truck-based 
transport through scanning apparatus.
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Tables 
Table 7-1. Densities and compositions, expressed as atom percents, of inert 
materials used in MCNP simulation geometry, as adapted from [4,6,7]. 
Material Density H C N O Other 
Air 0.0012  0.01% 75.5% 23.2% 1.3% Ar 
Brick     66% 0.4.% Al, 32% Si, 1% Ca 
EJ-309 0.916 55% 45%    
Concrete 2.3 30.4% 0.29%  49.9% 
0.92% Na, 1.03% Al, 
15.1% Si, 0.71% K, 
1.49% Ca, 0.16% Fe 
Cotton 1.1 48% 29%  24%  
Crude Oil 0.97 62% 37%   0.5% S 
Electronics 0.329 26% 2%  47% 2.6% Al, 12% Si, 10% Ni, 0.3% Fe 
Furniture 0.8 41% 32%  21% 3% Fe, 3% Al 
Granite 2.73 0% 0%  62% 
2.6% Na, 1.9%Mg, 
6.5% AL, 21% Si, 1.4% 
K, 2% Ca, 2% Fe 
Meat 1.1 60% 15% 1% 24% trace K, P 
Melamine 1.57 40% 20%   40% Si 
Vegetable oil  0.918 63% 34%  4%  
Paraffin 0.93 68% 32%    
Plaster 0.85 7%   63% 15% Ca, 15% S 
Plate Glass 2.4    60% 8.8% Na, 25% Si, 5.6% Ca 
Polyester  1.4 36% 45%  18%  
Polyethylene 0.93 67% 33%    
Polystyrene 1.06 50% 50%    
Polyvinyl 
chloride 1.406 50% 33%   17% Cl 
Rock Salt 2.18     50% Na, 50% Cl 
Rubber 1.1 50% 31%   19% S 
Sand 1.6   trace 65.5% 29.3% Si, 3.8% Al, 1.21% Ca 
Steel 7.87  0.32%   99.6% Fe, 0.05% S, 0.04% P 
Soil 1.75 29.4% 1.87%  50.5% 2.59% Al, 13.54% Si, 1.43% K, 0.27% Fe 
Water 1 67%   33%  
Wheat 0.79 7% 37% 2% 53% trace: S, Na, K, Ca, Mg, Fe, Cu, Zn, P, Cl 
Wood/paper 0.6/0.3 48% 29%  24%  
Vegetables 
(potatoes) 1.6 63% 6%  31% 
trace Ca, Fe, Mg, P, K, 
Na, S, Cl 
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Table 7-2. Explosive materials used to create explosive cargo templates, as 
adapted from [7]. 
Material Density H C N O Other 
Acetone 
Peroxide 1.22 55% 27%  18%  
Ammonium 
Nitrate 1.73 44%  22% 33%  
Black 
Powder 1.04 51% 7% 7% 23% 7.6% K, 3% Si 
EGDN 1.49 29% 14% 14% 43%  
Fertilizer 0.99 0%   0% 1% Na, 50% Cl, 48% K, trace Mg, Ca, Br 
HMX 1.9 29% 14% 29% 29%  
Nitrocellulose 1.66 29% 25% 13% 33%  
Nitroglycerin 1.13 25% 15% 15% 45%  
PETN 1.77 29% 17% 14% 41%  
RDX 1.82 29% 14% 29% 29%  
TNT 1.65 24% 33% 14% 29%  
  169 
 
Table 7-3. Important reactions induced activity from neutron activation of cargo 
materials, as adapted from [19]. Activity based on incident thermal flux of 1013 n 
cm-2s-1 and epithermal flux of 1011 n cm-2s-1 [18]. 
Isotope Reaction Product Half life 
Photons 
[MeV] 
Activity after 1 
min irradiation 
[Bq µg-1] 
23Na (n,!) 24Na 15.0 h 1.37, 2.75 108 
26Mg (n,!) 27Mg 9.46 m 0.84, 1.01 74.7 
27Al (n,!) 28Al 2.24 m 1.78, 336 14,000 
37Cl (n,!) 28Cl 37.2 m 2.17, 1.64 332 
59Co (n,!) 60Co 1930 d 1.33, 1.17 0.472 
63Cu (n,!) 64Cu 12.7 h 0.51, 262 274 
116Sn (n,!) 117mSn 13.6 d 0.16 0.0039 
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Table 7-4. Example of preliminary templates for several explosive-only cargos. 
Templates are based on the PHD detection algorithm. 
Flag RDX TNT Fertilizer EGDN 
  
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(< 0.14 MeVee,0!)  
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  
 
(2.1! 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(2.1! 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
1.16 1.10 1.47 1.10 
  
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,120!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
0.66 0.61 0.45 0.64 
  
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
1.27 1.19 0.94 1.25 
  
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,150!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
0.73 0.69 0.57 0.72 
  
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,120!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)  0.67 0.65 0.42 0.65 
  
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,150!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)  
1.26 1.25 0.85 1.23 
  
 
(total neutron,90!)
(total neutron,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
(C photon)  
3.39 " 103 2.46 " 103 5.93 " 103 3.31 " 103 
  
 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
(C photon)  
1.13 " 104 8.36 " 103 1.09 " 104 1.10 " 104 
  
 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
(N photon)  
2.99 " 103 2.89 " 103 2.51 " 103 2.91 " 103 
  
 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
(O photon)  
2.16 " 104 2.70 " 104 6.05  " 104 2.12 " 104 
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Table 7-5. Identities of the top flags used in determining the type of cargo in an 
unknown container and the thresholds used in the material categorization.  
 
Flag 
number 
Flag identity (averaged 
over 5 scans) Threshold 
Spectroscopic detection algorithm 
M1 
  
! 
> 10 MeV,150!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )  T1 = 5 
M2 
  
! 
6 "10 MeV,150!( )
6 "10 MeV,0!( )
 T2 = 30 
M3 
  
! 
> 10 MeV,120!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )
 T3 = 1.5 
M4 
  
! 
11.4 MeV,120!( )
11.4 MeV,0!( )
 T4 = 4.5 T5 = 1.4 
M5 
  
! 
11 MeV,150!( )
0.8 MeV,0!( )
 T6 = 50 
PHD detection algorithm 
M1 
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,150!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )
 T1 = 7 
M2 
  
! 
2.1" 4.9 MeVee,150!( )
2.1" 4.9 MeVee,0!( )
 T2 = 45 
M3 
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,120!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )
 T3 = 3 
M4 
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,120!( )
> 5.8 MeVee,0!( )
 T4, T5 not needed 
M5 
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,150!( )
< 0.14 MeVee,0!( )
 T6 = 40 
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Table 7-6a. Identities of the top flags used in determining if explosives are 
present in an unknown container. 
Spectroscopic algorithm 
Organic or hydrogenous cargo flags
 
  
! 
11 MeV,150!( )
11 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
11 MeV,150!( )
10 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,90!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
11 MeV,150!( )
9.6 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
O photon  
  
! 
> 10 MeV,120!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )    
! 
> 10 MeV,180!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
> 10 MeV,150!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )    
! 
6 "10 MeV,150!( )
6 -10 MeV,0!( )  
Metallic or inorganic cargo flags
 
  
! 
10.8 MeV,150!( )
10.8 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
11.2 MeV,150!( )
11.2 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
N photon  
  
! 
11.6 MeV,120!( )
11.6 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
O photon  
  
 
> 10 MeV,120!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )    
! 
11 MeV,150!( )
10 MeV,0!( )  
  
! 
> 10 MeV,150!( )
> 10 MeV,0!( )    
! 
> 10 MeV,150!( )
< 1 MeV,0!( )  
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Table 7-6b. Identities of the top flags used in determining if explosives are 
present in an unknown container. 
 
PHD algorithm
 
Organic or hydrogenous cargo flags
 
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,150!( )
> 5.8 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,150!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,90!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,120!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
O photon  
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,150!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )    
 
2.1! 4.9 MeVee,120!( )
2.1- 4.9 MeVee,0!( )  
Metallic or inorganic cargo flags
 
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,150!( )
> 5.8 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
C photon  
  
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,150!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
N photon  
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,120!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )  
  
! 
(total neutron,150!)
(total neutron,0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
O photon  
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,150!( )
> 4.9 MeVee,0!( )    
! 
> 5.8 MeVee,120!( )
> 5.8 MeVee,0!( )  
 
  
! 
> 4.9 MeVee,150!( )
> 0.14 MeVee,0!( )
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Table 7-7. Identities of the best flags used in eliminating false positives due to the 
presence of inert objects of elevated density. 
 
Organic or hydrogenous 
(OH) cargo flags 
Metallic or inorganic cargo 
(IM) cargo flags 
Explosives only triggering flags 
! 
6.2 MeV photon
1.8 MeV photon  
! 
5.2 MeV photon
3.8 MeV photon
 
! 
6.2 MeV photon
2.4 MeV photon
 
 
! 
6.2 MeV photon
2.6 MeV photon
 
 
! 
6.2 MeV photon
2.8 MeV photon
 
  
! 
(total neutron, 90!)
(total neutron, 0!)
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
O photon  
! 
6.2 MeV photon
3.4 MeV photon
 
 
Dense object only triggering flags 
(same for OH and IM cargos) 
! 
5.2 MeV photon
1.0 MeV photon
 
! 
5.2 MeV photon
2.6 MeV photon
 
! 
6.8 MeV photon
1.0 MeV photon
 
! 
4.6 MeV photon
3.4 MeV photon
 
! 
4.6 MeV photon
2.6 MeV photon
 
! 
5.2 MeV photon
3.4 MeV photon
 
! 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
" 
# $ 
% 
& ' 
N photon
! 
(total neutron,90°)
(total neutron,0°)
" 
# $ 
% 
& ' 
N photon
! 
(total neutron,150°)
(total neutron,0°)
" 
# $ 
% 
& ' 
O photon
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Table 7-8. Dose estimates at various locations for a single container scan 
consisting of one-minute irradiations with a 5 " 108 n s-1 D-T neutron generator. 
  
Location Dose (mSv) 
2 m outside container center 0.378 
3 m outside container center 0.00606 
4 m outside container center 0.0321 
5 m outside container center 0.00321 
5 m outside container center, shielded 0.0000717 
6 m outside container center 0.00200 
7 m outside container center 0.00136 
Centered above scan 1 0.151 
Centered above scan 2 0.167 
Centered above scan 3 0.169 
62 cm from floor above scan 1 0.224 
62 cm from floor above scan 2 0.230 
62 cm from floor above scan 3 0.230 
9 cm from floor above scan 1 0.396 
9 cm from floor above scan 2 0.405 
9 cm from floor above scan 3 0.405 
1.3 m from bottom, 9 cm from side, above scan 3  0.150 
1.3 m from bottom, 69 cm from side, above scan 3 0.162 
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Chapter 8. Evaluation of an Explosives-Detection 
Algorithm for Use in Sea-Land Cargo Containers 
 
Abstract 
One potential avenue for the illicit transportation of highly explosive 
material is through the use of sea-land cargo containers. An algorithm based on 
neutron and photon measurements during active neutron interrogation with 14.1 
MeV neutrons was developed. In this method, specific flags based on ratios of 
photon and neutron measurements function to characterize unknown cargo 
material, test for the presence of explosives, and minimize the number of false 
positives due to cargo heterogeneity. The detection algorithm has now been 
evaluated for effectiveness over a wide range of explosive sizes, positions, and 
cargo configurations. This evaluation includes a study of various sources of 
uncertainty, including those inherent in the measurement technique and from 
outside sources such as background radiation. An estimate of the false positive 
and false negative rates was completed for various measurement conditions and 
trigger thresholds. Results showed that, although minimum detectable explosive 
mass depended on the surrounding cargo material, explosive position, and cargo 
configuration, a 200 kg sphere of RDX could be reliably detected.  
Introduction 
The smuggling of chemical explosives in shipping containers presents 
several difficulties. Conventional x-ray scanning techniques cannot easily 
penetrate the large target masses and are further disadvantaged due to the 
similarities in electron density between explosive material and low-Z inert media. 
Furthermore, high throughput rates require minimal delay in the screening 
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process. Active neutron interrogation shows promise in the detection of 
explosives under these conditions [1]. 
Explosives detection algorithm and detection system 
A flag-based detection algorithm was devised that uses the neutron and 
photon measurements from 14.1 MeV active neutron interrogation of cargo 
containers to discern the presence of explosives [2]. This algorithm was 
developed in several stages, the first of which involved the characterization of 
neutron scattering behavior using Monte Carlo simulations [3]. Next, laboratory 
measurements confirmed the validity of calculated neutron detector response 
functions that form the backbone of several flag calculations [4]. These flags 
were then isolated using idealized simulations [5] and tested under more realistic 
simulated conditions [6]. The flags may be formed from ratios of neutron 
measurements, such as neutron measurements within a 0.2 MeV energy bin at 
different scatter angles, ratios of wider ranges of neutron energy at different 
scatter angles, ratios of total neutron count rates in different detectors, or ratios 
of neutrons within certain pulse height thresholds at different angles. Flags based 
on photons are generally ratios of the characteristic photons produced by the 
de-excitation of carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen after inelastic neutron scatter. Other 
flags are formed using combinations of the above neutron and photon 
measurements.  
This explosives-detection algorithm utilized flags in several different steps. 
The first step involved the sorting of unknown cargos into either 
inorganic/metallic cargos or organic/hydrogenous cargos. The next step involved 
explosives detection in the case in which the entire container is filled with 
explosives by matching the relative values of several key flags to templates of 
different explosive materials. Next, the algorithm calculated the trigger value, 
defined as the maximum relative change in an explosives-detection flag at one 
particular position relative to the other four. This trigger value is then compared 
with a predetermined threshold value. The threshold value may vary depending 
on which of the five positions the trigger value is calculated. If the algorithm 
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triggers at this step, it proceeds to the final step in which the values of several 
different flags are compared in order to minimize false positives due to the 
presence of denser but inert heterogeneities in the cargo. Implementation of the 
detection algorithm involves a system in which the cargo container is transported 
through a ring of detectors and over a buried D-T neutron generator. An earlier 
paper provided a detailed description as well as cost and dose estimates for 
system operation. [2] 
One important issue to consider is the feasibility of calculating the flags 
that require relatively stringent neutron spectroscopy. Several of the flags are 
based on fast neutron energy of ranges of 0.2 MeV, which is difficult to achieve 
with a high detection efficiency using available neutron detectors. Therefore, two 
separate detection algorithms were described, the spectroscopic algorithm 
utilized only the best-performing flags, even if it is not currently possible to 
efficiently implement them, while the pulse height distribution (PHD) algorithm 
used ranges in neutron pulse height distributions instead of stringent neutron 
spectroscopy, and is therefore fully implementable with currently available 
technology. All of the flags are described in earlier papers [2,6].  
Evaluation of the detection algorithm 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of the 
detection algorithm under various conditions through calculation the detection 
probability, system specificity and sensitivity. Some factors considered include 
random measurement fluctuations, explosive size and position, and 
heterogeneous cargo configurations. Quantitative assessment of many of these 
factors was accomplished through analysis of their effect on the trigger values, 
as defined above. Consideration of these factors also allowed for a further 
optimization of the detection algorithm through refinement of the trigger 
thresholds. Other sources of uncertainty include counting statistics, the effect of 
photon escape peaks on photon-based flag performance, the presence of 
background radiation and signal degradation due to multiple neutron scatters in 
the shielding and surrounding environment.  
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Materials and Methods 
Monte Carlo simulations and data analysis 
All of the simulations were completed using either MCNP5 [7] or 
MCNP-PoliMi [8]. The results from the PoliMi simulations were input into a 
postprocessor that calculated the detector response of the eleven neutron 
detectors [9]. This detector response included both PHDs and time-of-flight 
(TOF) distributions, though the TOF information was not used due to high levels 
of uncertainty in the interaction position because of the very large target mass.  
General MCNP and MCNP-PoliMi geometry 
A detailed description of the simulation geometry was discussed in an 
earlier paper [2], although the general form is provided in Fig. 8-1 as a reference, 
with all material atomic compositions listed in Table 8-1. In this geometry, a 
standard-sized cargo container is located on a 25-cm-thick concrete slab over a 
standard soil. Eleven 20 cm thick, 40 cm radius neutron scintillation fluid EJ-309 
detectors surround the container [10,11,12]. The isotropic 14.1 MeV neutron 
source is located 160 cm below the bottom of the container and is shielded into a 
fan beam by a mixture of polyethylene and steel that is at least 50 cm thick. The 
fan beam is sufficiently broad such that the entire container width is irradiated 
and thick enough for a 10% overlap of adjacent measurements. In addition to the 
calculated neutron detector responses, MCNP F1 tallies are calculated on the 
detector surfaces facing the cargo container.  
Heterogeneous cargo geometries 
As the detection system is designed to find explosives through discovery 
of variations in particular flag values, it is very likely that more heterogeneous 
cargo configurations would prove problematic. Therefore, several geometries 
were tested that utilized crated cargo instead of homogenized cargo. Three 
different cargo types were considered: steel machine components, clothing, and 
furniture. All geometries included cargo inside wooden boxes that measured 100 
cm " 100 cm " 20 cm and were stacked 12 at a time with six rows of two crates 
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in each level. The total number of crates varied depending on cargo density, with 
the total mass equaling the maximum cargo load of the containers. The 
scenarios with simulated steel parts had 34 crates of steel with density 4 g cm-3, 
crated paper scenarios had 135 crates at 0.8 g cm-3, and furniture scenarios had 
64 crates at 2 g cm-3.  
Along with explosive-free simulations of each cargo, the heterogeneous 
simulations used one of two explosive configurations. In the first configuration, a 
rectangular box of RDX was placed between the two rows of cargo-filled crates, 
as shown in Fig 8-2a. This box of RDX had a width of 28 cm and a height and 
length of 62.6 cm for the 200 kg box, 76.7 cm for the 300 kg box, and 88.6 cm for 
the 400 kg box. In the second configuration, one to four crates of cargo were 
substituted with an equally-sized box of RDX. Each of the RDX crates contained 
274 kg of RDX and substituted for crates located in the middle of neighboring 
stacks, as shown in Fig. 8-2b. 
Data analysis and implementation of the detection algorithm 
Simulation output files included a text file of the F1 tally outputs, as well as 
text files for the PHD and TOF distribution calculated with the postprocessor. 
These were combined using a custom parser designed using a common 
mathematics and data analysis package (MATLAB, 3 Apple Hill Drive, Natick, 
MA, USA 01760), as well as spreadsheet software (Excel, Microsoft, 1 Microsoft 
Way, Redmond, WA, USA 98052). Similarly, custom MATLAB programs were 
used to calculate the relevant flag values, flag strengths, and statistical 
uncertainty in flag calculations. Other programs applied the detection algorithm, 
uncertainty analysis, and simulated measurement error.  
Sources of uncertainty in MCNP simulations 
Photon escape peaks 
All of the proposed flags formed using de-excitation photons were based 
on a 0.2 MeV energy bin width in the photon tallies. This level of energy 
resolution is easily achievable using available photon spectroscopy technology. 
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However, one issue not considered in the earlier simulations was the effect of the 
single, 0.511 MeV, or double, 1.22 MeV, escape peaks in actual photon 
measurements. One easy way to check the effectiveness of the current 
photon-based flags and include the escape peaks was to use the energy range 
between the photopeak energy and the photopeak minus 1.22 MeV in place of 
the single photopeak energy bin. The magnitude of this effect was estimated by 
finding the change in photon-based flag strengths for homogenous cargos with 
200 kg of concealed RDX when the flags were calculated with and without the 
increased range of photon energies.  
Measurement error 
Previous measurements showed that a 10% margin of error provided a 
conservative approximation of the uncertainty due to equipment measurement 
error, especially as much of the uncertainties due to light collection are included 
in the postprocessor [4,9]. In order to quantify the effect of measurement error on 
the flag calculations, an iterative computer program was created using a common 
software package (MATLAB). In this program, a random error was introduced to 
each tally and PHD in the simulation output files. This error fell within the 
Gaussian distribution defined by a 10% standard deviation from the “true” value 
provided by the simulation output. This process was iterated enough times such 
that average trigger values converged to within 2% of the average expected with 
infinite iterations. [13,14,15] The MATLAB code for creating the perturbed data is 
found in Appendix B. 
Neutron source and multiple-scatters 
The primary sources of non-equipment-based noise in the neutron signal 
are from multiple-scatters in the environment and the source shield. As well as 
neutron scatter in the environment, over 80% of the total photons originate 
outside the cargo container, the majority in the source shielding. This behavior 
was incorporated into the five-scan simulations through inclusion of an isotropic 
neutron source and accurate depiction of the source shield and surrounding 
environment. In this way, the effect of multiple scatters was part of the initial flag 
  184 
value and uncertainty calculations. Furthermore, because of a standardized 
scanning geometry, the amount of scatter outside the container should remain 
relatively constant between measurements and any remaining variations would 
have less impact than the random measurement error.  
Performance under different conditions 
Changing explosive size 
An earlier study [5] investigated the effect of explosive size on flag 
strength. It was found that there was a linear relationship between flag strength 
and explosive size for “specific” neutron flags, i.e. the flags based on ratios of 
specific 0.2 MeV energy bin neutron tallies. These previous calculations 
depended on a single measurement in a lateral irradiation configuration instead 
of the vertical configuration described above. As an extension of the earlier 
investigation, and in order to estimate the minimum detectable explosive mass in 
a given configuration, a series of simulations was completed in which a 5, 10, 50, 
100, 200, 300, or 400 kg sphere of RDX was concealed centered above one of 
the five scanning locations. Homogenous cargo materials included clothing, 
electronics, furniture, meat, paper, steel, vegetables, and wheat. The relationship 
between explosive mass and detection probability was estimated by plotting the 
trigger value as a function of explosive mass in both the spectroscopic and PHD 
explosives-detection algorithms. 
Changing explosive position 
Earlier studies [5] took a preliminary look at the effect of the position of the 
explosive position on flag strength, or the difference in flag value with and without 
a 500 kg sphere of RDX. This was expanded on by applying the 
explosives-detection algorithm to a series of simulations in which one of the more 
difficult cargo materials, paper, was homogenously distributed in a cargo 
container with 200 kg spheres of RDX at various locations. These locations 
included seventeen positions centered in the container along its length; vertical 
displacements of ±30 cm, ±60 cm, and ±90 cm above the center position; nine 
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lateral displacements within ±90 cm from center, and two additional cases in 
which the explosive was displaced 60 cm laterally and ±60 cm vertically from the 
center.  
Another set of simulations was completed in which 200 kg of explosives 
were placed in different locations in a cargo representing furniture. These 
simulations were necessary because an earlier study found that, while most inert 
cargos displayed increased trigger values at scanning positions one and five, a 
few, including paper, showed increases at the center position [2]. The furniture 
simulations had explosives along the container at fifteen positions between 35 
cm and 585 cm from container end. Additionally, depth displacements of -90 cm, 
-60 cm, -30 cm, and 60 cm were simulated, along with width displacements of 15 
cm, 45 cm, 60 cm, and 90 cm. 
Detection probability calculations 
In order to estimate the detection probability, including estimating the false 
negative (FN), false positive (FP), true negative (TN), and true positive (TP) 
rates, 4,000 randomly perturbed spectra were input into the detection algorithm. 
In the cases in which RDX was present, the percentage of positive algorithm 
results that correctly identified the location of the explosive gave an estimate of 
the TP rate. Similarly, the proportion of iterations without any trigger gave an 
estimate of the false negative rate. The FP rate in these cases was estimated by 
the number of times the algorithm triggered in the wrong location. For the cases 
without RDX, The true negative rate was estimated by the proportion of 
non-triggering iterations, while FPs were defined by the number of times the 
algorithm triggered at any of the five scanning locations.  
Optimization of explosives-triggering thresholds 
Initial triggering thresholds were chosen in an earlier paper [2] based on 
observation of simulations of homogenous cargo with 200 kg sphere of RDX. It 
was found that the vast majority of cargos showed elevated values at the edges, 
i.e. positions 1 and 5, due to asymmetries in cargo scanning at these positions. 
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Therefore trigger thresholds of 0.2 were chosen for possible explosives in these 
positions, while a threshold of 0.1 was used for positions 2, 3, and 4 [2]. 
However, further optimization of these trigger thresholds was explored in this 
study. Nine different trigger thresholds, shown in Table 8-2, were applied in the 
detection algorithm described above with 4,000 iterations of 118 
randomly-perturbed simulation results [2]. Homogenous cargos used in the 
optimization process included clothing, electronics, furniture, meat, paper, steel, 
vegetables, and wheat, with the atomic compositions shown in Table 8-1. 
Explosives ranged from absent to 500 kg spheres. Receiver-operating 
characteristic (ROC) curves were used to choose optimum trigger thresholds 
using average FP and average TP rates calculated from all the homogenous 
cargos as described above [16,17,18].  
Results and Discussion 
Sources of uncertainty in MCNP simulations 
Photon escape peaks 
When the photon-based flags were recalculated using the increased 
photon energy range to compensate for losses in photon escape peaks most 
showed little change or an improvement in flag strength. As shown in Table 8-3, 
33% of the flags had decreases in flag strength of more than 0.10, while 33% 
had changes of less than 0.10 and another 33% showed an improvement of 
more than 0.1. Furthermore, the extended photon energy range increased 
average triggering rate by 4% with a 0.1 trigger threshold, and by 6% with a 0.2 
trigger threshold. Another important thing to note that all of the photon-based 
flags used in the explosives-triggering step of the detection algorithm showed 
either no significant change, or an improvement of around 0.3 when the 
increased photon energy range was used. Therefore, it is valid to conclude that 
compensating for photon escape peaks will have either minimal change or 
actually improve the effectiveness of the detection algorithm, with any negative 
impact occurring in the final step of the algorithm. 
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Measurement error 
Examples of perturbed neutron spectra and pulse height distributions are 
shown in Figs. 8-3a and 8-3b. It was found that 4,000 iterations were more than 
sufficient to estimate the expected peak heights, as the average did not change 
by more than 2% with an increased number of iterations. Inclusion of 
measurement error had a significant effect on the detection rate, as the random 
perturbations could occasionally change the trigger value by as much as 30-50%, 
which increased both the number of false positives and false negatives. 
Scenarios for which the unperturbed trigger value was below the detection 
threshold saw a corresponding increase in successful detections. 
Environmental radiation interference 
As with any radiation measurement, the background radiation must be 
considered when estimating the performance of a measurement system. Earlier 
measurements in the laboratory demonstrated that liquid scintillator-based 
detectors of the same type as the proposed system measured background count 
rates of about 30 counts per second, with about 0.5% of counts due to neutrons 
[4]. Calculations showed an intrinsic detection efficiency of approximately 13% 
for neutrons, yielding a neutron background rate of 1.15 n s-1 [4]. The proposed 
detectors are considerably larger, with a neutron detector counting efficiency of 
approximately 20%, based on comparisons of the PHDs and F1 tallies. The 
larger active volume also increases the photon detection probability leading to a 
conservative estimate of 100 background photon counts per second, with only 
0.23 neutron counts per second. Simulations showed that, given an incident 
neutron source rate of 108 n s-1, all of the detectors experienced fluxes exceeding 
1,500 neutrons and 10,000 photons per second. This corresponds to 
source-produced count rates of 290 neutron and 4,800 photon counts per 
second. Therefore, the background-produced count rates do not contribute 
significantly to either the neutron or photon measurements.  
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Neutron source and multiple-scatters 
The primary source of noise in the neutron signal is from multiple-scatters 
in the environment and the source shield. Furthermore, over 80% of the total 
inelastic-scatter photons originate outside the cargo container, mostly in the 
source shielding. This behavior was incorporated into the five-scan simulations 
through inclusion of an isotropic neutron source and accurate depiction of the 
source shield and surrounding environment. In this way, the effect of multiple 
scatters was part of the initial flag value and uncertainty calculations. 
Furthermore, because of a standardized scanning geometry, the amount of 
scatter outside the container should remain relatively constant between 
measurements and any remaining variations would have less impact than the 
10% variation produced through random measurement error. 
Optimization of explosives-triggering thresholds 
The ROC curves shown in Fig. 8-4 demonstrate the relationship between 
FP rate and the TP rate for the nine different triggering thresholds listed in Table 
8-2. As seen in the figure, both algorithms occupy the far upper right corner, 
away from the FP=TP line, and therefore have a relatively high figure of merit 
[16]. Due to its higher TP rate for a given FP rate, the PHD algorithm is superior 
in performance to the spectroscopic algorithm for cases with more than 100 kg of 
RDX. All detection thresholds showed increased TP rates when applied to the 
PHD detection algorithm. The final choice of the trigger threshold will depend on 
what FP and TP rates are considered acceptable. These rates are shown in 
Table 8-4, along with the TP/FP ratio. The highest ratios signify the best trade-off 
between TP and FP rates. This is found, for both algorithms, in threshold T5, 
which corresponds to a value of 0.2 for any scanning position. This threshold 
also corresponds to the lowest TP rate, which may be unacceptable when 
detecting something as dangerous as explosives. However, using threshold T9, 
or 0.175 at the edges and 0.125 elsewhere, increases the average TP rate to 
38% and 57% for the spectroscopic and PHD algorithms, respectively, while 
keeping the average FP rate below 3% for both cases. It should be noted that the 
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relatively low TP rates in the table are due to averaging from cases with small 
amounts of explosive. 
Performance under different conditions 
Explosive size 
It was found that the trigger value, for a given cargo, was linearly 
dependent on explosive mass, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.83 to 
0.99 in the spectroscopic algorithm and 0.78 to 0.98 in the PHD algorithm. This is 
shown in Figs. 8-5a and 8-5b for the spectroscopic and PHD algorithms, 
respectively. This was expected, as earlier studies found a roughly linear 
relationship between flag strength, which the trigger values are based on, and 
explosive mass [6]. Applying trigger threshold T9, i.e. 0.175 at positions 1 and 5 
and 0.125 at 2, 3, and 4, provides estimates of the theoretically possible 
minimum detectable mass (MDM) of detectable explosive for both algorithms. As 
seen in the figures, trigger values were considerably higher in the PHD algorithm, 
which leads to smaller MDMs, as well as potentially better overall performance. 
As expected, some cargo materials better concealed the explosive, such that the 
MDMs in these materials were significantly larger. The largest MDMs were found 
in organic/hydrogenous materials such as meat, paper, and vegetables, with 
MDMs ranging from 100 to 150 kg in the PHD algorithm and 250 to 350 kg with 
the spectroscopic algorithm. Inorganic materials, such as steel and electronics, 
performed better with MDMs of 30 to 100 kg and 20 to 45 kg for the 
spectroscopic and PHD detection algorithms, respectively. Mixed and 
intermediate cargo materials had MDMs of 70 to 130 kg for the spectroscopic 
algorithm and 30to 60 kg in the PHD algorithm. It is expected that the MDM 
would increase when factors such as more realistic cargo distributions and 
measurement error are considered. 
Explosive position 
As expected, the performance of the detection algorithm was sensitive to 
explosive position within the container. It was expected that the trigger value 
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would decrease significantly when the explosive was positioned between 
scanning positions. This is because the explosive would increase flag values at 
adjacent scanning locations and therefore decrease the difference between any 
single flag value and the average flag value, from which the trigger value is 
calculated. For the two scenarios with homogenous paper or furniture cargo, it 
was found that the trigger value varied by more than 0.25 along the length of the 
container. As shown in Fig. 8-6a, the trigger value was greatest in the center 
position and considerably lower at the ends. In most cases, trigger values were 
also higher when the explosive was centered above a scanning position. As 
expected, there was much less variation in trigger value, 0.1 to 0.12, when the 
explosive was shifted across the width of the container. This is shown in Fig. 
8-6b, in which the increased values at the outer edges means that detection 
probability should actually increase when the explosive is further from the center 
position. Fig. 8-6c shows the variation in trigger value when the explosive is 
raised or lowered from its centered position. Variation in trigger value for these 
scenarios varied between 0.1 and 0.25.  
Heterogeneous cargo geometry and explosive configuration 
The trigger values for the simulations in which a box of RDX was placed in 
the center of a cargo container filled with crates of cargo are shown in Table 8-5. 
As seen in the table, all trigger values far exceeded the highest studied threshold 
value of 0.2 and therefore had a 100% detection probability. These high trigger 
values were not unexpected, as the explosive was exposed to both the source 
and several detectors with little cargo material interfering.  
Trigger values, and therefore detection probabilities, decreased 
dramatically when the explosive took the place of one to four crates in the 
container. As seen in Table 8-5, trigger values for these scenarios were well 
below the minimum triggering threshold of 0.1 for all cases except steel cargo 
with three or more crates of RDX. As each crate contains 274 kg of explosive, 
the near-zero detection rates in low-Z cargo of large explosive masses in these 
geometries is a weakness that must be accounted for before final implementation 
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of the system. However, it should be noted that the crates of RDX in the paper 
scenario were between scanning positions one and two, while the furniture 
scenario had RDX between positions four and five. As discussed in the previous 
section, positioning the explosives in these positions significantly decreases the 
trigger value. However, these simulations demonstrate that the proposed 
algorithm and associated system has weaknesses in that strategically placed 
explosives in cargo containers would probably not be detected. 
Explosives detection probability 
As discussed above multiple applications of random measurement error to 
simulation data allowed the calculation of expected TP rates in scenarios with 
varying amounts of explosive, as shown in Table 8-6. As expected, inorganic or 
metallic materials, such as electronics and steel have the highest detection 
probability for a given explosive mass, and therefore the smallest MDM. This is 
due to the fact that RDX is more similar, chemically, to organic/hydrogenous 
materials. The calculated MDMs compared favorably with the theoretical MDMs 
discussed above, with approximately 50 kg more explosives than the theoretical 
MDM reaching an almost 100% TP rate. The FP rates for both crated and 
homogenous cargo distributions with zero explosives are shown in Table 8-7. As 
seen in the table, both algorithms had FP rates of less than 5%, with rates in 
homogenous cargo generally lower than the crated geometries. As expected, the 
PHD algorithm performed considerably better than the spectroscopic detection 
algorithm in both TP and FP rates, mostly due to larger trigger values using this 
algorithm.  
The one exception to the PHD algorithms’ superior performance was in 
the cases in which one to four crates in the heterogeneous geometry were 
replaced with RDX. As expected from their low trigger values, these scenarios 
had low detection rates, less than 5% for all RDX masses with paper or furniture, 
and requiring three crates of RDX to have a 71% detection rate in the steel 
scenario. For these cases, the spectroscopic algorithm performed better, 
detecting three crates of steel, while the PHD algorithm could not even reliably 
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detect four. It is surmised that this is because the use of the more specific flags in 
the spectroscopic algorithm provide better sensitivity for cases in which the 
density of the surrounding cargo closely matches that of the explosive. 
Another potential source of false readings comes from if either the 
material determination or the dense object correction reach inaccurate 
conclusions. This does not happen with the materials simulated here, but may 
occur with cargo that is unlike the particular materials studied here, or with 
containers in which different types of cargo is distributed heterogeneously in the 
container. The best way to minimize these errors is to test a wider range of 
materials and cargo distributions and better optimize the thresholds used in both 
parts of the algorithm. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the proposed system 
The proposed system exhibits all the advantages of neutron-based 
explosives detection systems, such as the ability to differentiate between light 
elements and high target penetration. Furthermore, the proposed system, the 
first to combine both neutron and photon signals in a simple algorithm, has the 
advantage of fewer incident neutrons as compared to thermal neutron activation 
or inelastic photon based methods and less stringent neutron spectroscopy 
requirements than many neutron detection based methods. Other advantages 
are the relatively low cost of the detectors and the potential for using neutron 
pulse height distributions instead of complicated unfolding algorithms for the 
neutron flags. Provided that a powerful D-T neutron generator were used, the 
proposed system allows for throughput rates that are slower than x-ray 
screening, but considerably faster than other neutron screening techniques. 
However, the current algorithm is only able to reliably detect large explosives and 
has a relatively high false-positive rate that would further slow the screening 
process. Another disadvantage of the system is that the algorithm depends on a 
relatively homogenous distribution of inert cargo in the container. If more than 
one type of cargo is present in different locations, or multiple explosives are 
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distributed along the container length, the triggering algorithm will be 
compromised. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
It was shown that specific flags, designed to trigger in the presence of 
explosives, could work together to produce a feasible explosives-detection 
algorithm that can be implemented using currently-existing technology. 
Performance of this algorithm was evaluated under various scenarios, including 
changing mass and position of the explosive, both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous cargo distributions, and accounting for random measurement 
error. Other factors included sources of error such as photon escape peaks and 
background radiation. It was found, after optimization of the triggering thresholds, 
that the system could reliably detect 200 kg explosives in homogenous cargos 
when the explosive was centered above a scanning position. However, deviation 
in placement and cargo distribution may decrease detection probability 
dramatically.  
Future efforts should explore improvements to both the detection 
algorithm and the implementation system. This could include increasing the 
number of cargo type categories, and varying the triggering portion of the 
algorithm according to the material. Treating the symmetrical, i.e. same scatter 
angle, detectors individually and testing other flags based on the neutron pulse 
height distributions could also further improve algorithm performance. Probably 
the greatest improvement could be accomplished by either increasing the 
number of scans or comparing the average trigger values of adjacent scans to 
the average of the other three in order to detect explosives positioned between 
scanning positions. It is possible that artificial intelligence techniques, such as 
neural networks, could be used to further optimize the algorithm, such as in 
materials identification or the influence of inert but dense objects in the container 
[19].  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 8-1. General geometry of the explosives-detection system 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 8-2. Heterogeneous cargo geometry with a) centered 200, 300, or 400 kg 
box of RDX, and b) RDX replacing 1-4 crates of cargo, with two crates shown. 
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a. 
Figure 8-3. Illustration of implementation of 10% measurement error for a) 
neutron energy tallies and b) neutron pulse height distributions at detectors 
tallying neutrons at different scatter angles. 
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b. 
Figure 8-3 (continued). Illustration of implementation of 10% measurement error 
for a) neutron energy tallies and b) neutron pulse height distributions at the 
different scatter angles. 
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Figure 8-4. Receiver-operating characteristic curves for the Spectroscopic and 
PHD detection algorithms. False positive rates are averaged over all 
homogenous cargos and true positives for homogenous cases with greater than 
100 kg RDX. Numbers refer to threshold numbers as listed in Table 8-2. 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 8-5. Trigger values as a function of explosive mass in homogeneous 
cargo simulations for a) spectroscopic algorithm and b) PHD algorithm. Shown 
along with an example 0.1 detection threshold. 
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a. 
 
Figure 8-6. Trigger value as a function of explosive position in furniture or paper 
cargo along a) container length with marked scanning positions, b) container 
width, and c) container height. 
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b. 
 
 
c. 
Figure 8-6 (continued). Trigger value as a function of explosive position in 
furniture or paper cargo along a) container length with marked scanning 
positions, b) container width, and c) container height. 
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Tables 
Table 8-1. Atomic compositions of materials in Monte Carlo simulations, as 
adapted from [2,5,6]. 
 
Material Density H C N O Other 
Air 0.0012  0.01% 75.5% 23.2% 1.3% Ar 
Clothing 1.1 48% 29%  24%  
Concrete 2.3 30% 0%  50% 
1% Na, 1% Al, 
15% Si, 1% K, 
1.5% Ca, trace Fe 
Liquid 
scintillator 
(EJ-309) 
0.916 54.8% 45.2%    
Electronics 0.329 26% 2%  47% 2.6% Al, 12% Si, 10% Ni, 0.3% Fe 
Furniture 0.8 41% 32%  21% 3% Fe, 3% Al 
Meat 1.1 60% 15% 1% 24% trace K, P 
Paper, wood 0.6 or 0.7 48% 29%  24%  
Polyethylene 0.93 67% 33%    
RDX       
Soil 1.75 29.4% 1.87%  50.5% 
2.59% Al, 13.54% 
Si, 1.43% K, 
0.27% Fe 
Steel 7.87  0.32%   99.6% Fe, 0.05% S, 0.04% P 
Vegetables 
(potatoes) 1.6 63% 6%  31% 
trace Ca, Fe, Mg, 
P, K, Na, S, Cl 
Wheat 0.79 7% 37% 2% 53% 
trace: S, Na, K, 
Ca, Mg, Fe, Cu, 
Zn, P, Cl 
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Table 8-2. Trigger threshold values tested in detection algorithm. 
 
Threshold 
Number 
Position 
1 
Position 
2 
Position 
3 
Position 
4 
Position 
5 
T1 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.10 
T2 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 
T3 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 
T4 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
T5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
T6 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
T7 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 
T8 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 
T9 0.175 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.175 
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Table 8-3. Effect of photon escape peaks on relevant flag values. 
 
Photon flag 
identity 
Average 
change in 
flag strength Photon flag identity 
Average 
change in 
flag strength 
 0.20 ± 0.08  -0.27 ± 0.16 
 0.26 ± 0.16  -0.25 ± 0.1 
 -0.15 ± 0.13  0.31 ± 0.21 
 -0.01 ± 0.09 
 
0.29 ± 0.15 
 0.01 ± 0.06 
 
0.06 ± 0.06 
 -0.15 ± 0.15 
 
-0.01 ± 0.14 
 -0.10 ± 0.08 
 
0.30 ± 0.15 
 -0.10 ± 0.13 
 
0.06 ± 0.06 
 0.33 ± 0.22 
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Table 8-4. Average true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) rates with different 
trigger thresholds for homogenous cargos containing between 10 kg and 400 kg 
RDX. Also shown is the ratio of true positives to false positives. 
 
Threshold 
number 
Threshold: scan 
position 
Average 
TP 
Average 
FP TP/FP 
Spectroscopic 
6 0.100: all positions 48.5% 9.83% 4.93 
8 0.175: all positions 48.5% 9.83% 4.93 
1 0.200: 3 0.100: 1, 2, 4, 5 47.6% 9.27% 5.13 
3 0.150: 1, 5 0.100: 2, 3, 4 43.0% 4.47% 9.61 
7 0.125: all positions 42.3% 3.99% 10.6 
2 0.200: 1, 5 0.100: 2, 3, 4 39.5% 3.79% 10.4 
9 0.175: 1, 5 0.125: 2, 3, 4 38.0% 1.89% 20.1 
4 0.150: all positions 35.8% 1.64% 21.8 
5 0.200: all positions 26.9% 0.62% 43.8 
PHD 
6 0.100: all positions 68.2% 8.72% 7.83 
8 0.175: all positions 68.2% 8.72% 7.83 
1 0.200: 3 0.100: 1, 2, 4, 5 68.2% 8.28% 8.23 
3 0.150: 1, 5 0.100: 2, 3, 4 62.7% 4.38% 14.3 
7 0.125: all positions 61.9% 4.48% 13.8 
2 0.200: 1, 5 0.100: 2, 3, 4 58.7% 3.91% 15.0 
9 0.175: 1, 5 0.125: 2, 3, 4 57.3% 2.81% 20.4 
4 0.150: all positions 56.0% 2.72% 20.6 
5 0.200: all positions 45.8% 2.00% 22.9 
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Table 8-5. Trigger values for crated geometries with box of RDX in the center of 
the container. Each crate of RDX contains 274 kg of explosive. 
 
Cargo RDX Trigger value (Spectroscopic) 
Trigger value 
(PHD) 
Furniture 0 0.0455 0.0455 
Paper 0 0.0554 0.0594 
Steel 0 0.0664 0.0493 
Centered box of RDX 
Furniture 200 kg 2.91 3.27 
Furniture 300 kg 3.10 3.40 
Furniture 400 kg 3.25 3.48 
Paper 200 kg 2.70 3.15 
Paper 300 kg 3.00 3.34 
Paper 400 kg 3.23 3.46 
Steel 200 kg 1.98 2.32 
Steel 300 kg 2.09 2.42 
Steel 400 kg 2.17 2.48 
Cargo crates replaced with RDX 
Furniture 1 crate 0.0457 0.0455 
Furniture 2 crates 0.0458 0.0455 
Furniture 3 crates 0.0457 0.0452 
Furniture 4 crates 0.0460 0.0452 
Paper 1 crate 0.0558 0.0593 
Paper 2 crates 0.0560 0.0595 
Paper 3 crates 0.0557 0.0596 
Paper 4 crates 0.0560 0.0597 
Steel 1 crate 0.0613 0.0439 
Steel 2 crates 0.0698 0.0450 
Steel 3 crates 0.197 0.0968 
Steel 4 crates 0.349 0.134 
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Table 8-6. True positive rates as a function of explosive size in homogeneous 
cargo simulations with explosive centered above one scanning position. 
 
RDX 
(kg) Cloth Electronics Furniture Meat Paper Steel Vegetables Wheat 
 Spectroscopic detection algorithm 
10 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 3% 0% 1% 
25 1% 1% 1% 4% 0% 18% 0% 2% 
50 4% 13% 4% 7%  71% 0% 10% 
100 32% 75% 27% 17% 1% 100% 1% 41% 
200 87% 99% 81% 36% 21%  12% 86% 
300 99% 100% 98% 57% 60% 100% 38% 99% 
400 100%   76% 89%  72%  
500     99%    
 PHD detection algorithm 
10 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 3% 0% 3% 
25 5% 9% 4% 6% 0% 43% 0% 13% 
50 79% 97% 72% 20%  100% 1% 38% 
100 100% 100% 100% 35% 16% 100% 31% 93% 
200 100% 100% 100% 80% 99%  100% 100% 
300 100% 100% 100% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
400 100%   99% 100%  100%  
500     100%    
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Table 8-7. False positive rates in homogenous and crated cargo geometries. 
 
Cargo Spectroscopic algorithm 
PHD 
algorithm 
Cloth (homogenous) 0.40% 0.00% 
Electronics (homogenous) 1.53% 0.08% 
Furniture (homogenous) 0.50% 0.03% 
Meat (homogenous) 3.08% 4.18% 
Paper (homogenous) 4.90% 0.55% 
Steel (homogenous) 1.60% 0.10% 
Vegetables (homogenous) 0.73% 0.33% 
Wheat (homogenous) 1.88% 0.65% 
Furniture (crated) 4.38% 1.13% 
Paper (crated) 2.58% 0.28% 
Steel (crated) 3.85% 0.40% 
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Chapter 9. Statistical Modeling to Improve a Flag-Based 
Explosives-Detection Algorithm based on Active 
Neutron Interrogation 
Abstract 
Earlier efforts have identified an algorithm that uses neutron and photon 
measurements from active neutron interrogation to find explosives hidden in 
cargo containers. This algorithm uses flags, in the form of specific mathematical 
manipulations of the exiting neutron and photon radiation at different angles, to 
first classify the cargo type, then search for hidden explosives, and finally 
minimize certain false positives due to cargo heterogeneities. Statistical modeling 
software has now been applied to the previously-identified flags in an effort to 
improve the detection algorithm. Statistically-modeled algorithms were developed 
for three subsets of the screening scenarios. The new detection models have 
shown accurate results exceeding 98% for simplified screening scenarios and 
80%-90% when more realistic conditions are considered. Comparison of the 
statistically-modeled algorithm with previously-developed detection algorithms 
found an increase in the figure of merit, defined to have a value between 0.5 and 
1.0, from 0.72 to 0.77. Estimates of the expected error due to statistical 
fluctuations in radiation measurement found that the statistically-modeled 
algorithm varied by about twice as much as the earlier algorithms. 
Introduction 
The possibility of hidden explosives in sea-land cargo containers presents 
a real threat to security. Due to the dire consequences of successful smuggling 
and extremely high throughput at sea ports, scanning for explosives in an 
efficient and effective manner is necessary [1]. Most strategies currently 
employed depend on x-ray or other photon-based imaging of container contents 
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[2]. However, the dearth of significant metallic components in explosive material, 
as well as similarities in electron density to inert cargos, makes detection difficult 
[2].  
Cargo screening by active neutron interrogation 
One of the more promising strategies for detecting chemical explosives in 
large volumes, such as cargo containers, is active neutron interrogation. In active 
neutron interrogation, the signal may come from either the characteristic photons 
produced during neutron absorption or inelastic scatter, or from the scattered 
neutrons themselves [2]. The method studied here combines both photons and 
neutrons into a detection algorithm and therefore maximizes the number of signal 
carriers, which minimizes both measurement time and dose to personnel. 
Development of an explosives-detection algorithm 
The studied detection algorithm was developed during earlier efforts that 
involved the simulation of several explosives-screening scenarios involving cargo 
containers. The simulations were completed using the Monte Carlo software 
MCNP5 [3] or MCNP-PoliMi [4], with a custom post-processor [5] used to 
calculate the neutron detector response in several cases. In these simulations, a 
standard 2.4 m ! 6.2 m ! 2.6 m steel cargo container was placed on a concrete 
slab and irradiated from a monoenergetic 14.1-MeV neutron source, as produced 
by a D-T neutron generator. The container was surrounded by detectors that 
tallied neutron and photon flux in 30° scatter increments. Steps in algorithm 
development included characterization of the neutron scatter [6], identification of 
flags under idealistic conditions [7], testing these flags and identifying others in 
more realistic simulations [8], and validation of the simulated neutron detector 
responses using laboratory measurements [7].  
A flag-based algorithm for explosives detection 
The results from the earlier simulations identified many different flags that 
could be used in the algorithm. These flags are generally defined as ratios of 
either neutrons or photons at one energy and angle, divided by either neutrons or 
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photons at another energy and angle. The best-performing flags were identified 
by isolating the ones with the greatest percent difference for cases that were 
identical except for the presence of the explosive RDX (C3H6N6O6). 
Types of flags 
The first class of flags was defined by the ratio of neutrons of within a 0.2 
MeV energy range as measured at a particular detector. This type of flag best 
took advantage of neutron scatter peaks produced during elastic and inelastic 
scatter, but were ultimately not included due to limitations in technologically 
feasible neutron spectroscopy [7]. However, knowledge of the best performing 
flags of this type led to another class of flags that are very similar, but use wider 
neutron energy ranges, 1-2 MeV, at the same scatter angles as before [8]. Other 
neutron-based flags used the ratios of total backscattered and transmitted 
neutrons [7,8]. A final type of neutron-based flag was calculated directly from the 
neutron detector pulse height distributions (PHDs) and therefore did not require 
any unfolding of the neutron spectrum, as would be required for neutron 
spectroscopy [8]. Photon-based flags included ratios of the characteristic photons 
from neutron inelastic scatter off hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen nuclei 
as well as certain flags that combined these photons with neutron measurements 
at specific angles [7,8].  
Algorithm structure 
Because of the enormous variety in container cargos, the detection 
algorithm is based on finding significant changes in flag value as a function of 
container position that may signal the presence of an explosive [9]. Therefore, 
the container is irradiated at multiple locations along its length, which also 
compensates for limited target penetration that prevents total container volume 
scanning with a single irradiation. It was found that five irradiations with a 
fan-shaped neutron beam were sufficient to interrogate the entire container 
without increasing measurement time unnecessarily [9]. 
It was also determined that the best-performing flags in organic or 
hydrogenous cargos were different than those for metallic or inorganic cargos 
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[7,8]. Therefore the first step of the algorithm was to categorize an unknown 
cargo using empirically-determined material-sensitive flags [8,9]. The next step 
involved identifying potential containers that were completely filled with explosive 
through comparison with pre-determined flag templates. Next, a triggering 
sub-algorithm searched for significant changes in the explosives-sensitive flags 
as a function of position and returned a positive result if the trigger value (T) 
exceed a predetermined threshold amount [9]. Finally, containers with possible 
explosives went through an additional step that minimized the number of false 
positives due to the presence of unusually dense, but inert, objects [9]. 
Algorithm performance 
Further efforts quantified the performance of the detection algorithm under 
various conditions while taking into account sources of error such as 
measurement uncertainties and environmental interference [10]. Estimates made 
of the minimum detectable amounts of explosive in different types of cargo 
yielded results in the range of 50-100 kg for inorganic/metallic cargos and 
100-200 kg for organic/hydrogenous cargos [10]. Detection probability for each 
case was estimated using a 10% standard deviation random perturbation of 
simulation results, similar to what would be expected in a real measurement 
[11-14]. It was found that algorithm performance was significantly decreased if 
the explosive was not centered above one of the five scanning locations [10]. 
Furthermore, detection was particularly difficult when the simulated cargo was 
distributed heterogeneously, in this case palletized on the container floor [10]. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate possible improvements to the 
detection algorithm through application of statistical modeling software. 
Materials and Methods 
Statistical modeling 
For this study, the software package IBM SPSS v. 19 (IBM Corporation, 1 
New Orchard Road, Armonk, New York) was used to run binary logistic 
regression tests [15] on combinations of variables in order to build a model that 
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correctly predicted the presence or absence of the explosive RDX. As with all 
models created using binary logistic regression, the model was in the form: 
 
ln P1! P
" 
# 
$ 
% = z = &0 + &1x1 + &2x2 + ' ' ' + &k xk ,  (9.1) 
in which P is the probability of a positive result, xi are variables in the model, with 
fitted parameters !. The software output includes the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters !0 and multipliers !1 through !k, along with standard 
error for the ! values, the Wald &2 values. Also provided is the odds ratio, e', 
which represents a measure of the effect on P of changing the value of variable 
xi by one and provides a measure of the importance of the given variable. At this 
stage, the default cut-off value of 0.5 was used, such that only cases in which the 
probability P exceeded 0.5 were considered to contain an explosive. Potential 
models were evaluated according to the number of false negatives and false 
positives, as well as whether the included variables were statistically significant 
using a 95% confidence interval.  
The model was determined through a process of elimination in which all 
flags were tested in groups of three to five. Any that had significance levels below 
0.1 were then considered as potentially statistically significant. Next, these 
variables were tried in different combinations in order to maximize the percent 
that were correctly identified. Finally, the relative number of true positive, true 
negative, false positive, and false negative cases resulting from application of the 
potential models were used to pick the best one. 
Variables in the statistical model 
A total of 137 variables were considered when testing different detection 
models. These variables were derived from 38 unique flags, shown in Tables 9-1 
and 9-2, that showed significant differences between cases with and without 
explosive in earlier studies [7,8,9]. As before, these flags were calculated at each 
of the five scanning locations in a given screening scenario, but three types of 
variables were calculated for each of the 38 flags. The first of these, the flag 
range (Rf) for flag f is defined as: 
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Rf =
fmax ! fmin
µ f ,    (9.2) 
in which fmax, fmin , and µf are the maximum, minimum, and average values for the 
particular flag. The next variable, peak height (Pf), may be thought of the percent 
difference between the maximum and average flag values, and is defined as: 
! 
Pf =
fmax " µ f
µ f
.     (9.3)
 
The third type of flag-derived variable, the trigger value (Tf), is closely related to 
the peak height and was first used in the triggering sub-algorithm of original 
detection algorithm [9]. The trigger value maximizes the difference between the 
maximum flag value, where the explosive is most likely to be located, and the 
baseline flag value of the other four locations. It is defined by: 
 
Tf = maxs
fs= i ! µ f ,s" i
µ f ,s" i
# 
$ % 
& 
' ( ,   (9.4) 
in which s is one of the five scanning positions, i. 
 Earlier efforts showed that, in many cases, the best indicator of the 
presence of explosives was not the trigger value of one particular flag, but was 
the maximum trigger value for all the flags [9,10]. Therefore, the maximum, 
median, and average of each of the range, peak height, and trigger value were 
also considered as possible variables in the detection model.  
Because explosives located between adjoining scanning locations would 
raise the flag values at both locations and not create a clear “peak” in the trigger 
value, these scenarios are difficult to discern using only the variables discussed 
above. Therefore, it was useful to compare the off-center flag value, defined by 
the average flag value at two adjoining locations, with the other three off-center 
flag values. Therefore, the off-center range, off-center peak height, and off-center 
trigger value was calculated for each of the 38 flags and the maximum, median, 
and average off-center quantities were considered as possible variables in the 
model. Also considered were the maximum, median, and average of all trigger 
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values and the total spectroscopic and PHD trigger values from the original 
detection algorithm [9]. 
Cargo container screening scenarios 
A total of 178 cargo-screening scenarios were included when creating the 
statistical model of the improved explosives-detection algorithm. In many cases, 
the inert cargo material was distributed homogenously through the entire 
container with an explosive positioned directly above a scanning location such 
that the total cargo mass equaled the maximum container capacity of 21,600 kg. 
Cargos in this configuration included cotton, electronics, furniture, meat, paper, 
vegetables, and grain with explosives ranging from 0 to 500 kg [8]. Other 
simulated screening scenarios contained no explosive, but covered a wider 
range of homogenous cargos: bricks, concrete, crude oil, glass, stone, melamine, 
vegetable oil, paraffin, polyethylene, polystyrene, plaster, rubber, salt, and water.  
Another set of simulations included a 200 kg sphere of explosive inside paper or 
furniture cargo, but placed the explosive at different locations inside the 
container. Other scenarios attempted to “fool” the detection algorithm by having 
artificially dense, but inert, materials in place of an explosive. Still others made 
detection considerably more difficult by distributing the cargo heterogeneously 
inside the container by simulating a crated geometry in which the explosive was 
hidden among the crates [9].  
Data subsets 
In the process of constructing a more general detection model, the 
above-mentioned screening scenario data were separated into several levels of 
decreasing detection probability in the original algorithm [10]. In the most 
idealized cases, the cargo was distributed evenly throughout the container with 
zero to 400 kg explosive centered above one of the screening locations. These 
included 51 cases with explosive and 22 without. In the homogenous screening 
scenario data set the cargo was again distributed homogenously but additional 
scenarios had the explosive positioned away from the centered locations or 
displaced vertically relative to the neutron source. In this subset there were 116 
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cases with explosives and 22 cases without. The most difficult detection 
scenarios were the ones with either hidden inert objects or cargo 
heterogeneously distributed in crates on the container floor. The final detection 
model, which included all types of screening scenarios, contained a 
randomly-selected half of the scenarios with 70 cases with explosive and 19 
without. 
Results and Discussion 
Explosives screening models for selected data sets 
The best-performing model that correctly predicted the presence of 
explosive in 99% of idealistic scenarios is shown in Table 9-3. As shown in the 
table, all statistical significance values, or p-values, were no greater than 0.1. Out 
of 51 cases with explosive and 22 without, there was one false negative and zero 
false positives. This is which is remarkable give that most of the small explosives, 
with a mass of 10 kg, were detected. Table 9-3 also shows a very effective model 
for detecting explosives in any of the homogenous cargo scenarios, including the 
more difficult cases with displaced explosives. This model also performed very 
well, with a 99% accuracy rate, one false positive, and two false negatives. This 
model was based on four variables, two of which had p-values below 0.05. One 
variable had a higher p-value of 0.26, but elimination of this variable decreased 
the accuracy by more than 5%. The final model presented in Table 9-3 is for a 
randomly-selected half of all the simulated detection scenarios, including the 
ones that were undetectable in the old algorithms [10]. The accuracy in this 
four-variable model was lower, 87%, and included one false negative and nine 
false positives. All variables except the constant had p-values below 0.07.  
It is useful to note that all models, with a single exception, relied solely on 
flags that may be calculated using available neutron and photon detector 
technology. The single exception of this was the first flag listed in the 
homogenous-scenarios algorithm, which required more stringent neutron 
spectroscopy. However, an alternative model used only easily calculated flags, 
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but increased the number of false negatives by two. This model is shown in 
Table 9-4. 
Application of detection model to control data 
When the model based on a random half of the screening scenarios was 
applied to the full 178 scanning scenarios, the accuracy decreased to 80%, with 
31 false positives and five false negatives out of a data set containing 41 
scenarios without RDX and 137 with RDX. The false positive cases showed no 
obvious pattern, with both homogenous and heterogeneous cargos of both types 
appearing as false positives. However, changing the threshold to 0.8 decreased 
the false positive rate by a factor of 2 while keeping the true positive rate above 
75%. All of the false negatives were found in electronics cargo, with explosive 
masses in idealistic electronics below 100 kg and below 200 kg in other cases. 
Most of these scenarios were also false negatives in the earlier algorithms [10]. 
However, these RDX-positive-probability in these cases was above 0.39 and 
therefore quite close to the original threshold of 0.5.  
Detection probability thresholds 
Adjusting the critical threshold value that divided positive and negative 
model results can have a dramatic effect on the false positive and false negative 
rates. While it is always necessary to find a balance between the two, the case of 
explosives detection has some special considerations. First of all, the potential 
consequences of a false negative, i.e. loss of life and property on a large scale, 
are severe. However, too many false positives will dramatically slow down the 
flow of cargo through very busy ports. The different detection models were 
applied to all screening scenarios and the relationship between threshold and 
correct identification of true positives or true negatives is shown in Fig. 9-1. As 
shown in the figure, the true positive and true negative rates intersect at different 
thresholds for the different detection models. The three-statistically-derived 
algorithms discussed above function best when detection thresholds are between 
0.7 and 0.9. The threshold for the final algorithm will depend on the acceptable 
rate of false positives and false negatives. 
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The previously-studied spectroscopic and PHD detection algorithms 
determined the presence or absence of explosive by comparing the trigger value, 
with a value between zero and one, to a predetermined threshold, much like P in 
the statistically-modeled algorithms discussed here. The true positive and true 
negative rates for these algorithms as a function of threshold value are included 
in Fig. 9-1 as a point of comparison.  
Measurement error and comparisons with earlier algorithms 
One important facet of the earlier studies was how the inclusion of a 
random 10% measurement error affected the trigger values, and therefore the 
detection rate. This random perturbation of the simulation data and subsequent 
calculation of trigger values, repeated many times, showed that the 10% variation 
in simulation output led to an average 3.9% variation in spectroscopic trigger 
value and 3.4% variation in the PHD trigger value [10]. When this procedure was 
repeated for the statistically-modeled algorithms, the 10% data perturbation 
resulted in 4.8%, 5.0%, and 7.7% variations in the p-values for the idealistic, 
homogenous, and all-scenario models, respectively. This increase in P variation 
is mainly due to error propagation of several variables in the statistically-modeled 
algorithms, while error in the earlier algorithms is mainly dependent on the one 
flag showing the largest change in the presence of RDX. 
Another useful tool in comparing the performance of the detection 
algorithms is the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. ROC curves are 
plots of the true positive (TP) rate versus the false positive (FP) rate and are a 
common way to visualize and analyze the behavior of diagnostic systems [16]. 
The area under a ROC curve is often used as a figure of merit to quantitatively 
compare different diagnostic tests [16]. This figure of merit will vary from 0.5, 
which represents a random choice between positive and negative results, and 
1.0, which represents a perfect diagnostic test [16]. 
Fig 9-2a shows the ROC curves for the three-statistically-modeled 
algorithms as well as the spectroscopic and PHD algorithms as applied to 
homogenous cargo screening scenarios. Fig. 9-2b shows the same ROC curves 
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when the five algorithms are applied to all screening scenarios.  As seen in Fig. 
9-2a, the homogenous scenarios statistically-derived model is farthest from the 
FP=TP line, which represents an ineffective (i.e. random) test, and is therefore 
the most effective in finding explosives in homogenous cargo screening 
scenarios. As expected, performance of all detection algorithms decreased 
significantly when applied to all of the screening scenarios, as shown by 
comparing Figs. 9-2a and 9-2b.  
Table 9-5 lists the figures of merit, as defined by the area under the ROC 
curve, for the five algorithms when applied to both homogenous and all screening 
scenarios. This table shows that, for homogenous scenarios, both the idealistic 
scenario and homogenous scenario statistically-modeled algorithms exceeded 
the earlier algorithms. However, when all screening scenarios were considered, 
only the all-scenario statistically-modeled algorithm performed better than the 
earlier algorithms, with a figure of merit of 0.77 compared to the other’s 
0.70-0.72. This improvement is partly due to the fact that the earlier algorithms 
were designed using mainly homogenous cargos while analysis for the 
statistically-modeled algorithm was based on all available types of simulation 
data.  
Consequences of low-prevalence realities 
As is the case with any test designed around realities in which the 
prevalence of true positives is extremely low, the vast majority of the positive test 
results will be false positives. For example, if the proposed method were used as 
a primary screening technique in an environment in which the prevalence of 
explosives was 0.01%, and detection thresholds were set such that there was a 
20% FP rate and 80% TP rate, only 0.04% of the positive readings would actually 
have explosives. This rate improves significantly if the algorithm were used as a 
secondary scanning system behind a primary scanning system, such as one that 
increased the prevalence of containers with explosive to 1%. In this case, 3.8% 
of positive readings would actually contain explosives.  
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Advantages and disadvantages of the proposed system 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Efforts using statistical modeling software to improve a flag-based 
explosives detection algorithm have shown promise, increasing the figure of 
merit, defined to have a value between 0.5 and 1.0, from 0.72 to 0.77. Models 
have been found that correctly identify the presence or absence of the explosive 
RDX more than 80% of the time. Different models have been explored for cases 
with both heterogeneous and homogenous cargo configurations. Results have 
shown that the statistically-modeled algorithm performed better than both of the 
detection algorithms proposed in previous chapters when applied to all screening 
scenarios. Future efforts should explore statistically-modeled algorithms in 
greater depth, along with testing new variables and new combinations of the 
variables discussed above. Furthermore, the new model should be rigorously 
tested with additional simulations before experimental validation. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 9-1. Relationship between the triggering cut-off threshold and the percent 
of correctly identified screening scenarios with and without the explosive RDX for 
the three statistically-derived detection models as well as the earlier 
spectroscopic and PHD algorithms. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
Figure 9-2. ROC curves for the five different detection algorithms when applied to 
a) homogenous and b) all screening scenarios. Also shown is the false positive 
(FP) equals true positive (TP) line. Error bars reflect uncertainty due to 10% 
random measurement error and lines serve only to guide the eye. 
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Tables 
Table 9-1. List of neutron-based flags used in statistical model development. 
 
Neutron peak Neutron energy range Neutron PHD 
  
 
(10.8 MeV,150!)
(10.8 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 10 MeV,120!)
(> 10 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(< 0.14 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11 MeV,150!)
(11 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 10 MeV,150!)
(> 10 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,150!)
(< 0.14 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11.2 MeV,150!)
(11.2 MeV,0!)    
 
(6 !10 MeV,150!)
(6 !10 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,150!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11.4 MeV,120!)
(11.4 MeV,0!)    
 
(> 10 MeV,150!)
(< 1 MeV,0!)    
 
(2.1! 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(2.1! 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11.6 MeV,120!)
(11.6 MeV,0!)     
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,120!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11 MeV,150!)
(0.8 MeV,0!)     
 
(> 4.9 MeVee,150!)
(< 4.9 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11 MeV,150!)
(10 MeV,0!)     
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,120!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)  
  
 
(11.MeV,150!)
(9.6 MeV,0!)     
 
(> 5.8 MeVee,150!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)  
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Table 9-2. List of photon- and neutron-photon-based flags used in statistical 
model development. 
 
Photon peak 
 
5.2 MeV
1.0 MeV  
 
6.2 MeV
2.6 MeV  
 
6.8 MeV
1.0 MeV  
 
6.2 MeV
2.8 MeV  
 
6.2 MeV
1.8 MeV  
 
4.6 MeV
3.4 MeV  
 
6.2 MeV
2.4 MeV  
 
5.2 MeV
3.4 MeV  
 
4.6 MeV
2.6 MeV  
 
6.2 MeV
3.4 MeV  
 
5.2 MeV
2.6 MeV  
 
5.2 MeV
3.8 MeV  
Combined neutron-photon 
  
 
total neutrons, 150!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
C photons    
 
total neutrons, 90!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
N photons  
  
 
total neutrons, 90!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
C photons    
 
total neutrons, 150!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
O photons  
  
 
total neutrons, 150!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
N photons    
 
total neutrons, 90!  
total neutrons, 0!
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
O photons  
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Table 9-3. Best-performing models for explosives detection in idealized 
scenarios, explosives detection in homogenous cargos, and explosives detection 
in all scenarios. Also shown are the statistical significance (p-value) and 
maximum likelihood estimate of the multiplying parameter (B). 
 
Number 
cases 
Percent 
accuracy Variable p-value B 
Explosives detection in idealized scenarios 
73 99% Maximum R 0.039 -105 
  Maximum T 0.044 -611 
  Median T 0.045 928 
  Mean P 0.092 305 
  
  
 
P (> 5.8 MeVee,150
!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
&  0.095 148 
  Constant 0.052 -12.1 
Explosives detection in homogenous cargos 
138 99% 
  
 
P (11 MeV,150
!)
(0.8 MeV,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
&  0.043 -27.3 
  
  
 
T (> 4.9 MeVee,120
!)
(> 4.9 MeVee,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
&  0.022 99.9 
  
  
 
T (> 5.8 MeVee,150
!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
&  0.13 -40.4 
  Maximum off-center T 0.26 17.3 
  Constant 0.087 -2.95 
Explosives detection in random half of all scenarios 
89 87% Median off-center T 0.066 22.1 
  
 
T 5.2 MeV photons1.0 MeV photons
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
 0.12 -28.4 
  
 
T 6.8 MeV photons1.0 MeV photons
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
 0.035 28.1 
  
 
P 5.2 MeV photons2.6 MeV photons
! 
" # 
$ 
% & 
 0.044 -40.1 
  Constant 0.084 1.62 
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Table 9-4. Alternative model for explosives detection in homogenous scenarios 
utilizing only flags calculated using currently available technology. Also shown 
are the statistical significance values (p-value) and fitted multiplier parameter (B). 
 
Number 
cases 
Percent 
accuracy Variable p-value 
138 98% Maximum R
 
0.29 
  
  
 
P (> 5.8 MeVee,150
!)
(> 5.8 MeVee,0!)
! 
" 
# 
$ 
% 
&  0.0010 
  Median T 0.0070 
  Maximum T 0.010 
  Constant 0.11 
 
 
Table 9-5. Figure of merit, defined by area under ROC curve, for the five 
explosives-detection models for homogenous screening scenarios and all 
screening scenarios.  
 
Explosives-
detection model 
In homogenous 
Screening 
Scenarios 
In all 
Screening 
Scenarios 
Idealistic  0.97 0.56 
Homogenous  0.97 0.57 
All scenarios 0.84 0.77 
PHD 0.91 0.72 
Spectroscopic 0.87 0.70 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Summary of Findings 
The problem of explosives detection has been under intensive study for 
several decades. Explosives detection in large targets, such as the standard 
land-sea cargo containers studied here, has proven especially difficult. Several 
strategies based on nuclear technology have been tested, with varying degrees 
of success. Although neutron interrogation has the potential to be an extremely 
effective method due to high target penetrability and ability to distinguish among 
light elements, it has yet to be deployed in cargo scanning on a large scale. The 
basic strategies for explosives detection using neutron interrogation include 
thermal neutron activation, measurement of characteristic de-excitation photons, 
and measurements of the reflected and transmitted neutron flux. In this study, the 
photon and neutron products of neutron interactions in target material have been 
combined in a novel way that maximizes the number of signal carriers and thus 
decreases the number of incident neutrons. This innovative strategy relies on the 
calculation of flags, generally in the form of ratios of specific neutron or photon 
measurements, and then combining these flags into a detection algorithm. This 
algorithm is designed to be fully automatic and functions with a wide variety of 
cargo materials. This dissertation details the steps leading to the development of 
the algorithm and its application in an explosives-screening system. 
The first step of the algorithm development, as described in Chapter 3, 
involved the characterization of the neutron scatter interaction products in the 
cargo container. This included identification of the neutron and photon peaks 
produced when fast neutrons scattered off targets of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, 
oxygen, and iron at different angles. Once these characteristic neutron and 
photon peaks were identified, other targets of interest were included in the 
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simulations. These targets included hydrogenous (water), organic (vegetable oil), 
and metallic (steel) materials and results showed the expected combination of 
the earlier-identified features. Several of the most distinct features, such as 
inelastic photon peaks, inelastic neutron peaks, as well as the 
elastically-scattered neutrons, formed the basis of potential flags. These highly 
simplified simulations demonstrated that it was possible to discern the expected 
neutron and photon peaks, and that these peaks were superimposed in the 
expected manner when more than one element was present in the target. 
The next step involved benchmarking the simulations with laboratory 
measurements, as discussed in Chapter 4. These measurements utilized a D-D 
neutron generator, several different scatter materials including the 
explosives-surrogate melamine, as well as two different neutron detectors. One 
detection system, which utilized a coarse neutron spectroscopy system, 
measured the change in both total and high-energy neutron flux when target 
materials were in place. The other system also counted total neutron flux, but 
allowed a more detailed manipulation of the pulse height distribution (PHD), 
including separation of the neutron and photon pulses. These measured results 
were compared with simulations, including simulations of the detector PHDs. It 
was found that both the changes in neutron flux and the PHDs compared 
favorably between the simulation and measurement, with correlation coefficients 
of greater than 0.75 and 0.97, respectively. The results of this study 
demonstrated that basic approximations in the simulation geometry allowed an 
accurate portrayal of neutron scatter and a 10% error due to measurement was 
reasonable.  
The next chapter utilized the characteristic features found in Chapter 3 to 
find the most significant differences in cases with and without explosive under 
idealistic conditions. These flags fell into one of four categories: based solely on 
the backscatter neutron spectrum, ratios of specific neutron tallies at one energy 
and different angles, ratios of select neutron peaks, and ratios of photon peaks. 
The best-performing flags were then identified for the three types of cargo: 
metallic, organic, and hydrogenous. This chapter also explored the effect of the 
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position and amount of explosive on the flag calculations. It was found that flag 
strength was highly dependent on source-explosive distance, but flag strength for 
flags based on neutron tally ratios responded in a linear fashion. Similarly, these 
flags showed a predictable, roughly linear response to changes in explosive 
mass.  
Chapter 6 expanded on the findings of Chapter 5 by testing the previously 
identified flags in a more realistic simulated environment. This included a more 
accurate representation of a shielded D-T neutron generator, inclusion of the 
surrounding environment, and expansion on the materials inside the cargo 
containers. Other simulations utilized a palletized distribution of cargo in the 
container instead of the homogenous distribution used earlier. The results from 
these simulations also served to build on the earlier flag selection by forming the 
basis of “combinatory” flags that combined the identities of several of the 
best-performing flags from the previous chapter into flags that required far less 
stringent neutron spectroscopy. Further testing showed that the combinatory 
flags performed as well as, or better than, the more specific flags that they were 
based on. Another aspect of the added realism was the simulation of the neutron 
detector response using MCNP-PoliMi. The simulated detector response 
included calculated time-of-flight and PHDs. Several flags were then tested that 
converted the energy thresholds of the combinatory flags into pulse height 
thresholds in the pulse height distributions, creating flags that did not require any 
unfolding of the neutron spectrum. Results showed that several 
explosives-detection showed promise under relatively realistic simulated 
conditions. Furthermore, in most cases the PHD-based flags performed better 
than, or as well as, the combinatory flags. Finally, the very best flags for 
explosives-detection were identified for two types of cargo materials: 
organic/hydrogenous and inorganic/metallic. 
 In Chapter 7 these flags were put together into an explosives detection 
algorithm. This algorithm had three main steps: materials determination, 
explosives detection, and correction for cargo inhomogeneities, along with an 
additional step that identified entirely explosives-filled containers. The explosives 
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portion of the algorithm was triggered when the values of certain flags exceeded 
their average value over the container by a certain threshold amount. This 
algorithm is applied as part of a detection system in which cargo containers are 
irradiated with a 14.1 MeV fan beam from below at five evenly distributed points 
for less than two minutes each along the length of the container. Surrounding the 
container in a ring are eleven large liquid scintillation neutron detectors and 
several photon detectors. Transport through the detection system by either a 
conveyor belt or rail apparatus that held the containers from above or below. The 
dose estimate for operators behind a concrete shield is less than the average 
annual dose to a member of the public, as is that to an individual hidden in the 
container for one pass through the scanning system. It was estimated that each 
scanning system would cost approximately $1M and could scan one container 
every ten minutes. 
The detection algorithm and associated scanning system was further 
optimized and evaluated in Chapter 8. This included optimization of the algorithm 
trigger thresholds and estimates of the algorithm sensitivity and specificity. 
Several sources of error were considered, including a conservative 10% random 
measurement error, the effect of photon escape peaks, and noise due to multiple 
neutron interactions in the surrounding environment. Receiver-operating 
characteristic curves for the proposed algorithm showed that it performed very 
well in relatively homogenous cargos. Algorithm performance was quantified for 
cases with heterogeneous cargo configurations as well as a function of explosive 
size and position. Given the influence of these factors, it was possible to estimate 
the minimum detectable amount of explosive in “more difficult” organic cargos, 
such as paper, to approximately 200 kg while amounts as small as 25 kg could 
be identified in metallic cargos. 
Chapter 9 discussed improvements to the detection algorithm using 
statistical modeling software. The software incorporated several flags found 
earlier into several types of variables and performed binary logistic regression on 
them in order to create a model that correctly identified containers with 
explosives. These models showed superior performance to the earlier 
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algorithms, especially in heterogeneous cargos or in cases in which the explosive 
was not centered over a scanning location and could correctly identify the 
presence or absence of the explosive RDX more than 80% of the time. 
The proposed system has several advantages over other nuclear-based 
explosives detection systems. Like other active neutron interrogation systems, 
the method discussed here depends on detecting the actual explosive material, 
instead of metallic components, as is used in photon interrogation techniques. 
Because the proposed system uses both neutrons and photons in a simple, 
automatic algorithm, interrogation times are considerably shorter than other 
neutron-based methods and do not require highly skilled operating personnel. 
Furthermore, the algorithm may be implemented without using stringent neutron 
spectroscopy or other expensive and time-consuming detection technologies. 
However, the current algorithm is only able to detect large explosives and has a 
relatively high false positive rate.  
Future Directions 
There are several ways in which the proposed system could be improved, 
as well as further studies that could more clearly define the abilities and 
limitations of the current implementation of the detection algorithm. Future 
systems could utilize better detection technology, which could potentially 
significantly improve both the minimum detectable amount and the false 
positive/false negative rate.  
Changes and optimization of explosives detection algorithm 
As mentioned above, preliminary efforts have shown that it is possible to 
improve the detection algorithm using statistical modeling of several flags. These 
efforts should be expanded, both in testing new variables and combinations of 
variables, and exploring new screening scenarios. The current algorithm is 
relatively good at differentiating between organic/hydrogenous materials and 
inorganic/metallic cargos. However, intermediate cargo types, such as furniture 
or toys, are often mislabeled. The modeling software could potentially be used to 
find a model that better differentiated between cargo types. An increase in the 
  236 
number of cargo types considered, and optimization of the 
materials-determination portion of the algorithm would improve algorithm 
performance. Other potential improvements could be made by optimizing the 
triggering thresholds, depending on the type of cargo and flag identity. Treating 
the symmetrical, i.e. same scatter angle, detectors individually and testing other 
flags based on the neutron pulse height distributions could also further improve 
algorithm performance. Another change could be to add adjacent trigger values 
together, and compare the sum with the other three sums of adjacent trigger 
values in order to better detect explosives located between the scanning 
positions. Another improvement could be made by testing the use of wider 
energy bins in place of the 0.2 MeV energy bins currently being used in the two 
remaining detection flags based on single neutron bin ratios. It is also possible 
that other well-performing flags could be made using the PHD or time-of-flight 
distributions that would further decrease the need for neutron spectroscopy. 
Further efforts should examine how well the algorithm functions when different 
types of cargo are present within one container and when the cargo is distributed 
heterogeneously throughout the container. It is possible that artificial intelligence 
techniques, such as neural networks, could be used to further optimize the 
algorithm, such as in materials identification or the influence of inert but dense 
objects in the container.  
Improvements to screening system 
Other ways that MCNP-PoliMi could be used to improve the proposed 
system include optimization of the positions and numbers of neutron and photon 
detectors as well as the source shielding and position. Another improvement that 
may prove necessary is better photon spectroscopy, such as cadmium zinc 
telluride (CdZnTe) and future efforts should be made to better model the photon 
detector response in the explosives-detection system. Perhaps the greatest 
improvement could be made by considering combining the current active neutron 
interrogation system with a photon scanning system. Use of a powerful photon 
source could provide tomographic information on the structure and relative 
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electron density of the container’s contents. This information would improve the 
materials-determination portion of the detection algorithm and could also 
eliminate false measurements by acting as a confirmation of the results obtained 
through neutron interrogation. As is the case with any changes to the system 
technology, there are intrinsic trade-offs between resolution, detection efficiency, 
and container throughput that must be considered in the optimization process. 
Eventually, measurements must be made using a D-T neutron generator to test 
simulation results.  
Other applications of flags or the detection algorithm 
Many of the flags discussed in this study have the potential for other 
explosives-screening applications. Scanning other large targets, such as air 
freight containers, could potentially use the algorithm and screening system 
discussed here with minimal modifications. Smaller explosives screening 
scenarios, such as for luggage or mail could potentially use the flags in modified 
algorithms, probably through comparison to explosive templates. There is also 
the potential that these smaller screening scenarios could use the 
multiple-irradiation method discussed here, but with a D-D neutron generator 
instead of D-T neutron generator. 
Other contraband screening problems, such as those for narcotics or 
special nuclear material could use modified versions of the algorithm discussed 
here. These substances would require different flags in the algorithm, but the 
strategy of identifying changes in flags as a function of position could be applied 
to almost any scenario in which one is searching for bulk contraband in large 
targets. Furthermore, many of the strategies for improving the algorithm 
discussed here, such as binary logistic regression, would be applicable to these 
other screening scenarios. 
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Appendix A: Simulation Input Examples 
Neutron scatter characterization examples 
Example with single compound target 
c NES pure RDX target sphere 
1 2 -7.87 3 -1 -7 8 -11 12          imp:n=1 imp:p=1  
2 2 -7.87 2 -4 -7 8 -11 12          imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
3 2 -7.87 -5 7 -1 2 10 -9            imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
4 2 -7.87 6 -8 -1 2 10 -9            imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
5 2 -7.87 11 -9 -7 8 -1 2            imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
6 2 -7.87 10 -12 -7 8 -1 2          imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
7 1 -.0012 -3 4 -7 8 -11 12 #22 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
8 1 -.0012 -13 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 
      #21 #22                                imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
9 0 13                                         imp:n=0 imp:p=0 
10 0 -14 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
11 0 -15 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
12 0 -16 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
13 0 -17 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
14 0 -18 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
15 0 -19 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
16 0 -20 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
17 0 -21 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
18 0 -22 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
19 0 -23 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
20 0 -24 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
21 0 -25 26                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
22 3 -1.82 -27                             imp:n=1 imp:p=1             $RDX target 
 
1 px 121.92 
2 px -121.92 
3 px 121.603 
4 px -121.603 
5 py 609.6 
6 py -609.6 
7 py 609.283 
8 py -609.283 
9 pz 152.4 
10 pz -152.4 
11 pz 152.083 
12 pz -152.083 
13 so 1000 
14 sz 304.8 78 
15 sz -304.8 78 
16 sx 304.8 78 
17 sx -304.8 78 
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18 s 152.4 0 263.965 78 
19 s -152.4 0 263.965 78 
20 s 152.4 0 -263.965 78 
21 s -152.4 0 -263.965 78 
22 s 263.965 0 152.4 78 
23 s 263.965 0 -152.4 78 
24 s -263.965 0 152.4 78 
25 s -263.965 0 -152.4 78 
26 so 304.8 
27 so 93.5                                                                        $target sphere 
  
mode p n 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013           $air 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004 $carbon steel 
m3 6012 .143 7014 .285 8016 .286 1001 .286               $RDX 
sdef POS=-304.8 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1 VEC=1 0 0 DIR=D1    
si1 H 0.956 1                                                                   $cosine of angle needed 
sp1 0 1 
nps 100000000                                                               $number of histories  
e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20 
f11:n 16 
f21:p 16 
f31:n 22 
f41:p 22 
f51:n 18 
f61:p 18 
f71:n 14 
f81:p 14 
f91:n 19 
f101:p 19 
f111:n 24 
f121:p 24 
f131:n 17 
f141:p 17 
f151:n 25 
f161:p 25 
f171:n 21 
f181:p 21 
f191:n 15 
f201:p 15 
f211:n 20 
f221:p 20 
f231:n 23 
f241:p 23 
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Simulations for 2.4 MeV Neutron Scatter Experiments 
90° neutron scatter with shielding block  
c d-d generator with melamine target and MS2 on two wooden tables 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 
1 3 -0.65     -1                                        imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ short wooden table 
2 3 -0.65     -2                                        imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ long wooden table 
3 7 -0.874    -3                                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ active volume of detector 
4 8 -0.329    -4                                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics box of detector 
5 2 -7.87     -5 6                                     imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ metal cylinder of mp320 
7 8 -0.329    -7                                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics of mp320 
8 1 -0.000012 -6                                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ almost vacuum inside mp320 
11 5 -1.57    -11                                     imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ melamine target 
100 1 -0.0012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11 -91        imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air surrounding everything: change 
depending on target and shield 
101 1 -0.0012  92  93 -100                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air outside wall 
102 9 -2.3 91 -92                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ concrete wall 
109 10 -1.75 -93  -100                           imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ soil under floor 
110 0    100                                            imp:n=0 imp:p=0 $ past the end of the world (imp=0) 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 box   0.01 0    0       91.4 0 0  0 60.9   0  0 0 -5.08                    $ short table 
2 box   0    0.01 0.01   -60.9 0 0  0 183.01 0  0 0 -5.07                $ long table 
3 rcc   26.39  30.45  1.875    -3.5 0 0       1.8749                         $ active volume 
4 box   26.3901 17.65 0.011  22 0 0   0 25.6 0    0 0 25.6           $ detector electronics 
5 rcc  -30.45 152.37 5.1    0 55.8 0    5.08                                   $ outer cylinder of mp320 
6 rcc  -30.45 152.87 5.1    0 54.8 0    4.6                                     $ inner cylinder of mp320 
7 box  -38.38 161.704 10.2  15.875 0 0  0 37.211 0 0 0 13.97    $ electronics box of mp320 
91 box -300 -300 -91.44    600 0 0    0 600 0   0 0 300                $ inside of wall 
92 box -400 -400 -191.44   800 0 0    0 800 0   0 0 500               $ outside of wall 
93 pz  -192.92                                                                               $ edge of floor 
11 box -22.94 22.95 0.02    -15 0 0    0 15 0    0 0 14.15             $ melamine target 
100 so 1000                                                                                  $ end of the world!! 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013             $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004   $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 1001 0.47619 6000 0.285714 8016 0.238095            $ wood p=0.65 (pine) 
m4 1001 .667 8016 .333                                                   $ water p=1 
m5 1001 0.4 12000 0.2 14000 0.4                                    $ melamine p=1.57 
m6 6012 0.335 8016 0.037 1001 0.628                            $ vegetable oil p=0.918 
m7 6012 0.335 6000 0.452                                               $ NE213 detector material p=0.874 
m8 1001 0.257 6012 0.0187 8016 0.468 13027 0.0259 & 
     14028 0.123 28000 0.1043                                          $ det electronics material p=0.329467 
m9 1001 0.304245  6012 0.002870  8016 0.498628  11023 0.009179 13027 0.010261 & 
      14000 0.150505  19000 0.007114  20000 0.014882  & 
        26000 0.001599                                                        $ ordinary concrete p=2.3 
m10 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
   0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027                              $ soil EPA GR 12 standard p=1.75 
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c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode p n 
sdef POS=-30.45 152.37 7.64 PAR=1 ERG=2.4           $ monoenergetic 2.4 MeV neutron source 
nps 200000000                                                              $ number of histories  
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f6 energy deposition tallies, MeV/g on MS2 detector and idealized MS2 
f16:n 3                                                                            $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins 
e16 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                                              $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f26:p 3                                                                            $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins 
e26 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                                              $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f36:n 3                                                                            $ MS2 with MS2 energy bins 
e36 .01 .5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 16 18 20        $ MS2 energy bins  
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
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120° neutron scatter with shielding block  
c d-d generator, oil-shielded melamine target, shielded MS2,120 deg scatter 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 $ 
convenient column counter :) 
1 3 -0.65     -1                                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ short wooden table 
2 3 -0.65     -2                                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ long wooden table 
3 7 -0.874    -3                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ active volume of detector 
4 8 -0.329    -4                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics box of detector 
5 2 -7.87     -5 6                               imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ metal cylinder of mp320 
7 8 -0.329    -7                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics of mp320 
8 1 -0.000012 -6                              imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ almost vacuum inside mp320 
12 5 -1.57    -11                               imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ melamine target 
21 4 -1       -21                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ shielding box between det and source 
22 6 -0.918   -22                              imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ oil shield 
100 1 -0.0012  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11 21 22 -91     imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air surrounding everything 
101 1 -0.0012  92  93 -100              imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air outside walls 
102 9 -2.3 91 -92                             imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ concrete 
109 10 -1.75 -93  -100                     imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ soil under floor 
110 0    100                                     imp:n=0 imp:p=0 $ past the end of the world (imp=0) 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 box   0.01 30 0       91.4 0 0  0 76.2   0  0 0 -5.08                       $ short table 
2 box   0 0 0   -45.72 0 0  0 304.8 0  0 0 -5.07                               $ long table 
3 rcc   27.94 102.79 5      -6.63 3.98 0      2.54                              $ active volume 
4 box   42 84 0 -18.42 11.26 0 8.614 14.085 0 0 0 15.875            $ detector electronics 
21 box  9.63 61.4 0   -20.68 12.42 0   9.15 15.24 0   0 0 27.94     $ shielding box  
5 rcc   -22.86 0 5.09   0 55.8 0    5.08                                            $ outer cylinder of mp320 
6 rcc   -22.86 0.5 5.09   0 54.8 0    4.60                                         $ inner cylinder of mp320 
7 box   -30.79 9.334 10.17  15.875 0 0  0 37.211 0  0 0 13.97      $ electronics box of mp320 
11 box  -34.29 133.27 0     22.86 0 0    0 11.43 0   0 0 20.32        $ melamine target  
22 box  -35.56 119.3 0       25.4 0 0    0 13.97 0   0 0 25.4            $ oil shield 
91 box -300 -300 -91.44    600 0 0    0 700 0   0 0 300                  $ inside of concrete walls 
92 box -400 -400 -191.44   800 0 0    0 900 0   0 0 500                 $ outside of concrete walls 
93 pz  -192.92                                                                                 $ edge of floor (bottom) 
100 so 1000                                                                                    $ end of the world!! 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013                    $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004          $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 1001 0.47619 6000 0.285714 8016 0.238095                   $ wood p=0.65 (pine) 
m4 1001 .667 8016 .333                                                          $ water p=1 
m5 1001 0.4 12000 0.2 14000 0.4                                           $ melamine p=1.57 
m6 6012 0.335 8016 0.037 1001 0.628                                   $ vegetable oil p=0.918 
m7 6012 0.335 6000 0.452                                                      $ NE213 detector material p=0.874 
m8 1001 0.257 6012 0.0187 8016 0.468 13027 0.0259 14028 0.123 28000 0.1043  $ electronics  
m9 1001 0.304245  6012 0.002870  8016 0.498628  11023 0.009179 13027 0.010261 & 
       14000 0.150505  19000 0.007114  20000 0.014882  26000 0.001599        $ concrete p= 2.3 
m10 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
       0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027                                 $ soil EPA GR 12 standard p=1.75 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
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c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode p n 
sdef POS=-22.86 41.83  5.09 PAR=1 ERG=2.4              $ monoenergetic 2.4 MeV neutron source 
nps 200000000                                                                $ number of histories 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f6 energy deposition tallies, MeV/g on MS2 detector and idealized MS2 
f16:n 3                                                          $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins 
e16 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                            $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f26:p 3                                                          $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins 
e26 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                            $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f36:n 3                                                          $ MS2 with MS2 energy bins 
e36 .01 .5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 16 18 20   $ MS2 energy bins  
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
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90° neutron scatter with dual neutron detection systems (MCNP-PoliMi) 
 
c d-d generator with paper target, MS2, and EJ-309 on tables and chair with water shielding from 
8/19/10 measurement 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 $ 
convenient column counter :) 
1 3 -0.65     -1                                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ seat of chair 
101 2 -7.87 -101 102                         imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ table leg 
102 1 -0.0012 -102                            imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ inside of table leg 
2 3 -0.65     -2                                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ long wooden table 
201 2 -7.87 -201 202                         imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ table legs/frame 
202 1 -0.0012 -202                            imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ inside of table legs/frame 
3 11 -0.874    -3                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ active volume of MS2 
4 8 -0.329    -4                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics box of MS2 
5 2 -7.87     -5 6                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ metal cylinder of mp320 
7 8 -0.329    -7                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics of mp320 
8 1 -0.000012 -6                                imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ almost vacuum inside mp320 
9 7 -0.916    -8                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ active volume of EJ-309 
10 8 -0.329   -9                                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ electronics of EJ-309 
12 3 -0.65  1    -11                             imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ paper target 
21 4 -1       -21                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ shielding box between source and MS2 
22 4 -1       -22                                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ shielding box between source and EJ-309 
900 1 -0.0012  1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 11 21 22 -91 & 
    101 201                                         imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air surrounding everything 
901 1 -0.0012  92  93 -900                imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ air outside walls 
902 9 -2.3 91 -92                               imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ concrete 
909 10 -1.75 -93  -900                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ soil under floor 
910 0    900                                        imp:n=0 imp:p=0 $ past the end of the world (imp=0) 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 box   50  23.5 0    -37 -27.3 0   27.3 -37 0   0 0 -5                         $ chair top 
2 box   88.24 52 0     -147.3 -108.6 0   -37.98 51.5 0   0 0 -5           $ table top 
101 rcc 45 -9.05 -5   0 0 -80    3                                                       $ outside of chair leg 
102 rcc 45 -9.05 -5   0 0 -80    2.5                                                    $ inside of chair leg 
201 box 88.24 52 -5     -147.3 -108.6 0   -37.98 51.5 0   0 0 -80      $ outside of table legs/frame 
(approx by box) 
202 box 87.74 52.5 -5.5   -146.3 -107.6 0   -36.98 50.5 0   0 0 -79  $ inside of table legs/frame 
3 rcc   30.48 0 3.55    7.62 0 0      2.54                           `                 $ active volume of MS2 
4 box   38.1 -8.255 0.01    21.59 0 0   0 16.51 0   0 0 15.875           $ MS2 electronics 
5 rcc  -18.346  41.9 5.1    55.8 0 0    5.08                                         $ outer cylinder of mp320 
6 rcc  -17.84  41.9 5.1    54.8 0 0    4.60                                           $ inner cylinder of mp320 
7 box  -9.451 33.96 10.2  37.211 0 0   0 15.875 0  0 0 13.97           $ electronics box of mp320 
8 rcc  -30.48 0 10   -12.5 0 0   6.3                                                     $ EJ-309 active volume 
9 rcc  -42.98 0 10   -15 0 0    6                                                          $ EJ-309 electronics and PMT 
11 box -7.5 -7.5 0.011    15 0 0    0 15 0   0 0 16                              $ paper target (one ream) 
21 box -37.6 16.9 0.01  22.67 -8.25 0 6.08 16.71 0  0 0 27.94         $ shielding box between 
source and EJ-309 
22 box  14.7 8.4 0.01   22.67 8.25 0  -6.08 16.71 0  0 0 27.94         $ MS2/source shielding box  
91 box -300 -300 -91.44    600 0 0    0 600 0   0 0 300                     $ inside of concrete walls 
92 box -400 -400 -191.44   800 0 0    0 800 0   0 0 500                    $ outside of concrete walls 
93 pz  -192.92                                                                                    $ edge of floor (bottom) 
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900 so 1000                                                                                      $ end of the world!! 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6000.60c .0001 7014.60c .755 8016.60c .232 18000 .013         $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 0.9959 6000.60c 0.0032 16032.60c 0.0005 15031.60c 0.0004   $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 1001.60c 0.47619 6000.60c 0.285714 8016.60c 0.238095        $ wood p=0.65 (pine) 
m4 1001.60c .667 8016.60c .333                                                      $ water p=1 
c m5 1001.60c 0.4 6000.60c 0.2 7014.60c 0.4                                  $ melamine powder p=0.51 
c m6 6000.60c 0.335 8016.60c 0.037 1001.60c 0.628                      $ vegetable oil p=0.918 
m7 1001 0.548 nlib=60c 6000 0.452 nlib=60c                                   $ EJ 309 p=0.916 
m8 1001.60c 0.257 6000.60c 0.0187 8016.60c 0.468 13027.60c 0.0259 & 
   14028 0.123 28000 0.1043                                                              $ electronics  
m9 1001.60c 0.304 6000.60c 0.00287 8016.60c 0.4987 13027.60c 0.0103 & 
   14000.60c 0.151 19000.60c 0.00711 20000 0.014882 26000 0.001599  $ concrete p= 2.3 
m10 1001.60c 0.2938 6000.60c 0.0187 8016.60c 0.5045 13027.60c 0.0259 & 
    14028 0.1354 19000.60c 0.0143 26056.60c 0.0027                      $ soil p=1.75 
m11 6000.60c .4519 1001.60c .5481                                                 $ NE-213 p=0.874 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Physics and data Cards --------------------------- 
mode n p 
PHYS:N  J     20 
PHYS:P  J     1 
CUT:N   2J    0 
CUT:P   2J    0 
RPOL 0.010 0.010                                           $ RPOL (1)(2)= n,p cutoff E 
IPOL 0 1 1 1 2J 1 9                                          $ collect data from 1 cell (#9) 
FILES 21 DUMN1                                            $ for output files 
DBCN                                                               $ debug parallelizing 
PRDMP 2J 1                                                    $ dump data file 
sdef POS=0 41.9 7.64 PAR=1 ERG=2.4         $ monoenergetic 2.4 MeV neutron source 
nps 40000000                                                  $ number of histories 
c ---------- End Physics and Data Cards ------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies, on front faces of both detectors 
f11:n 3.3                                                    $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins, neutron tally 
e11 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                         $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f21:p 3.3                                                    $ MS2 0.2 MeV energy bins, photon tally 
e21 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                        $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f31:n 3.3                                                   $ MS2 with MS2 energy bins, neutron tally 
e31 .01 .5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 16 18 20   $ MS2 energy bins  
f41:n 8.3                                                   $ neutron tally on EJ-309 
e41 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                        $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
f51:p 8.3                                                   $ photon tally on EJ-309 
e51 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                        $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
c ----------- End Tally Cards ----------------------------- 
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Explosives detection in container screening scenarios 
Idealized detection scenario example 
c RDX with water in cargo container d-t source 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 
1 2 -7.87 3 -1 -7 8 -11 12        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ far side of container (away from source)  
2 2 -7.87 2 -4 -7 8 -11 12        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ near side of container (facing source) 
3 2 -7.87 -5 7 -1 2 10 -9          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ front end of container 
4 2 -7.87 6 -8 -1 2 10 -9          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ rear end of container 
5 2 -7.87 11 -9 -7 8 -1 2          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ top of container 
6 2 -7.87 10 -12 -7 8 -1 2        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ bottom of container 
7 4 -0.460 -3 4 -7 8 -11 12 #22   imp:n=1 imp:p=1       $ interior the container 
8 1 -.0012 -13 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #100 #30 #60 #90 #120 & 
               #150 #180 #22      imp:n=1 imp:p=1              $ air around outside of detectors 
c ------- Ideal hemispherical detectors 
100 1 -0.0012 -100 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 0 deg detector 
30  1 -0.0012 -30 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 30 deg detector 
60  1 -0.0012 -60 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 60 deg detector 
90  1 -0.0012 -90 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 90 deg detector 
120 1 -0.0012 -120 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 120 deg detector 
150 1 -0.0012 -150 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 1500 deg detector 
180 1 -0.0012 -180 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 180 deg detector 
22  3 -1.82   -27                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ Target sphere 
9 0 13                                      imp:n=0 imp:p=0           $ Past the edge.... 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 px 121.92                      $ outside far side (away from source) 
2 px -121.92                     $ outside near side (facing source) 
3 px 121.574                    $ inside far side (away from source) 
4 px -121.574                   $ inside near side (facing source) 
5 py 310.217                    $ outside front end 
6 py -310.217                   $ outside rear end 
7 py 309.871                    $ inside front end 
8 py -309.871                   $ inside rear end 
9 pz 129.867                    $ outside top of container 
10 pz -129.867                 $ outside bottom of container 
11 pz 129.521                  $ inside top of container 
12 pz -129.521                 $ inside bottom of container 
13 so 1000                       $ Outermost sphere 
27 so 18.72                      $ Target sphere 
100 sx 304.8 78                       $ 0 deg detector outside 
30 s 263.965 0 152.4 78          $ 30 deg detector outside 
60 s 152.4 0 263.965 78          $ 60 deg detector outside 
90 sz 304.8 78                         $ 90 deg detector outside 
120 s -152.4 0 263.965 78       $ 120 deg detector outside 
150 s -263.965 0 152.4 78       $ 150 deg detector outside 
180 sx -304.8 78                      $ 180 deg detector outside 
26 so 304.8                              $ inner surface of detectors 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
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m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013             $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004   $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 6012 .143 7014 .285 8016 .286 1001 .286                 $ RDX p=1.82 
m4 1001 .667 8016 .333                                                   $ water p=1.0 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode p n 
sdef POS=-304 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1  VEC=1 0 0 DIR=D1  $ monoenergetic 14.1 MeV neutron 
source 
si1 H 0.9194 1                                                     $ cosine of angle needed for conical beam 
sp1 0 1 
nps 200000000                                                   $ number of histories  
e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                                     $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
cut:n j 0.05                                                          $ neutron cut card 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies 
f11:n 100       $ 0 deg detector, neutron 
f21:p 100       $ 0 deg detector, photon 
f31:n 30         $ 30 deg detector, neutron 
f41:p 30         $ 30 deg detector, photon 
f51:n 60         $ 60 deg detector, neutron 
f61:p 60         $ 60 deg detector, photon 
f71:n 90         $ 90 deg detector, neutron 
f81:p 90         $ 90 deg detector, photon 
f91:n 120       $ 120 deg detector, neutron 
f101:p 120     $ 120 deg detector, photon 
f111:n 150     $ 150 deg detector, neutron 
f121:p 150     $ 150 deg detector, photon 
f131:n 180     $ 180 deg detector, neutron 
f141:p 180     $ 180 deg detector, photon 
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
 
 
  248 
Shielded 14.1 MeV isotropic neutron source with surrounding environment 
c diffuse paper shielding, RDX, shielded isotropic d-t source 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 
c ---- Container --------------------------- 
1 2 -7.87 3 -1 -7 8 -11 12        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ far side of container (away from source)  
2 2 -7.87 2 -4 -7 8 -11 12        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ near side of container (facing source) 
3 2 -7.87 -5 7 -1 2 10 -9          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ front end of container 
4 2 -7.87 6 -8 -1 2 10 -9          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ rear end of container 
5 2 -7.87 11 -9 -7 8 -1 2          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ top of container 
6 2 -7.87 10 -12 -7 8 -1 2        imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ bottom of container 
7 5 -.4602 -3 4 -7 8 -11 12 #22   imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ interior the container 
c ---- Detectors --------------------------- 
100 1 -0.0012 -100 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 0 deg detector 
30  1 -0.0012 -30 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 30 deg detector 
60  1 -0.0012 -60 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 60 deg detector 
90  1 -0.0012 -90 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 90 deg detector 
120 1 -0.0012 -120 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 120 deg detector 
150 1 -0.0012 -150 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 150 deg detector 
180 1 -0.0012 -180 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 180 deg detector 
c --- Source shield --------------------------- 
201  4 -0.94 201 -202   -301           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (1) 
202  2 -7.86 202 -203   -302           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (2) 
203  2 -7.86 203 -204   -303           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (3) 
204  2 -7.86 204 -205   -304           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (4) 
205  2 -7.86 205 -206   -305           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (5) 
206  2 -7.86 206 -207   -306           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (6) 
207  4 -0.94 207 -208   -307           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (7) 
208  2 -7.86 208 -209   -308           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (8) 
209  4 -0.94 209 -210   -309           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (9) 
210  2 -7.86 210 -211   -310           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (10) 
c --- Other cells --------------------------- 
8 1 -.0012 -13 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #100 #30 #60 #90 #120 #150 #180 #22 28 & 
  #201 #202 #203 #204 #205 #206 #207 #208 #209 #210 imp:n=1 imp:p=1     $ air  
10 6 -2.3 -28 29 -13              imp:n=1 imp:p=1                  $ concrete slab 
11 7 -1.75 -29 -13                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1                  $ ground 
22  3 -1.8200   -27                imp:n=1 imp:p=1                  $ Target sphere 
9 0 13                                   imp:n=0 imp:p=0                  $ Past the edge.... 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
c ---- Container -------------------------------- 
1 px 121.92                      $ outside far side (away from source) 
2 px -121.92                     $ outside near side (facing source) 
3 px 121.603                    $ inside far side (away from source) 
4 px -121.603                   $ inside near side (facing source) 
5 py 310.217                    $ outside front end 
6 py -310.217                   $ outside rear end 
7 py 309.9                        $ inside front end 
8 py -309.9                       $ inside rear end 
9 pz 129.867                    $ outside top of container 
10 pz -129.867                  $ outside bottom of container 
11 pz 129.55                     $ inside top of container 
12 pz -129.55                    $ inside bottom of container 
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c ---- Detectors --------------------------- 
100 sx 304.8 78                       $ 0 deg detector outside 
30 s 263.965 0 152.4 78          $ 30 deg detector outside 
60 s 152.4 0 263.965 78          $ 60 deg detector outside 
90 sz 304.8 78                         $ 90 deg detector outside 
120 s -152.4 0 263.965 78       $ 120 deg detector outside 
150 s -263.965 0 152.4 78       $ 150 deg detector outside 
180 sx -304.8 78                      $ 180 deg detector outside 
26 so 304.8                              $ inner surface of detectors 
c ---- Source Shield ------------------------- 
201  RCC  -444.001  0 0   22.4  0   0   9         $ inside surface of shield 
202  RCC  -449      0 0   34.4  0   0   14          $ end of 1st poly layer 
203  RCC  -454      0 0   46.5  0   0   19          $ inside thick steel 
204  RCC  -459      0 0   58.5  0   0   24          $ inside thick steel 
205  RCC  -464      0 0   70.5  0   0   29          $ inside thick steel 
206  RCC  -469      0 0   82.5  0   0   34          $ inside thick steel 
207  RCC  -474      0 0   94.5  0   0   39          $ end of large steel layer 
208  RCC  -479      0 0   106.5 0   0   44         $ end of 2nd poly layer 
209  RCC  -484      0 0   118.5 0   0   49         $ end of 2nd steel layer 
210  RCC  -489      0 0   130.5 0   0   54         $ end of 3rd poly layer 
211  RCC  -499      0 0   135.5 0   0   59         $ outside surface of shield 
301 px -421.6                                                  $ edge of layer 1 
302 px -414.6                                                  $ edge of layer 2 
303 px -407.5                                                  $ edge of layer 3 
304 px -400.5                                                  $ edge of layer 4 
305 px -393.5                                                  $ edge of layer 5 
306 px -386.5                                                  $ edge of layer 6 
307 px -379.5                                                  $ edge of layer 7 
308 px -372.5                                                  $ edge of layer 8 
309 px -365.5                                                  $ edge of layer 9 
310 px -358.5                                                  $ edge of layer 10 
c ---- Other surfaces --------------------------- 
13 so 1000                                   $ Outermost sphere 
27 so 40.3                                    $ Target sphere (500 kg RDX) 
28 pz -130                                    $ top surface of concrete slab 
29 pz -160.48                               $ border between slab and ground 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013             $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004   $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 6012 .143 7014 .285 8016 .286 1001 .286                 $ RDX p=1.82 
m4 1001 4 6000 2                                                             $ polyethylene 
m5 1001 0.47619 6000 0.285714 8016 0.238095            $ newspaper: p~=0.65 
m6 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027                                 $ soil EPA GR 12 standard p=1.75 
m7 1001 0.304245  6012 0.002870  8016 0.498628  11023 & 
      0.009179 13027 0.010261 14000 0.150505  19000 & 
      0.007114  20000 0.014882  26000 0.001599             $ ordinary concrete p=2.3 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode p n 
sdef POS=-444 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1                    $ monoenergetic isotropic 14.1 MeV neutron 
source 
nps 1000000000                                                      $ number of histories  
e0 0.1 0.2 147I 15 20                                               $ 0.1 MeV Energy Bins 
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cut:n j 0.05                                                                $ neutron cut card 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies 
f11:n 100                    $ 0 deg detector, neutron 
f21:p 100                    $ 0 deg detector, photon 
f31:n 30                      $ 30 deg detector, neutron 
f41:p 30                      $ 30 deg detector, photon 
f51:n 60                      $ 60 deg detector, neutron 
f61:p 60                      $ 60 deg detector, photon 
f71:n 90                      $ 90 deg detector, neutron 
f81:p 90                      $ 90 deg detector, photon 
f91:n 120                    $ 120 deg detector, neutron 
f101:p 120                  $ 120 deg detector, photon 
f111:n 150                  $ 150 deg detector, neutron 
f121:p 150                  $ 150 deg detector, photon 
f131:n 180                  $ 180 deg detector, neutron 
f141:p 180                  $ 180 deg detector, photon 
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
 
  251 
Heterogenous cargo packing: steel in crates with shielded source output 
c original: crated metal shielding, RDX, conical shielded D-T source (shield still in place), cement 
pad over soil 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 $ 
convenient counter 
c --- Main Parts --------------------------- 
1 2 -7.87 -1 2                          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ steel container 
2 1 -.0012 -2 27 400 402 404 406 408 410 412 414 416 & 
  418 420 422 424 426 428 430 432 434 436 438 440 & 
  442 444 446 448 450 452 454 456 458 460 462 464 & 
  466                                       imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ inside of container 
10 7 -2.3 -28 29 -13               imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ cement pad 
11 6 -1.75 -29 -13                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ ground 
22 3 -1.82     -27                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ Target box 
28 1 -.0012 -13 28 1 #100 #30 #60 #90 #120 #150 &  
   #180 #201 #202 #203 #204 #205 #206 #207 #208 & 
   #209 #210                          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ air around everything 
9 0 13                                    imp:n=0 imp:p=0           $ Past the edge.... 
c ---- Detectors --------------------------- 
100 1 -0.0012 -100 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 0 deg detector 
30  1 -0.0012 -30 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 30 deg detector 
60  1 -0.0012 -60 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 60 deg detector 
90  1 -0.0012 -90 26                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 90 deg detector 
120 1 -0.0012 -120 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 120 deg detector 
150 1 -0.0012 -150 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 150 deg detector 
180 1 -0.0012 -180 26             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 180 deg detector 
c --- Source shield --------------------------- 
201  4 -0.94 201 -202   -301           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (1) 
202  2 -7.86 202 -203   -302           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (2) 
203  2 -7.86 203 -204   -303           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (3) 
204  2 -7.86 204 -205   -304           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (4) 
205  2 -7.86 205 -206   -305           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (5) 
206  4 -0.94 206 -207   -306           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (6) 
207  2 -7.86 207 -208   -307           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (7) 
208  4 -0.94 208 -209   -308           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (8) 
209  2 -7.86 209 -210   -309           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ steel cylinder (9) 
210  4 -0.94 210 -211   -310           imp:n=1 imp:p=1        $ polyethylene cylinder (10) 
c --- Crates inside cargo container ------------ 
400  8  -0.8  -400  401  imp:n=1 imp:p=1    $ Crate itself (#400) 
402  8  -0.8  -402  403  imp:n=1 imp:p=1    $ Crate itself (#402) 
… 
466  8  -0.8  -466  467  imp:n=1 imp:p=1    $ Crate itself (#466) 
401  2  -4  -401    imp:n=1 imp:p=1         $ Interior of crate #400 
403  2  -4  -403    imp:n=1 imp:p=1         $ Interior of crate #402 
… 
467  2  -4  -467    imp:n=1 imp:p=1         $ Interior of crate #466 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
c ---- Main parts --------------------------- 
1 box -121.92 -309.6 -129.867  243.84 0 0  0 619.2 0  0 0 259.734        $ outside of container 
2 box -121.603 -309.283 -129.55  243.206 0 0  0 618.566 0  0 0 259.1  $ inside of container 
13 so 1000                                                                                                $ Outermost sphere 
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27 box -14 -81.5 -129  28 0 0  0 163.5 0  0 0 60                                      $ Target (500 kg RDX) 
28 pz -130                                                                $ top surface of concrete slab 
29 pz -155                                                                $ border between slab and ground 
c ---- Detectors --------------------------- 
100 sx 304.8 78                       $ 0 deg detector outside 
30 s 263.965 0 152.4 78          $ 30 deg detector outside 
60 s 152.4 0 263.965 78          $ 60 deg detector outside 
90 sz 304.8 78                         $ 90 deg detector outside 
120 s -152.4 0 263.965 78       $ 120 deg detector outside 
150 s -263.965 0 152.4 78       $ 150 deg detector outside 
180 sx -304.8 78                      $ 180 deg detector outside 
26 so 304.8                              $ inner surface of detectors 
c ---- Source Shield ------------------------- 
201  RCC  -444.001  0 0   22.4  0   0   9         $ inside surface of shield 
202  RCC  -449      0 0   34.4  0   0   14          $ end of 1st poly layer 
203  RCC  -454      0 0   46.5  0   0   19          $ inside thick steel 
204  RCC  -459      0 0   58.5  0   0   24          $ inside thick steel 
205  RCC  -464      0 0   70.5  0   0   29          $ inside thick steel 
206  RCC  -469      0 0   82.5  0   0   34          $ inside thick steel 
207  RCC  -474      0 0   94.5  0   0   39          $ end of large steel layer 
208  RCC  -479      0 0   106.5 0   0   44         $ end of 2nd poly layer 
209  RCC  -484      0 0   118.5 0   0   49         $ end of 2nd steel layer 
210  RCC  -489      0 0   130.5 0   0   54         $ end of 3rd poly layer 
211  RCC  -499      0 0   135.5 0   0   59         $ outside surface of shield 
301 px -421.6                                     $ edge of layer 1 
302 px -414.6                                     $ edge of layer 2 
303 px -407.5                                     $ edge of layer 3 
304 px -400.5                                     $ edge of layer 4 
305 px -393.5                                     $ edge of layer 5 
306 px -386.5                                     $ edge of layer 6 
307 px -379.5                                     $ edge of layer 7 
308 px -372.5                                     $ edge of layer 8 
309 px -365.5                                     $ edge of layer 9 
310 px -358.5                                     $ edge of layer 10 
c ---- Crates inside container ------------------------- 
400 box -115 -308 -129   100 0 0   0 100 0   0 0 20   
402 box 15 -308 -129      100 0 0   0 100 0   0 0 20   
… 
467 box -113 206 -85        94 0 0   0 94 0   0 0 16  
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013        $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 .9959 6012 .0032 16032 .0005 15031 .0004   $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 6012 .143 7014 .285 8016 .286 1001 .286                                  $ RDX p=1.82 
m4 1001 4 6000 2                                                                              $ polyethylene 
m5 1001 0.41495 6012 0.31703 8016 0.20747 26000 0.03027659 & 
    13027 0.0302765                                                                            $ Furniture 
m6 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
    0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027                                               $ soil  
m7 1001 0.304245  6012 0.002870  8016 0.498628  11023 0.009179 13027 0.010261 & 
   14000 0.150505  19000 0.007114  20000 0.014882  26000 0.001599  $ concrete p=2.3 
m8 1001 0.47619 6000 0.285714 8016 0.238095                              $ wood  
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode p n 
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sdef POS=-444 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=D1 VEC=1 0 0 DIR=D2   $ conical 14.1 MeV neutron source 
si1 0 0.1 0.2 147I 15 20 
sp1 0 &                             $ Energies of neutrons produced with isotropic source inside the shield 
1.86E-03 &  
3.52E-03 &  
… 
0.00E+00  
si2 H 0.9274 1                                            $ cosine of angle needed 
sp2 0 1 
nps 1000000000                                      $ number of histories  
e0 0.1 0.2 147I 15 20                               $ 0.1 MeV Energy Bins 
cut:n j 0.05                                               $ neutron cut card 
PRDMP 2J 1                                            $ dump data file 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies 
f11:n 100            $ 0 deg detector, neutron 
f21:p 100            $ 0 deg detector, photon 
f31:n 30              $ 30 deg detector, neutron 
f41:p 30              $ 30 deg detector, photon 
f51:n 60              $ 60 deg detector, neutron 
f61:p 60              $ 60 deg detector, photon 
f71:n 90              $ 90 deg detector, neutron 
f81:p 90              $ 90 deg detector, photon 
f91:n 120            $ 120 deg detector, neutron 
f101:p 120          $ 120 deg detector, photon 
f111:n 150          $ 150 deg detector, neutron 
f121:p 150          $ 150 deg detector, photon 
f131:n 180          $ 180 deg detector, neutron 
f141:p 180          $ 180 deg detector, photon 
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
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Explosives detection with 5-scan technique 
Irradiation with fan beam, scanning position 4, 11 neutron detectors, 
homogeneous cargo (MCNP-PoliMi) 
c diffuse meat, isotropic shielded D-T source in ground, cement pad over soil 
c position 4 scan (4.34 m from edge), 400 kg RDX position 2 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 
c ---- Container --------------------------- 
1 2 -7.87 -1 2                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ container itself 
2 5 -0.4 -2 27                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1            $ inside container 
c ------- EJ-309 neutron detectors ---------------------- 
100 8 -0.916 -100             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 0 deg detector 
30  8 -0.916 -30                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 30 deg detector 
60  8 -0.916 -60                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 60 deg detector 
90  8 -0.916 -90                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 90 deg detector 
120 8 -0.916 -120             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 120 deg detector 
150 8 -0.916 -150             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 150 deg detector 
212 8 -0.916 -212             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 210 deg detector 
240 8 -0.916 -240             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 240 deg detector 
270 8 -0.916 -270             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 270 deg detector 
300 8 -0.916 -300             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 300 deg detector 
330 8 -0.916 -330             imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 330 deg detector 
c --- Source shield --------------------------- 
201  4 -4.4 -201              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ back of shield 
202  4 -4.4 -202              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ -y side of shield 
203  4 -4.4 -203              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ +y side of shield 
204  4 -4.4 -204              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ +z side of shield 
205  4 -4.4 -205              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ -z side of shield 
c --- Other stuff --------------------------- 
8 1 -.0012 -13 #1 #2 100 30 60 90 120 240 270 & 
  300 330 #22 28                             imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ air around everything 
10 7 -2.3 -28 29 25 -13 #26 120 240       imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ cement pad 
11 6 -1.75 -29 -13 25 26 120 150 212   imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ ground 
22 3 -1.82     -27                      imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ Target sphere 
25 1 -0.0012 -28 -25 120 150 212 240 26      imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ cut-out in ground for detectors 
26 1 -0.0012 -26 150 212 #11  #201 #202 #203 #204 & 
  #205                                         imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ Well in ground 
9 0 13                               imp:n=0 imp:p=0  $ Past the edge.... 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 box -129.87 -434.22 -121.92 259.73 0 0  0 620.43 0 0 0 243.84      $ outside of box 
2 box -129.52 -433.87 -121.57 259.04 0 0  0 619.74 0 0 0 243.15      $ inside of box 
13 so 1000                                                           $ Outermost sphere 
25 RCC 0 -40 0  0 80 0       250                           $ cut-out for detectors 
26 BOX -340 -65 -122  210 0 0  0 130 0  0 0 243.8                    $ Well for source and detectors  
27 sy -248.22 37.44                                            $ Target sphere (400 kg RDX) 
28 px -130                                                           $ top surface of concrete slab 
29 px -155                                                           $ border between slab and ground 
c ---- Source Shield Surfaces ------------------------- 
201 BOX -340 -63 -88.7  50 0 0  0 126 0  0 0 177.4          $ back of shield 
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202 BOX -290 -63 -88.7  50 0 0  0  50 0  0 0 177.4           $ -y side of shield 
203 BOX -290  13 -88.7  50 0 0  0  50 0  0 0 177.4           $ +y side of shield 
204 BOX -290 -13  38.7  50 0 0  0  26 0  0 0  50            $ +z side of shield 
205 BOX -290 -13 -38.7  50 0 0  0  26 0  0 0 -50            $ -z side of shield 
c --------- Detector Surfaces --------------------- 
100 RCC  225    0    0       20    0    0     40      $ 0 deg detector 
30  RCC  194.86 0  112.5     17.32 0   10     40    $ 30 deg detector 
60  RCC  112.5  0  194.86    10    0   17.32  40    $ 60 deg detector 
90  RCC    0    0  225        0    0   20     40      $ 90 deg detector 
120 RCC -112.5  0  194.86   -10    0   17.32  40   $ 120 deg detector 
150 RCC -194.86 0  112.5    -17.32 0   10     40   $ 150 deg detector 
212 RCC -194.86 0 -112.5    -17.32 0  -10     40   $ 210 deg detector 
240 RCC -112.5  0 -194.86   -10    0  -17.32  40   $ 240 deg detector 
270 RCC    0    0 -225        0    0  -20     40       $ 270 deg detector 
300 RCC  112.5  0 -194.86    10    0  -17.32  40    $ 300 deg detector 
330 RCC  194.86 0 -112.5     17.32 0  -10     40    $ 330 deg detector 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6000.60c .0001 7014.60c .755 8016.60c .232 18000 .013       $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 0.9959 6000.60c 0.0032 16032.60c 0.0005 15031.60c 0.0004     $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 6000.60c 0.143 7014.60c 0.285 8016.60c 0.286 1001.60c 0.286        $ RDX p=1.82 
m4 1001.60c -0.0275 6000.60c -0.0825 26000 -0.89                      $ 1/2 poly, 1/2 steel by volume, 
p=4.405 
m5 1001.60c 0.604199 6000.60c 0.14512 7014.60c 0.0072276 8016.60c & 
   0.2424 19000.60c 0.0005547 15031.60c 0.000469326                $ Meat p=1.1 
m6 1001.60c 0.2938 6000.60c 0.0187 8016.60c 0.5045 13027.60c 0.0259 & 
    14028 0.1354 19000.60c 0.0143 26056.60c 0.0027                    $ soil EPA GR 12 standard 
p=1.75 
m7 1001.60c 0.304 6000.60c 0.00287 8016.60c 0.4987 11023 0.009179 & 
   13027.60c 0.0103 14000.60c 0.151 19000.60c 0.00711 20000 0.014882 & 
   26000 0.001599                                                         $ ordinary concrete p= 2.3 
m8 1001.60c 0.548 6000.60c 0.452                                         $ EJ 309 p=0.916 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode n p 
nps 100000000                                    $ number of histories 
PHYS:N  J     20                                    $ needed for analog mcnp 
PHYS:P  J     1                                  $ needed for analog mcnp 
CUT:N   2J    0                                      $ needed for analog mcnp 
CUT:P   2J    0                                      $ needed for analog mcnp 
RPOL 0.010 0.010                                 $ RPOL (1)(2) = n,p cutoff E 
IPOL 0 1 1 1 2J 6 100 30 60 90 120 150 $ collect data from 6 det cells 
FILES 21 DUMN1                                    $ for output files 
DBCN                                                 $ debug parallelizing 
PRDMP 2J 1                                           $ dump data file 
sdef POS=-289.9 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1 $ monoenergetic conical 14.1 MeV neutron source 
e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                          $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies 
f11:n 100.3       $ 0 deg detector, neutron 
f21:p 100.3     $ 0 deg detector, photon 
f31:n 30.3        $ 30 deg detector, neutron 
f41:p 30.3        $ 30 deg detector, photon 
f51:n 60.3        $ 60 deg detector, neutron 
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f61:p 60.3        $ 60 deg detector, photon 
f71:n 90.3        $ 90 deg detector, neutron 
f81:p 90.3        $ 90 deg detector, photon 
f91:n 120.3       $ 120 deg detector, neutron 
f101:p 120.3      $ 120 deg detector, photon 
f111:n 150.3      $ 150 deg detector, neutron 
f121:p 150.3      $ 150 deg detector, photon 
f131:n 212.3      $ 210 deg detector, neutron 
f141:p 212.3      $ 210 deg detector, photon 
f151:n 240.3      $ 240 deg detector, neutron 
f161:p 240.3      $ 240 deg detector, photon 
f171:n 270.3      $ 270 deg detector, neutron 
f181:p 270.3      $ 270 deg detector, photon 
f191:n 300.3      $ 300 deg detector, neutron 
f201:p 300.3      $ 300 deg detector, photon 
f211:n 330.3      $ 330 deg detector, neutron 
f221:p 330.3      $ 330 deg detector, photon 
c ------End Tally Cards --------- 
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Irradiation with fan beam, 11 neutron detectors, container on truck bed 
(MCNP-PoliMi) 
 
c diffuse paper, isotropic shielded D-T source in ground, cement pad over soil 
c position 2 (3.1 m from edge), 200 kg RDX position 2 
c ------Cell Cards---------------------------------------- 
c 3456789 123456789 223456789 323456789 423456789 523456789 623456789 723456789 
c ---- Container --------------------------- 
1 2 -7.87 -1 2                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ container itself 
2 5 -0.3 -2 27                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ inside container 
3 9 -2.7 -3                      imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ truck bed 
4 10 -1.5 -5 4                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 1 
5 10 -1.5 -7 6                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 2 
6 10 -1.5 -9 8                  imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 3 
7 10 -1.5 -11 10              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 4 
8 10 -1.5 -16 15              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 5 
9 10 -1.5 -18 17              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ wheel 6 
19 2 -7.87 -19               imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ rear axle 
20 2 -7.87 -20                imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ middle axle 
21 2 -7.87 -21                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ front axle 
c ------- EJ-309 neutron detectors ---------------------- 
100 8 -0.916 -100           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 0 deg detector 
30  8 -0.916 -30              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 30 deg detector 
60  8 -0.916 -60              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 60 deg detector 
90  8 -0.916 -90              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 90 deg detector 
120 8 -0.916 -120           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 120 deg detector 
150 8 -0.916 -150           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 150 deg detector 
212 8 -0.916 -212          imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 210 deg detector 
240 8 -0.916 -240           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 240 deg detector 
270 8 -0.916 -270           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 270 deg detector 
300 8 -0.916 -300           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 300 deg detector 
330 8 -0.916 -330           imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ 330 deg detector 
c --- Source shield --------------------------- 
201  4 -4.4 -201              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ back of shield 
202  4 -4.4 -202              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ -y side of shield 
203  4 -4.4 -203              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ +y side of shield 
204  4 -4.4 -204              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ +z side of shield 
205  4 -4.4 -205              imp:n=1 imp:p=1           $ -z side of shield 
c --- Other stuff --------------------------- 
13 1 -.0012 -13 #1 #2 3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 100 30 60 90 & 
  19 20 21 120 150 212 240 270 300 330 #22 28 imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ air around everything 
10 7 -2.3 -28 29 25 -13 #26 150 212                 imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ cement pad 
11 6 -1.75 -29 -13 25 26  150 212                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ ground 
22 3 -1.82     -27                                   imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ Target sphere 
25 1 -0.0012 -28 -25 150 212 26                    imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ cut-out in ground for detectors 
26 1 -0.0012 -26 150 212 #11  #201 #202 #203 #204 & 
  #205                                               imp:n=1 imp:p=1  $ Well in ground 
99 0 13                                              imp:n=0 imp:p=0  $ Past the edge.... 
c ------End Cell Cards------------------------------------ 
 
c ------Surface Cards------------------------------------- 
1 box -23.133 -186.217 -121.92 243.84 0 0  0 620.434 0 0 0 259.734   $ outside of box 
  258 
2 box -23.479 -185.871 -121.574 243.148 0 0 0 619.742 0 0 0 259.042  $ inside of box 
3 box -34.133 -246.75 -121.92   9.9 0 0 0 731.5 0 0 0 259.734        $ Bed of truck 
4 RCC -80 -206 -120 0 0 100  35                         $ wheel 1 inside 
5 RCC -80 -206 -120 0 0 100  40                      $ wheel 1 outside 
6 RCC -80 -206 35 0 0 100 35                      $ wheel 2 inside 
7 RCC -80 -206 35 0 0 100 40                            $ wheel 2 outside 
8 RCC -80 -106 -120 0 0 100  35                      $ wheel 3 inside 
9 RCC -80 -106 -120 0 0 100  40                        $ wheel 3 outside 
10 RCC -80 -106 35 0 0 100 35                           $ wheel 4 inside 
11 RCC -80 -106 35 0 0 100 40                           $ wheel 4 outside 
15 RCC -80 440 -120 0 0 100 35                         $ wheel 5 inside  
16 RCC -80 440 -120 0 0 100 40                         $ wheel 5 outside 
17 RCC -80 440 35 0 0 100 35                            $ wheel 6 inside 
18 RCC -80 440 35 0 0 100 40                             $ wheel 6 outside 
19 RCC -80 -206 -120 0 0 255 8                          $ rear axle 
20 RCC -80 -106 -120 0 0 255 8                           $ middle axle 
21 RCC -80 440 -120 0 0 255 8                          $ front axle 
13 so 1200                                                            $ Outermost sphere 
27 s 83 -0.217 0    29.71                               $ Target sphere (200 kg RDX) 
25 RCC 0 -40 0  0 80 0       250                          $ cut-out for detectors 
26 BOX -256 -65 -122  126 0 0  0 130 0  0 0 243.8      $ Well for source and detectors  
28 px -130                                                            $ top surface of concrete slab 
29 px -155                                                            $ border between slab and ground 
c ---- Source Shield Surfaces ------------------------- 
201 BOX -255 -63   -88.7  50 0 0  0 126 0  0 0 177.4    $ back of shield 
202 BOX -205 -61.3 -88.7  50 0 0  0  50 0  0 0 177.4       $ -y side of shield 
203 BOX -205  11.3 -88.7  50 0 0  0  50 0  0 0 177.4      $ +y side of shield 
204 BOX -205 -11.3  33.7  50 0 0  0  22.6 0  0 0  50         $ +z side of shield 
205 BOX -205 -11.3 -33.7  50 0 0  0  22.6 0  0 0 -50        $ -z side of shield 
c --------- Detector Surfaces --------------------- 
100 RCC  378    0    0       20    0    0     40      $ 0 deg detector 
30  RCC  347.86 0  112.5     17.32 0   10     40    $ 30 deg detector 
60  RCC  265.5  0  194.86    10    0   17.32  40    $ 60 deg detector 
90  RCC  153    0  225        0    0   20     40      $ 90 deg detector 
120 RCC  40.5   0  194.86   -10    0   17.32  40    $ 120 deg detector 
150 RCC -149.16 0  126.5    -18.51 0    7.56  40 $ 150 deg detector 
212 RCC -149.16 0 -126.5    -18.51 0   -7.56  40 $ 210 deg detector 
240 RCC  40.5   0 -194.86   -10    0  -17.32  40  $ 240 deg detector 
270 RCC  153    0 -225        0    0  -20     40      $ 270 deg detector 
300 RCC  265.5  0 -194.86    10    0  -17.32  40 $ 300 deg detector 
330 RCC  347.86 0 -112.5     17.32 0  -10     40  $ 330 deg detector 
c ---------end surface cards------------------------------- 
 
c --------Material Cards----------------------------------- 
m1 6000.60c .0001 7014.60c .755 8016.60c .232 18000 .013               $ air p=0.0012 
m2 26000 0.9959 6000.60c 0.0032 16032.60c 0.0005 15031.60c 0.0004 $ carbon steel p=7.87 
m3 6000.60c 0.143 7014.60c 0.285 8016.60c 0.286 1001.60c 0.286    $ RDX p=1.82 
m4 1001.60c -0.0275 6000.60c -0.0825 26000 -0.89       $ 1/2 poly, 1/2 steel by volume, p=4.405 
m5 1001.60c 0.47619 6000.60c 0.285714 8016.60c 0.238095               $ newspaper: p~=0.65 
m6 1001.60c 0.2938 6000.60c 0.0187 8016.60c 0.5045 13027.60c 0.0259 & 
    14028 0.1354 19000.60c 0.0143 26056.60c 0.0027     $ soil EPA GR 12 standard p=1.75 
m7 1001.60c 0.304 6000.60c 0.00287 8016.60c 0.4987 11023 0.009179 & 
   13027.60c 0.0103 14000.60c 0.151 19000.60c 0.00711 20000 0.014882 & 
   26000 0.001599                                                       $ ordinary concrete p= 2.3 
m8 1001.60c 0.548 6000.60c 0.452                                       $ EJ 309 p=0.916 
m9 13027.60c 1.0                                                        $ Aluminum for truck deck p=2.7 
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m10 1001.60c 0.5 6000.60c 0.3125 16032.60c 0.1875                  $ Vulcanized Rubber p=1.5 
c ------- End Material Cards ------------------------------ 
c ------- Data Cards -------------------------------------- 
mode n p 
nps 100000000                                        $ number of histories 
PHYS:N  J     20                                     $ needed for analog mcnp 
PHYS:P  J     1                                      $ needed for analog mcnp 
CUT:N   2J    0                                      $ needed for analog mcnp 
CUT:P   2J    0                                      $ needed for analog mcnp 
RPOL 0.010 0.010                                   $ RPOL (1)(2) = n,p cutoff E 
IPOL 0 1 1 1 2J 6 100 30 60 90 120 150 $ collect data from 6 det cells 
FILES 21 DUMN1                                  $ for output files 
DBCN                                                 $ debug parallelizing 
PRDMP 2J 1                                           $ dump data file 
sdef POS=-204.9 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1 $ monoenergetic conical 14.1 MeV neutron source 
e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20                          $ 0.2 MeV Energy Bins 
c ---------- End Data Cards ------------------------------- 
c ---------- Tally Cards ---------------------------------- 
c f1 current tallies 
f11:n 100.3       $ 0 deg detector, neutron 
f21:p 100.3       $ 0 deg detector, photon 
f31:n 30.3        $ 30 deg detector, neutron 
f41:p 30.3        $ 30 deg detector, photon 
f51:n 60.3        $ 60 deg detector, neutron 
f61:p 60.3        $ 60 deg detector, photon 
f71:n 90.3        $ 90 deg detector, neutron 
f81:p 90.3        $ 90 deg detector, photon 
f91:n 120.3       $ 120 deg detector, neutron 
f101:p 120.3      $ 120 deg detector, photon 
f111:n 150.3      $ 150 deg detector, neutron 
f121:p 150.3      $ 150 deg detector, photon 
f131:n 212.3      $ 210 deg detector, neutron 
f141:p 212.3      $ 210 deg detector, photon 
f151:n 240.3      $ 240 deg detector, neutron 
f161:p 240.3      $ 240 deg detector, photon 
f171:n 270.3      $ 270 deg detector, neutron 
f181:p 270.3      $ 270 deg detector, photon 
f191:n 300.3      $ 300 deg detector, neutron 
f201:p 300.3      $ 300 deg detector, photon 
f211:n 330.3      $ 330 deg detector, neutron 
f221:p 330.3      $ 330 deg detector, photon 
c ------End Tally Cards ---------
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Appendix B: Code Used in Data Analysis 
EJ-309 data parsing and PHD analysis 
Explosives Detection Algorithm (MATLAB) 
Sample main algorithm 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Explosives Detection Algorithm (main)   %% 
%%    Algorithm                                             %% 
%% Adrienne Lehnert                                    %% 
%%    April 15, 2011                                      %% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
clear 
clc 
DATA=zeros(77,28,5); % initialize array for data (detector tallies at 5 positions) 
  
Input = csvread('P5V.csv',0,0); 
DATA(:,:,1)=Input(1:77,:); 
DATA(:,:,2)=Input(78:154,:); 
DATA(:,:,3)=Input(155:231,:); 
DATA(:,:,4)=Input(232:308,:); 
DATA(:,:,5)=Input(309:385,:); 
  
[FlagLabels,AllFlags,FlagError]=AlgFlagMaker(DATA); %% Calculate the values of all flags and 
return with labels 
[M]=MaterialFinal(AllFlags); %% Find the material type 
[TriggersPD,r,TriggerLabels,TrigErrorPD,Triggers,P,TV,TriggerError]=TriggerFinal(AllFlags,FlagL
abels,FlagError,M); % Do the trigger calculations 
  
if (P==3 && TV>0.2) || (P~=3 && TV>0.1) 
    [status]=DensityFinal(AllFlags,M); 
end 
  
Error=zeros(204,2); 
for i=1:204 
    Error(i,1)=mean(AllFlags(i,:)); 
    Error(i,2)=mean(FlagError(i,:)); 
end 
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Flag calculator (spectroscopic algorithm) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Calculates flags for detection algorithm      %% 
%% Adrienne Lehnert                               %% 
%% 1/23/11                                        %% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
 
function [AlgFlagLabels,AlgFlags,AlgFlagError]=AlgFlagMaker(DATA) 
  
AlgFlags=zeros(33,5); 
AlgFlagError=zeros(33,5); 
RELERROR=zeros(77,14,5); % relative error matrix 
ABSERROR=zeros(77,14,5); % absolute error matrix 
TALLY=zeros(77,8,5); % neutron and photon tally matrix 
  
TALLY(:,1:7,:)=DATA(:,1:7,:); % populate neutron tallies 
RELERROR(:,:,:)=DATA(:,15:28,:); % populate neutron and photon relative error 
ABSERROR(:,:,:)=DATA(:,15:28,:).*DATA(:,1:14,:); % % populate neutron and photon absolute 
error 
  
for j=1:5 
    for i=1:77 
        TALLY(i,8,j)=sum(DATA(i,8:14,j)); % populate photon tally with sum of all photon tallies 
        ABSERROR(i,8,j)=(sum((ABSERROR(i,8:14,j).^2)))^0.5; % calculate absolute error for 
combined photons 
        RELERROR(i,8,j)=ABSERROR(i,8,j)/TALLY(i,8,j); % calculate relative error for combined 
photons 
    end 
end 
  
ABSERROR(:,9:14,:)=[]; % truncate error matrices 
RELERROR(:,9:14,:)=[]; 
  
  
%% Create Flag Labels 
AlgFlagLabels{1,1}='(10.8 MeV,150 deg)/(10.8 MeV,0 deg)'; 
AlgFlagLabels{2,1}='(11 MeV,150 deg)/(11 MeV,0 deg)'; 
… 
AlgFlagLabels{33,1}='(>10,150)/(<1,0)'; 
% End FlagLabel creation%%% 
  
%% Integrate spectrum 
for k=1:5 
    % Calculate combinatory relative errors for combinatory flags, these are 
    % temporary and are recalculated each time through the loop 
    Cgam=RELERROR(23,8,k); 
    Ngam=((ABSERROR(12,8,k)^2+ABSERROR(26,8,k)^2)^0.5)/(TALLY(12,8,k)+TALLY(26,8,k)); 
    Ogam=RELERROR(31,8,k); 
    LT1=zeros(1,7); 
    LT3=zeros(1,7); 
    GT10=zeros(1,7); 
    E4t8=zeros(1,7); 
    E6t10=zeros(1,7); 
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    z=isnan(RELERROR);   % clean up NANs 
    RELERROR(z)=0; 
    z=isnan(ABSERROR); 
    ABSERROR(z)=0; 
  
    for j=1:7  % also temporary, so recalculate 
        LT1(1,j)=(sum(ABSERROR(1:5,j).^2)^0.5)/(sum(TALLY(1:5,j))); 
        LT3(1,j)=(sum(ABSERROR(1:15,j).^2)^0.5)/(sum(TALLY(1:15,j))); 
        GT10(1,j)=(sum(ABSERROR(50:76,j).^2)^0.5)/(sum(TALLY(50:76,j))); 
        E4t8(1,j)=(sum(ABSERROR(21:40,j).^2)^0.5)/(sum(TALLY(21:40,j))); 
        E6t10(1,j)=(sum(ABSERROR(31:50,j).^2)^0.5)/(sum(TALLY(31:50,j))); 
    end 
  
    %% Calculate Flags %% 
    AlgFlags(1,k)=TALLY(54,6,k)/TALLY(54,1,k); 
    AlgFlags(2,k)=TALLY(55,6,k)/TALLY(55,1,k); 
    … 
    AlgFlags(32,k)=(sum(TALLY(31:50,6,k)))/(sum(TALLY(31:50,1,k))); 
    AlgFlags(33,k)=(sum(TALLY(50:76,6,k)))/(sum(TALLY(1:5,1,k))); 
    % Finished calculating flags 
  
    %% Calculate Flag Error 
    AlgFlagError(1,k)=((RELERROR(54,6,k)^2)+(RELERROR(54,1,k)^2))^0.5; 
    AlgFlagError(2,k)=((RELERROR(55,6,k)^2)+(RELERROR(55,1,k)^2))^0.5; 
… 
    AlgFlagError(33,k)=((GT10(1,6)^2)+(LT1(1,1)^2))^0.5; 
    % Finished Calculating Flag Error 
  
    %% Clean up 
    y=isinf(AlgFlags);% clean up NANs from 180 deg flags 
    z=isnan(AlgFlags); 
    AlgFlags(y)=0; 
    AlgFlags(z)=0; 
    y=isnan(AlgFlagError); 
    z=isinf(AlgFlagError); 
    AlgFlagError(y)=0; 
    AlgFlagError(z)=0; 
    clear y z 
end 
  
return 
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Materials identification 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Flag Algorithm for Explosives Detection  %% 
%%      Material type definitions            %% 
%%           Adrienne Lehnert                %% 
%%             April 20, 2010                %% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
function [M,MFlag_avg]=MaterialFinal2(AlgFlags) 
MFlag=zeros(5,5); 
MFlag_avg=zeros(5,1); 
for i=1:5   %% Isolate material flag values and calculate averages 
    MFlag(1,i)=AlgFlags(30,i);  % >10 MeV:150/0 
    MFlag(2,i)=AlgFlags(32,i);  % 6-10 MeV:150/0 
    MFlag(3,i)=AlgFlags(29,i);  % >10 MeV:120/0 
    MFlag(4,i)=AlgFlags(4,i);   % (11.4 MeV,120 deg)/(11.4 MeV,0 deg) 
    MFlag(5,i)=AlgFlags(6,i);   % (11.0 MeV, 150 deg)/(0.8 MeV, 0 deg) 
end 
  
for j=1:5 
    MFlag_avg(j,1)=mean(MFlag(j,:)); % find the averages for all the material flags 
end 
  
if max(MFlag_avg)>11 
%     disp('Cargo is Organic/Hydrogenous'); 
    M=1; 
elseif (MFlag_avg(2,1)/MFlag_avg(4,1))>1.5 
%     disp('Cargo is Inorganic/Metallic'); 
    M=2; 
elseif (MFlag_avg(4,1)/MFlag_avg(3,1))>4.5 || (MFlag_avg(4,1)/MFlag_avg(3,1))<1.4 
%     disp('Cargo is Organic/Hydrogenous'); 
    M=1; 
elseif sum(MFlag_avg(:,1))>50 
%     disp('Cargo is Organic/Hydrogenous'); 
    M=1; 
else 
%     disp('Cargo is Inorganic/Metallic'); 
    M=2; 
end 
  
return 
  
  264 
Correcting for inert, dense objects in containers 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%% Flag Algorithm for Explosives Detection  %% 
%%        Density Flag calculations          %% 
%%           Adrienne Lehnert                %% 
%%             April 20, 2011                %% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [status]=DensityFinal(AllFlags,M) 
Indep=zeros(6,5); 
Dep=zeros(6,5); 
  
% Get density-Indepdent flags 
if M==1 % get organic/hydrogenous density-independent flags 
    Indep(1,:)=AllFlags(137,:); 
    Indep(2,:)=AllFlags(139,:); 
    Indep(3,:)=AllFlags(142,:); 
    Indep(4,:)=AllFlags(146,:); 
    Indep(5,:)=AllFlags(149,:); 
    Indep(6,:)=AllFlags(151,:); 
end 
  
if M==2 % get metallic/inorganic flags 
    Indep(1,:)=AllFlags(167,:); 
    Indep(2,:)=AllFlags(168,:); 
    Indep(3,:)=AllFlags(169,:); 
    Indep(4,:)=AllFlags(172,:); 
    Indep(5,:)=AllFlags(173,:); 
    Indep(6,:)=AllFlags(174,:); 
end 
  
% Get density-dependent flags 
if M==1 % get organic/hydrogenous density-independent flags 
    Dep(1,:)=AllFlags(132,:); 
    Dep(2,:)=AllFlags(134,:); 
    Dep(3,:)=AllFlags(140,:); 
    Dep(4,:)=AllFlags(141,:); 
    Dep(5,:)=AllFlags(147,:); 
    Dep(6,:)=AllFlags(148,:); 
end 
  
if M==2 % get metallic/inorganic flags 
    Dep(1,:)=AllFlags(132,:); 
    Dep(2,:)=AllFlags(134,:); 
    Dep(3,:)=AllFlags(140,:); 
    Dep(4,:)=AllFlags(141,:); 
    Dep(5,:)=AllFlags(147,:); 
    Dep(6,:)=AllFlags(148,:); 
end 
  
[ri,ci]=size(Indep); 
[rd,cd]=size(Dep); 
Indep_avg=zeros(ri,1); % Initialize Trigger avg flag values 
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Dep_avg=zeros(rd,1); 
IndepPD=zeros(ri,ci);  % initiate percent difference matrix 
DepPD=zeros(rd,cd); 
  
for i=1:ri  % Calculate average values of trigger flags 
    Indep_avg(i,1)=mean(Indep(i,:)); 
    IndepPD(i,:)=abs(Indep(i,:)-Indep_avg(i,1))./Indep_avg(i,1); 
end 
for i=1:rd 
    Dep_avg(i,1)=mean(Dep(i,:)); 
    DepPD(i,:)=abs(Dep(i,:)-Dep_avg(i,1))./Dep_avg(i,1); 
end 
x=isnan(IndepPD); 
y=isnan(DepPD); 
Indep(x)=0; 
DepPD(y)=0; 
  
for j=1:6 
    IndepPD(j,:)=IndepPD(j,:)-min(IndepPD(j,:)); 
    DepPD(j,:)=DepPD(j,:)-min(DepPD(j,:)); 
end 
  
if mean(IndepPD)>mean(DepPD)  %% Determine if the object is explosive or benign 
    status=1; 
else 
    status=0; 
end 
  
return 
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10% Perturbation of Simulation Data (MATLAB) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Make new PHD data with up to 10% standard deviation       %% 
%                Adrienne Lehnert                                 %% 
%                     08/30/11                                     %% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
clear 
clc 
  
% fid1=fopen('tallyfiles.txt'); 
% fid2=fopen('PHDfiles.txt'); 
%  
% inputs1=textscan(fid1,'%s'); 
% inputs1=inputs1{1}; 
% inputs2=textscan(fid2,'%s'); 
% inputs2=inputs2{1}; 
% fclose(fid1); 
% fclose(fid2); 
% length(inputs1) 
% out=cell(1,20); 
  
% for k=1:length(inputs1) 
  
TrueTally=zeros(77,28,5);   % initialize array for tally data (detector tallies at 5 positions) 
TruePHD=zeros(1000,6,5);    % initialize array for PHD data (6 detectors at 5 positions) 
  
Input = csvread('P32V_tally.csv',0,0); 
Input2= csvread('P32V_nPHD.csv',0,0); 
TrueTally(:,:,1)=Input(1:77,1:28); 
TrueTally(:,:,2)=Input(78:154,1:28); 
TrueTally(:,:,3)=Input(155:231,1:28); 
TrueTally(:,:,4)=Input(232:308,1:28); 
TrueTally(:,:,5)=Input(309:385,1:28); 
TruePHD(:,:,1)=Input2(1:1000,1:6); 
TruePHD(:,:,2)=Input2(1001:2000,1:6); 
TruePHD(:,:,3)=Input2(2001:3000,1:6); 
TruePHD(:,:,4)=Input2(3001:4000,1:6); 
TruePHD(:,:,5)=Input2(4001:5000,1:6); 
  
n=4000; %%% Input the number of iterations with 10% standard deviation 
  
MeasTally=zeros(77,28,5,n); 
MeasPHD=zeros(1000,6,5,n); 
  
for i=1:n               %%% Create data with 10% standard deviation gaussian 
    R1=randn(77,14,5);  % random fluctuation in tally data 
    MeasTally(:,1:14,:,i)=TrueTally(:,1:14,:)+(TrueTally(:,1:14,:).*(R1.*0.1)); 
    MeasTally(:,15:28,:,i)=TrueTally(:,15:28,:); 
    R2=randn(1000,6,5); % random flucturation in PHD data 
    MeasPHD(:,:,:,i)=TruePHD+(TruePHD.*(R2.*0.1)); 
end 
  
MeasTally(77,:,:,:)=sum(MeasTally(1:76,:,:,:)); %%% Correct sum 
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%% Calculate the flag values and triggers for the original data 
TDATA=zeros(77,28,5); 
PHDData=zeros(1000,6,5); 
  
[FlagLabels,TrueFlags_s,TrueError]=AlgFlagMaker(TrueTally); 
[M_s]=MaterialFinal(TrueFlags_s); 
[TrueTriggersPD,r,TriggerLabels,TrueTrigErrorPD,Triggers,P_s,TV_s]=TriggerFinal(TrueFlags_s,
FlagLabels,TrueError,M_s); 
% 
[TrueTriggersPD,r,TriggerLabels,TrueTrigErrorPD,Triggers,P_s,TV_s]=TriggerFinal(TrueFlags_s,
FlagLabels,TrueError,2); 
  
[PHDFlags,PHDLabels]=PHDFlagMakerFINAL(TrueTally,TruePHD);  %% Calculate the values of 
all flags and return with labels 
[M_PHD,MFlag_PHDavg]=MaterialPHD(PHDFlags);             %% Find material type using non-
spectroscopic n flags 
[TrigPD_PHD,TriggerLabels_PHD,Triggers_PHD,P_PHD,TV_PHD]=TriggerPHD(PHDFlags,PHD
Labels,M_PHD); 
% 
[TrigPD_PHD,TriggerLabels_PHD,Triggers_PHD,P_PHD,TV_PHD]=TriggerPHD(PHDFlags,PHD
Labels,2); 
TVs_True=TV_s; 
P_True=P_PHD; 
TVphd_True=TV_PHD; 
r=size(TrigPD_PHD,1); 
  
%% initialize the variables for iterations of the noisy data 
MeasFlags_s=zeros(33,5,n); 
MeasError_s=zeros(33,5,n); 
MeasTrigPD_s=zeros(10,5,n); 
MeasTrigError_s=zeros(10,5,n); 
TriggerResults_s=zeros(n,2); 
pos_s=0; 
triggered_s=zeros(n,1); 
  
MeasFlags_PHD=zeros(26,5,n); 
MeasError_PHD=zeros(26,5,n); 
MeasTrigPD_PHD=zeros(r,5,n); 
MeasTrigError_PHD=zeros(r,5,n); 
TriggerResults_PHD=zeros(n,2); 
pos_PHD=0; 
triggered_PHD=zeros(n,1); 
  
%% Calculate the Flag values and triggers for each iteration 
M_spec=2; 
M_PHD=2; 
for i=1:n 
    TDATA=MeasTally(:,:,:,i); 
    PHDData=MeasPHD(:,:,:,i); 
  
    % Spectroscopic detection algorithm 
    [FlagLabels,AlgFlags,FlagError]=AlgFlagMaker(TDATA);    %% Calculate the values of all flags 
and return with labels 
    [M_spec,MFlag_avg]=MaterialFinal2(AlgFlags);            %% Find the material type using n 
spectroscopic flags 
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[TrigPD_s,r_s,TriggerLabels_s,TrigErrorPD_s,Triggers_s,P_s,TV_s,TriggerError_s]=TriggerFinal(
AlgFlags,FlagLabels,FlagError,M_spec); % Do the trigger calculations 
    MeasFlags_s(:,:,i)=AlgFlags; 
    MeasTrigPD_s(:,:,i)=TrigPD_s; 
    TriggerResults_s(i,1)=P_s; 
    TriggerResults_s(i,2)=TV_s; 
    if ((P_s==1 || P_s==5) && TV_s>0.2) || ((P_s==2 || P_s==3 || P_s==4) && TV_s>0.1) 
        [status_s]=DensityFinal(AlgFlags,M_spec); 
        triggered_s(pos_s+1)=P_s; 
        pos_s=pos_s+1; 
    end 
  
    % PHD detection algorithm 
    [PHDFlags,PHDLabels]=PHDFlagMakerFINAL(TDATA,PHDData);  %% Calculate the values 
of all flags and return with labels 
    [M_PHD,MFlag_PHDavg]=MaterialPHD(PHDFlags);             %% Find material type using non-
spectroscopic n flags 
    
[TrigPD_PHD,TriggerLabels_PHD,Triggers_PHD,P_PHD,TV_PHD]=TriggerPHD(PHDFlags,PHD
Labels,M_PHD); 
    MeasFlags_PHD(:,:,i)=PHDFlags; 
    MeasTrigPD_PHD(:,:,i)=TrigPD_PHD;       %% Problem here 
    TriggerResults_PHD(i,1)=P_PHD; 
    TriggerResults_PHD(i,2)=TV_PHD; 
    if ((P_PHD==1 || P_PHD==5) && TV_PHD>0.2) || ((P_PHD==2 || P_PHD==3 || P_PHD==4) 
&& TV_PHD>0.1) 
        [status_PHD]=DensityPHD(PHDFlags,M_PHD); 
        triggered_PHD(pos_PHD+1)=P_PHD; 
        pos_PHD=pos_PHD+1; 
    end 
  
  
end 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
